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Third-party intervention in civil wars is a phenomenon that presents a complex 
research puzzle in the fields of both International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA). While intervention decisions impact the duration and result of a given 
conflict, they also have broader regional implications and political consequences for 
those that intervene. Considering the significant role of the United States (US) in 
international politics and its political, economic, and military clout, the dynamics behind 
US interventions constitute a significant research area. 
The central questions this thesis aims to address are `what are the dynamics 
behind US foreign policy choices vis-à-vis Libya and Syria’s internationalised intra-
state conflicts?` and, more specifically, `What were the components that underpinned 
the selection of different set of elements from the intervention spectrum at different 
times and scales during the Libya and Syria conflicts`. To address these questions, 
small-N case study was used as the overarching methodology. The Libya and Syria 
conflicts provide valuable test cases to analyse the drivers behind the selective 
application of intervention in time, form, and scale by the US. 
The existing literature points towards the relevance of both systemic and 
domestic level factors. Neo-classical realism (NCR) is employed as the theoretical 
framework, and incorporates independent (threats to US interests vis-à-vis the Libya 
and Syria conflicts) and intervening variables (elite Ideology/Obama Doctrine, US 
economic constraints, US elite perception of the opposition in Libya and Syria, 
congressional dynamics and public opinion) at the system and unit levels 
respectively. The dependent variable - US foreign policy choices – varies across three 
main forms: non-intervention, non-military intervention, and military intervention. 
iv 
 
NCR has proven to be a comprehensive theoretical framework to understand the 
rationale behind the US`s suboptimal foreign policy choices. The results of the 
research conducted here reinforce the notion that it is problematic to explain foreign 
policy decisions exclusively from the perspective of a balancing against power or 
threats without considering the impact of intervening variables at the domestic level. 
The research also underpins the importance of political leaders and elites’ perceptions 
(regarding opposition groups as well as of domestic political restraints) through which 
systemic incentives and constraints are filtered and the contours of interests and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 The ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa that started 
in late 2010 and early 2011 against the corruption, poverty, and political repression 
that exemplified the autocratic regimes in the region brought regime change in Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya, and triggered the birth of a wide range of social movements in 
Bahrain and Yemen. Conversely, relatively few implications were seen in Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia, where the administrations were compelled to introduce socio-economic 
and political reforms to placate internal unrest. The positions taken by regional actors 
and global powers during the uprisings had profound repercussions for those states 
experiencing turmoil and for the wider Middle East and North Africa region. The US 
acquiesced in uprisings against pro-US Egyptian and Tunisian governments, militarily 
intervened in Libya against the Qaddafi regime at the early stages of the conflict, 
exercised a cautious approach in Syria by supporting political reform initially and 
providing limited support to political and armed opposition groups fighting against the 
Assad regime, and condoned Saudi-led suppression of the uprisings in Bahrain that 
threatened the pro-US Kingdom. US motives urging selective, distinct, and tailored 
approaches to those turmoils poses a crucial research puzzle.  
 Third-party intervention into civil wars in general and US intervention in particular 
is a phenomenon widely researched by scholars within the fields of both International 
Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Scholars have attempted to explore 
the factors that drive the decisions behind third-party intervention by exploring external 
determinants (i.e. the international system and the relative position of the intervener) 
and internal determinants (i.e. the intervener`s domestic politics). The research 
question this PhD addresses concerns dynamics behind US foreign policy choices vis-




to identify the underlying components of the processes and causal mechanisms that 
led to the US selecting elements from the intervention spectrum that differed in terms 
of both time and scale in the interventions in Libya and Syria. The conflicts in Libya 
and Syria have given rise to intervention strategies that differ in terms of form and 
scale; the absence of a direct US military action against the Assad regime constitutes 
a crucial research puzzle worthy of investigation.  
 These two conflicts were selected as cases for several reasons. First and 
foremost, both conflicts represent a narrowly-scoped subclass of the general 
intervention phenomenon; among the `Arab Spring` uprisings only those in Libya and 
Syria turned into `internationalised civil wars` involving an armed struggle between the 
incumbent governments and rebel forces and which saw third party intervention in 
support of belligerents. At the early stages of the uprisings the crackdown of the 
protestors by armed forces transformed the political uprisings into armed struggle. The 
presence of weapons of mass destruction, emerging ungoverned spaces and power 
vacuums, increasing threat of terrorism, and humanitarian crises (in the form of 
refugees, internally displaced people and civilian casualties) became a source of 
concern for the international community. The potential spill over effects engulfing the 
Middle East and North Africa region and even reaching to Europe stimulated 
international actors to get involved and take action, one way or another.  The Libyan 
and Syrian regimes were both non-democratic and both monopolised political power, 
exploited national resources and pursued anti-western foreign policy agendas that 
provided incentives for other actors` intervention.  The comparison of the US response 
to two Arab Spring uprisings will potentially help us to better explain factors 




 John Gerring (2004) defines a case study as “a work that focuses its attention on 
a single example of a broader phenomenon”. The aim is to grasp the common 
attributes of the phenomenon through in-depth analysis of a single unit (Gerring, 
2004). The broader phenomenon in this research is `US interventions’, while Libya 
and Syria constitute the units to be probed.   Gary Thomas sees the case study as a 
focus that provides an in-depth and multi-angled perspective. He defines case study 
work as: 
the analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, 
institutions or other systems which are studied holistically by one or more 
methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a 
class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame – an object – within 
which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates 
(Thomas, 2011:23). 
 
  Thus, the Libya and Syria cases will be explored to understand the driving forces 
behind the US`s selective application of intervention in time, form and scale. That 
necessitates exploring the dynamics that influence the US decision about whether or 
not to intervene in the first place and after the principal decision is made what the level 
of ambition and commitment should be. While there are many large-N empirical 
analyses of the dynamics influential in intervention decisions for civil wars, small-N 
qualitative case studies have been underexplored in the existing literature.  
  Apart from the Arab Spring uprisings, intrastate conflicts in general and civil 
wars in particular constitute a significant aspect of international politics. Since the end 
of World War II there has been a steady increase in the number of intrastate conflicts. 
Even though there has been a period of decline since the mid-1990s, the majority of 
conflicts have still been intrastate. In 2014, 39 of the 40 active conflicts were fought 




of these conflicts were internationalised with  intervention from other states in the form 
of troops (Themner and Wallensteen, 2013).  
 










Figure 2 Number of Conflicts in 2014 by Type 
Data Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/ Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) 

















 Intrastate conflicts are defined as conflicts that occur between or among two or 
more groups within the internationally recognised territory of a state. The sub-
categories for intrastate conflicts are mainly civil wars and inter-communal conflicts. 
Civil wars are characterized by the involvement of government forces against non-
state actor(s) whilst inter-communal conflicts, meanwhile, involve two or more non-
state groups (Sarkees, Wayman, & Singer, 2003). Within that characterisation Libya 
and Syria conflicts fall under the criteria of an `internationalised civil war`.  
 Technical specifications and definitions for civil wars differ in various research 
designs in the literature which has crucial implications, particularly for large-N 
empirical studies. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) (cited in Derouen & Sobek, 2004) 
define civil war as a conflict that: inflicts at least 1,000 conflict deaths; challenges the 
existence of the sovereign state in which the conflict occurs; and involves the state 
and opposing rebels launching a campaign that inflicts casualties as well. Sambanis 
also refers to Small and Singer`s (1982) (cited in Sambanis, 2004, p.816) definition of 
civil war as "any armed conflict that involves military action internal to the metropole, 
the active participation of the national government, and effective resistance by both 
sides."  
 Regan defines intrastate conflict as armed, sustained combat between groups 
within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities (Regan, 1996), 
whereas the widely used Correlates of War dataset criteria is 1000 fatalities per year 
(Regan, 2002) and  UCDP-PRIO dataset criteria is 25 conflict related death in a given 
year (Kreutz, 2010).  
 The narrow and broadly scoped definitions of foreign intervention range from 




those that conceptualize intervention more broadly to include economic, logistical, and 
diplomatic assistance or sanctions applied to influence the outcome of the conflict. 
 In a recent study that sought to analyse how foreign assistance to one or both 
sides in a civil war influences the dynamics of the conflict, Lockyer defines foreign 
intervention as “the transfer of resources from an external state to a contesting party 
in a civil war.” Resources are broadly defined as the transfer of funds, arms, equipment 
and foreign troops (Lockyer, 2011). Seeking to identify the conditions under which 
foreign countries intervene in civil wars, Woo defines foreign intervention as “the active 
and overt involvement of a country in foreign civil wars through the deployment of 
troops or naval or air forces, as well as through the provision of logistical aid, military 
advisers, or military forces.” (Woo, 2009). Chang and Sanders go further, to perceive 
enforcement of targeted arms trade sanctions upon the rebel group as a form of 
intervention (Chang & Sanders, 2009). Yoon`s understanding of US intervention in 
civil wars encompasses both non-military and military activities, ranging from 
economic assistance, arms supply, deployment of advisers and troops in combat role 
into a war zone, to direct military engagement in a combat operation (Yoon, 1997).  
 James Rosenau also makes a distinction between non-military and military 
intervention and introduces two criteria for an action to be considered an intervention: 
convention-breaking and an authority-oriented act. In that context Rosenau describes 
interventionist behaviour as: 
Constitute[ing] a sharp break with then-existing forms and […] directed at 
changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target 
society.  (Rosenau, 1969) 
 
 For this research, third-party intervention is conceived broadly as not only the 
exertion of military power, but also economic, logistical, and diplomatic assistance or 




to those the Libya and Syria conflicts meets the criteria outlined by James Rosenau 
and can thus be defined as an intervention.  
Understanding the US`s externally-driven interests as the primary motivation for 
intervention falls short of offering a convincing explanation for the variation in the US`s 
response to similar or different situations. This thesis seeks to address that 
shortcoming; to do so requires an analysis of the “domestic environment in which 
foreign policy is formulated” (Yoon, 1997). Thus, this research utilises neo-classical 
realism (NCR) as the theoretical framework to systematically analyse domestic and 
external factors and their interplay in accounting for foreign policy decisions1.   
The thesis also contributes to the literature by incorporating domestic level 
intervening variables as part of an application of NCR.  NCR is employed as the 
theoretical framework by incorporating independent variables (namely, threats to US 
interests vis-à-vis the Libya and Syria conflicts) and intervening variables (namely, 
elite ideology/Obama doctrine, US economic constraints, US elite perception of the 
opposition in Libya and Syria, Congressional dynamics and public opinion) at the 
system and unit levels respectively. The variation in the dependent variable that 
represents American foreign policy choices/outcomes is broken down to non-
intervention, non-military intervention, and military intervention with specific sub 
elements.  
 The intervention literature refers to a multitude of factors as potential drivers for 
intervention. Amber Aubone`s survey of the intervention literature (Aubone, 2013) 
highlights the influence of both system and domestic level drivers. This bolsters the 
appropriateness of using NCR to explore a state’s intervention decision 
                                                          




Empirical studies of US interventions have several limitations: Firstly, most      
large-N studies consider intervention on the basis of a narrowly scoped definition that 
refers simply to the use of troops and direct military engagement in combat operations. 
Secondly, most of those studies ignore the fact that the motivation of the intervener 
may change over time during the protracted conflicts (Mullenbach & Matthews, 2008) 
(this was for the most part the case for Syria, as we will see). Thirdly, there is a lack 
of consensus on: the criteria by which the conflicts are sub-divided into subcategories; 
key parameters that define the common framework for intrastate conflicts; and missing 
variables that could not be incorporated into the models because of unavailable data 
may result in contradictory conclusions.  
To mitigate these limitations, the thesis explores military intervention, but also 
non-military forms of intervention such as diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, 
arms embargoes, the provision of training, weapons, and equipment to warring parties, 
and the sharing of intelligence. The temporal analysis of the cases and the US 
response to changing dynamics allows for an exploration of the shifts in the motivation 
of the intervener. In depth analysis of the cases helps to identify the most significant 
drivers of intervention and the way these factors influence the intervention decision, 
but does so in a way that avoids being bound by the limitations of the data sets 
available. In depth analysis of the cases also provides further data that can inform 
future large-N research.  
  The existing literature on the decisions underpinning US interventions in civil 
wars by and large takes into consideration both external and internal factors. Brands` 
research exploring  US military interventions in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and 
Grenada identifies regional instability, the influence of a malign rival, threats to US 




determinants (Brands, 1987). Fordham, meanwhile,  explores the relationship 
between two of the most important factors underpinning US interventions, namely 
security concerns and economic interests (Fordham, 2008). 
 Yoon`s empirical research explores US interventions in internal conflicts that 
occurred between 1945 and 1989. It takes into consideration strategic security 
interests, economic interests, public opinion, the electoral cycle, and the state of the 
US economy as domestic variables.  Yoon’s research suggests that strategic interests 
are the driving factors, while domestic factors (except for public opinion) serve as 
limiting factors of US intervention (Yoon, 1997) Ostrom and Job also empirically 
explore the probability of the US use of force by operationalising variables in the  
international, domestic and political arenas (Ostrom & Job, 1986). 
 However, up until now only a few qualitative studies attempted to employ NCR.  
Colin Dueck’s model of US military intervention stands out in particular. Dueck’s model 
takes into consideration national interests and potential threats to those interests on 
the one hand and domestic political incentives and constraints on the other in order to 
explain and predict why and how the US engages in military interventions. With 
regards to the Libya and Syria conflicts, there has been a significant gap in the 
analyses and understandings of the US foreign policy dynamics and decisions 
underpinning the intervention. Kevin Marsh analysed why and how the Obama 
Administration intervened in Libya in his qualitative research by using Dueck`s NCR 
model (Marsh, 2014). James Sperling analysed the different levels of commitment of 
the UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy in contributing to Operation Unified 
Protector during the Libya intervention by using NCR as a theoretical framework 
(Sperling, 2016). However, qualitative analysis of the US intervention in Syria from the 




 In this research Dueck`s model was employed to explore the influence of both 
national interests and the political constraints and incentives on the US foreign policy 
choices.  The model required a comprehensive analysis of US interests vis-à-vis the 
Libya and Syria conflicts as a starting point. The analysis of those interests exclusively 
yields to expected or optimum US foreign policy choices that should have been 
pursued as the overarching US policies. However, understanding the difference 
between the expected or optimum US foreign policies and those that were put in 
practice during the course of the conflict necessitates the incorporation of domestic 
variables.  
 The analytical examination of Libya and Syria conflicts revealed the fact that pure 
neorealism falls short of explaining US foreign policy decisions. The neorealist 
explanation, which focuses on national interest and threats to those interests, could 
by and large explain and predict expected US foreign policy decisions in Libya. 
However, there was a contradiction between expected and observed US foreign policy 
decisions during distinct episodes of the Syria conflict. While the threat perception to 
US interests in Syria was higher compared to Libya, US intervention was limited in 
form and scope. So the incongruence between expected and observed foreign policy 
decisions in Syria and the contradiction between Libya and Syria cases prove the 
deficiency of neorealism as a theory of foreign policy analysis. This analytical gap 
could be filled by incorporating intervening variables to explain the deviation from 
expected foreign policy choices. 
 As a conclusion, the intervention decision for Libya was predominantly taken out 
of US strategic interests and threats to those interests (H1) and the intervening 
variables influenced and limited the scope of the military intervention (H2) which 




particularly the Obama Doctrine and the perception of the opposition in Syria seemed 
to have affected the form and the scope of the intervention options chosen by the US 
administration; the intervening variables sufficiently explain the deviation from 
expected and optimal US foreign policy choices. Thus, the analytical evidence 
supports the hypothesis and renders NCR as a viable theory for foreign policy analysis 
by confirming H2 for both Libya and Syria cases.  
 With regards to the distinct interpretation of NCR, the Libya case confirms semi-
orthodox interpretations of NCR that considers external drivers as the primary driver 
of intervention decision, whereas domestic constraints have a secondary influence by 
limiting the form and the scale of intervention. US response to Syria confirms the 
orthodox interpretation of NCR, which posits that domestic constraints interfere when 
states diverge from the incentives of the international system.   
NCR has thus proven to be a comprehensive theoretical framework to 
understand the dynamics behind the suboptimal foreign policy choices of the US 
administration. The results of this research reinforce NCR applicability as a theory of 
foreign policy analysis and, in particular, highlights the role of foreign policy 
executives` perceptions and their interpretation of national interests, threats and other 
systemic incentives and constraints. 
With regards to the methodology employed, the use of process tracing helped to 
identify different elements of the causal chain that led to particular foreign policy 
outcomes in the Libya and Syria conflicts. The congruence methodology proved a 
powerful tool to test NCR theory, as it was employed in conjunction with process 
tracing.  
The analytical insights of this research are mainly extracted from an in-depth 




Obama`s speeches, US Congressional records, US Secretary of State, Secretary of 
Defence and top Generals` testimonies at Senate and the US House Committees on 
Foreign Relations and Armed Services, the memoirs of key Administration officials, 
speeches of former ambassadors, official documents and reports, research papers, 
books, and media accounts.  
The qualitative analysis of those sources is triangulated and corroborated with 
structured interviews conducted with subject matter experts, academics and officials 
to probe further insights regarding the US foreign policy making process and how that 
process could have worked throughout the Libya and Syria conflicts. The interviews 
are not the primary sources of the research, rather they are complementary to the 
analytical research. The interviews are used to support or challenge the insights 
derived from primary and secondary data. Interview questions which encapsulate the 
independent and intervening variables and their potential influence on the dependent 
variable are presented in Appendix A and Appendix B. The second version of the 
interview questions represent the revised questions to reflect a shift in the theoretical 
framework.  The limitations of structured interviews are mitigated by the selection of 
open-ended questions to give maximum flexibility to the interviewees in expressing 
their ideas comprehensively. Aberbach and Rockman underline the importance of 
open-ended question in interviews to reach an analytically elegant end-product and to 
increase the validity of a given study (Aberbach and  Rockman, 2002). 
 As suggested by Gideon Rose, “significant area expertise is critical for an 
accurate understanding of countries` foreign policy behaviour” (Rose, 1998). The 
composition of the interviewees including US citizens with a profound expertise in 
Middle East and North Africa affairs were instrumental in painting an as accurate as 




 The interviewees are chosen from Libya and Syria subject matter experts from 
NATO, national intelligence services, and academics working on US foreign policy and 
the Middle East and North Africa regions. NATO experts have been following the 
political, economic, and security situation in Libya or Syria even before conflicts 
emerged. The US initiated, and later NATO mandated, operations in Libya provided a 
comprehensive understanding of the internal and international dynamics of the 
conflict. Similarly, US efforts to take action for the Syria crisis from the beginning and 
preparation for contingency planning for a potential NATO operation in Syria made it 
possible for the analysts to be kept up to date about the actors and factors affecting 
the dynamics of the conflict. Thus, NATO experts were a proven valuable source who 
could provide useful perspective pertinent to the prevailing conditions and conflict 
characteristics that led to different forms of intervention. Considering different sort of 
intervention strategies followed by the US and keeping military intervention on the 
table depending on the changing situation on the ground and regional implications 
observed during the course of the conflict kept NATO vigilant and prepared for a 
potential mandate.    
 Bearing in mind the risks of attribution of personal opinion to institutions and 
nations, coupled with the sensitivities concerning ongoing conflicts, it was left to the 
interviewees` discretion whether or not to remain anonymous. Any reference to those 
individuals who opted to remain anonymous was made via numeric reference 
throughout the research. The list of interviewees along with associated restricted 







Structure of the thesis 
 The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical 
and methodological framework. The chapter starts by exploring the literature on NCR 
and its application in various studies. It examines the main strands in NCR and then 
considers a NCR model for military interventions. The chapter presents a NCR model 
encompassing independent, intervening, and dependent variables to explain US 
foreign policy vis-à-vis the Libya and Syria interventions. The chapter also outlines 
how process tracing is employed to analyse the cases and identify different elements 
of the causal chain that led to particular foreign policy decisions, and the way the 
congruence method is employed to test NCR theory with case studies.  
 Chapter 3 examines the historic US relationship with both the Libyan and Syrian 
regimes in order to provide a baseline context for the detailed analysis of the 
independent, intervening, and dependent variables. 
 Chapter 4 is the first part of the qualitative analyses and focuses on the 
international dynamics underpinning US decisions on the Libya and Syria conflicts. 
The chapter starts with the identification of US interests concerning security, 
prosperity, values and international order with regards to Libya and Syria conflicts. The 
chapter then explores threats to those interests to establish a baseline of expected US 
foreign policy decisions with regards to US intervention options to Libya and Syria 
conflicts. 
 Chapter 5 constitutes the second part of the analytical effort and examines the 
potential impact of domestic constraints or incentives on US decision making along 
the lines of four intervening variables: the Obama Doctrine, US economic constraints, 





 Chapter 6 outlines the analytical outcome of the research by explaining the 
essential elements of the causal chains that resulted in particular US foreign policy 
outcomes vis-à-vis the Libya and Syria conflicts. The chapter starts with the Libya 
case, followed by Syria, and is completed by a comparison of the two. 
 Finally, Chapter 7 summarises theoretical conclusions supported by brief 
analytical discussions extracted from the cases. It also discusses limitations 
encountered during the research, suggestions for further research, and potential 





Chapter 2 Neoclassical Realism Framework and Methodology 
 
The objective of this thesis is to shed light on the foreign policy dynamics that 
were decisive in the US response to the civil wars in Libya and Syria. It contributes to 
an understanding of third-party interventions in civil wars and US interventions in 
particular. In this context, analysing the Libyan and Syrian civil wars provides an 
opportunity to test the explanatory power of NCR, help establish its limits, and also to 
develop a comprehensive understanding of US foreign policy dynamics with regards 
to military intervention as a foreign policy tool. A combination of a congruence method 
and theory oriented process tracing will be applied to conduct within-case and cross 
case analysis for the Libya and Syria conflicts.  
 To test the theory I will use Stephen Van Evera`s three steps as a scheme: This 
involves: 1) explaining the theory; 2) outlining the expected outcome driven by the 
theory; and 3) exploring the cases and checking if congruence between expectation 
and observation is present (Evera, 1997). This chapter first explores the literature on 
NCR and its application in various studies. This is followed by a proposed NCR model 
encompassing independent, intervening, and dependent variables to explain US 
foreign policy vis-à-vis the Libya and Syria civil wars. Finally, the way process tracing 
and congruence method is employed to analyse the cases and test NCR is outlined.  
 
2.1 Neo-Classical Realism (NCR)   
 
Brian Rathbun argues that NCR is a logical extension of neorealism, and 
incorporates ideas and domestic politics into the analysis to explain the underlying 




incentives of the international system (Rathbun, 2008). Similar to Rathbun, a 
significant amount of research using NCR strives to explain the state`s foreign policy 
divergence from the neorealist predictions with reference to the intervening role of 
domestic political pressures between foreign policy choices and structural premises 
(Fordham, 2009,p.253). For example, Thomas Juneau develops a variant of 
neoclassical realism, a theory of foreign policy mistakes, to explore the causes and 
consequences of Iranian action. Juneau provides “a framework differentiating between 
ideal, optimal foreign policy — which responds solely to structural pressures and 
incentives — and actual, suboptimal choices, which arise following the filtering effect 
of domestic pathologies” (Juneau, 2015, p.4). To provide a more accurate explanation 
of foreign policy choices in Iran, Juneau introduces three intervening variables: 1) 
status (to which the state aspires: great or regional power); 2) regime identity (national 
identity and strategic culture), and; 3) factional politics (factional and/or bureaucratic 
competition) (Juneau, 2015, p.41). 
Thus, NCR attempts to expand upon neorealism and fill an explanatory gap by 
incorporating state-level factors as mediating or intervening variables between the 
imperatives of the international system and state behaviour (Quinn, 2013). Ripsman, 
Taliaferro and Lobell situate NCR as both a framework for explaining foreign policy 
choices of a state deviating from neorealist premises and as a distinct theory that 
provides an additional explanatory framework for why a certain foreign policy was 
pursued (Ripsman et al., 2009,p.285,287), but argue that it doesn’t necessarily imply 
a complete departure from neorealist predictions. 
Before getting into the details of NCR it is worth discussing, albeit briefly, the 
theory of neorealism itself. Structural realists advocate that prevailing anarchy stems 




environment in which each state aims to maximise its relative power to counterbalance 
its  opponents for the sake of maintaining security. While defensive realism sees states 
as security maximizers, offensive realism argues states are power maximizers. 
Defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz claim that states are satisfied when they 
obtain enough power to ensure their security and survival, whereas offensive realists 
like John Mearsheimer argue that states are willing to acquire as much power as 
possible and make use of any opportunity to alter the existing distribution of power in 
their favour (Dunne and  Schmidt, 2014).  
Waltz`s balance of power theory has been challenged by Stephen M. Walt`s 
balance of threat theory, which postulates that ‘power’ alone cannot explain state`s 
balancing behaviour and proposes ‘threat’ and ‘proximity’ as additional factors that 
need to be taken into consideration. Therefore, balance-of-threat theory incorporates 
power, geography, offensive capabilities, and intentions to explain the balancing 
behaviour of states in the international system. While balance-of-power theory predicts 
that states will confront the strongest state in the system, balance-of-threat theory 
predicts they will mobilise internal sources and/or  externally seek alliances against 
the most threatening (Walt, 1997). The main distinction Walt introduces is the idea that 
threat perception is shaped by other states' perceived intentions (Walt, 1992) in 
addition to capabilities. According to Walt, states balance against different kinds of 
threats, not just power alone (Walt, 1988).  
In this regard Steve Yetiv`s research on the US’s role in the Middle East explores 
American  foreign policy with regards to Iran, Iraq, and Russia and tests two strands 
of neorealism: balance of power and balance of threat. The results suggest that in US 
foreign policy, balancing regional threats has taken precedence over balancing against 




Yetiv reiterated his conviction that the US has rarely practiced balancing policy in the 
Middle East and balance of power is one of the last things the US is thinking about 
with regard to these states.  
As neo-realists disregard domestic factors there is growing body of research that 
suggests that the relative position of a state in the international system is not sufficient 
to explain foreign policy choices. Robert D. Putnam uses the metaphor of the two-level 
game that decision-makers play at the domestic and international level in an attempt 
to reconcile both simultaneously. In addition to the international position of a state,  
decision makers take into consideration public opinion and elections, on the one hand, 
as domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations, and parties, 
social classes, interest groups, legislators, and executive officials as the sub-state 
actors, on the other (Putnam, 1988). 
Having briefly examined neorealism, in this section I will endeavour to explore 
what NCR provides analytically as a theoretical framework. NCR, firstly developed by 
Gideon Rose, aims to explain the causal relationship between particular foreign policy 
choices of a state (as the dependent variable) with reference to both relative power in 
the international system (as the independent variable) and domestic factors (as 
intervening variables). Rose acknowledges the role of systemic pressures and 
incentives as the primary drivers, particularly relative to material power and the 
position of a state in the international system, but also underlines the importance of 
elite perceptions by stating: 
There is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities 
to foreign policy behaviour. Foreign policy choices are made by actual political 






So decision makers` perceptions filter systemic pressures/incentives and 
translate these into foreign policy decisions. Rose explains that process as a causal 
chain between independent, intervening and dependent variables that allows one to 
gauge the impact of intervening variables over structural empirical predictions (Rose, 
1998). The central question at this point is what weight should be given to intervening 
unit–level variables in the decision making process for US intervention. 
Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaffero suggest leaders` assessment of relative power 
and other state`s intentions set parameters for how states define their interests and 
that NCR is thus a valuable framework to explain variation in the foreign policies of a 
state over time (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, 2009,p.25,26). The link between 
defining the boundaries of national interests and leaders` assessment of relative 
power and other state`s intentions is important to be able to understand the systemic 
influencers of foreign policy.  
Particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the move from bi-polarity to 
uni-polarity relieved the international constraints on the US, which resulted in greater 
leeway in making foreign policy decisions. With little risk of an effective 
counterbalancing or lack of  imminent threat stemming from a nation state (Ripsman 
et al., 2009,p.295) the US was expected to “act in an unconstrained manner and 
without the fear of retaliation” (Lobell, 2009,p.48). That is visible in the greater number 
of military interventions the US has undertaken since the 1990s.  
  Robert Jervis defines uni-polarity as “a system in which one state has 
significantly more capabilities than any other” and, in broader terms, as “a system in 
which the uni-pole’s security and perhaps other values cannot be threatened by 
others”. Jervis attributes changing US foreign policy from one administration to the 




the increasing impact of non-state actors and other counterbalancing mechanisms like 
nuclear weapons and terrorist groups. So, while the US was still concerned about 
preventing the rise of a peer competitor, it was also  determined  to counter trans-
national terrorism, maintain an open international economic system, and ensure the 
prevalence of certain international norms (Jervis, 2009). In that context it is safe to 
suggest that foreign policy decisions of US foreign policy executives (FPE) are 
conditioned first by perceptions regarding the status of the balance of power/threat in 
the international system, which in turn shapes security interest perceptions; and 
second, by  the constraints and inducements emanating from domestic level factors in 
foreign policy decision making processes (Lobell, 2009,p.64).  
There are various schools of NCR, which differ in their interpretation of the 
independent variable as the basis of analysis. According to the mainstream and 
original school pioneered by Gideon Rose, the independent variable is power and 
power shapes the parameters of state foreign policy (some other researchers use 
threat as the independent variable) (Thomas Juneau, 2016). Others start the analysis 
by defining and prioritising national interests and the threats to those interests within 
the current structure of the international system (Kitchen, 2010).  Colin Dueck puts 
forward a framework to specifically analyse intervention decisions and outlines how, 
why, and the extent to which domestic politics matters in shaping US military 
interventions abroad while leaders seek to pursue national security interests. He 
argues that international systemic pressures are the most important cause behind 
foreign policy behaviour of particular states, but only because of their mediating effects 
on unit-level variables such as elite perceptions and domestic political conditions 
(Dueck, 2009,p.141,145,150) According to this model, when facing the possibility of 




interests, particularly security interests of the US, and potential threats to those 
interests. Subsequently, when they perceive severe external threats to vital interests, 
domestic political incentives and constraints condition the scope and scale of the 
intervention (Dueck, 2009,p.139,148).  
 The most challenging step in NCR analysis is defining the right set of intervening 
variables. Studies utilising NCR as a theoretical framework provide valuable 
alternatives for the selection of intervening variables. So, in this part I will briefly look 
into research that has focused on NCR as a theoretical framework. Tudor Oneo 
categorises different approaches to NCR according to the weight the researchers 
attribute to intervening variables. He labels his categories: orthodox, semi-orthodox 
and revivalist. The orthodox interpretation posits that domestic variables interfere only 
when states diverge from the incentives of the international system. Alternatively, the 
semi-orthodox interpretation acknowledges the foreign policy choices of a state as 
being guided first and foremost by a state’s relative power, capability or influence and 
attributes a limited role to domestic politics. The revivalist approach, meanwhile, 
challenges the supremacy of the international system and prioritises the influence of 
domestic factors and actors as the primary drivers of foreign policy (Onea, 2012).  
Lorenzo Cladi and Mark Webber deploy an ‘orthodox` interpretation  of NCR to 
understand a country’s foreign policy divergence from systemic incentives with 
reference to variables located at the domestic level. In their research on Italian foreign 
policy in the post-cold war period the authors subsumed elite perceptions, distribution 
of political power and government instability as intervening variables into their analysis 
to understand how Italy responded to systemic incentives and formulised its foreign 
policy (Cladi and  Webber, 2011). This model is suitable to analyse a country`s general 




falls short of giving enough analytical depth to understanding specific policies and 
choices of a state with regards to intervention.  
As mentioned above, NCR`s perspective on military intervention is explained by 
Dueck, who stresses the importance of how state elites perceive national interests.  
Here, decisions on military intervention or non-intervention are contextualised through 
national interests under domestic political considerations and constraints. These 
constraints are expected to constrain and influence the form, timing and the scale of 
an  intervention (Dueck, 2009,p.139). Kevin Marsh used this model to analyse why the 
Obama administration intervened in the Libyan civil war in 2011.  The author examined 
the interplay between the US security interest in Libya (regional stability, energy 
security, values, international order) and domestic constraints or factors (the fiscal and 
economic crisis, military overstretch, US public opinion/war weariness, divided 
Congress, President and his advisor`s perceptions). Marsh concludes that NCR 
proved valuable in the analysis of military interventions to understand how systemic-
level factors drive military intervention while domestic politics and elite perceptions 
constrain the nature of the intervention (Marsh, 2014). Marsh`s model is tailored and 
fit for the purpose of analysing intervention decisions as part of a country`s FPA. 
However, the intervening variable `President and his advisor`s perceptions` is too 
general and requires further analyses of the President`s and his advisors perceptions 
with regards to national interests, threats to those interests, and conflict itself. This 
blurs the line between independent variable and intervening variables. Moreover, this 
model does not take into consideration the perception of the President and his 
advisors vis-à-vis rebels, which is the crucial element in the context of civil war.  
Other research that uses NCR as a theoretical framework analyses US ‘Dual 




The research underlines the value of using NCR, which balances both regional and 
international inter-state dynamics and domestic level constraints to explain particular 
foreign policy choices, namely perceptions of power and threat, domestic institutions, 
and interest groups (Edwards, 2013). Similar to Marsh, Edwards handle `perceptions 
of power and threat` as an intervening variable that is situated in relation to the 
dependent variable, `interests and distribution of power within the international 
system`. Zenonas Tziarras uses NCR to explore Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Middle East since 2002. Tziarras considers `elite ideology` and `domestic interest 
groups` as intervening variables at the domestic or unit level to explain the variation 
of TFP behaviour (revisionism or status quo), within the framework of system level 
independent variables, `relative power changes`, `external threat perceptions` and 
`international economic interdependence`. Tziarras concludes that system-level 
drivers and international power relations play the primary role in conjunction with unit-
level variables in shaping and causing shifts in foreign policy  (Tziarras, 2014). 
Tziarras`s choice of independent variables focuses on security and economic interest 
conceptions of Turkey. For the US this requires a tailored approach, as the US is a 
global power assuming broader responsibilities, which means taking into 
consideration other elements of national interest like `values` and ̀ international order`.  
Jason W. Davidson uses NCR theory to explain why the UK, France and Italy`s 
support for US led military operations abroad varies. He does so by analysing 
international level power and security imperatives and domestic politics. Davidson`s 
NCR conceptualisation starts with the basic neorealist assumption that expects states 
to maximise their relative power and security under the incentives of an anarchic 
international system. Davidson`s NCR frame work focuses on three domestic 




threat to national interest and prestige, public opinion, and electoral relevance 
(Davidson, 2011).  
James Sperling uses NCR to analyse variance in British, Canadian, French, 
German and Italian responses to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 
1973 and the varying levels of willingness to contribute to Operation Unified Protector 
during the Libya intervention. As the analytical starting point, the author`s model takes 
exogenous shifts in the relative distribution of the global and regional balance of power 
as the independent variable. Sperling introduces four distinct intervening variables: 
material interests (oil and gas supplies, bilateral investment and trading, mass 
migration); constraints on extraction and mobilisation of capabilities; domestic political 
context (public opinion, electoral cycle, and vulnerability of government); national 
security culture (the lens through which national authorities view the structural position 
of the state) (Sperling, 2016). Given that it takes the electoral cycle into account, 
Sperling`s approach is a crucial element applicable to US FPA with regards to Libya 
and Syria as Congressional and Presidential elections have the potential to influence 
the nature and timing of intervention decisions.  
As opposed to scholars that prioritise the importance of international level 
incentives, there is some literature, including that from Randall Schweller, which 
advocates a revivalist strand and provides an NCR explanation of the under balancing 
behaviours of states. Schweller`s revivalist interpretation of NCR identifies the 
influence of domestic factors and actors as the primary drivers of foreign policy. The 
author posits that domestic variables thwart balance of power predictions and 
constrain the foreign policy options of states. Schweller looks at four domestic 
variables: elite consensus (disagreement) about the nature and extent of the threat; 




of political survival); elite cohesion (the degree of fragmentation among political 
leadership over ideological, religious, cultural, ethnic differences, and diverging 
interests); and social cohesion (relative strength of ties that bind individuals and 
groups together) (Schweller, 2008). While Schweller proposes exploring exclusively 
domestic variables, he cannot escape from indirectly looking at the international 
dimension. `Elite consensus (disagreement) about the nature and extent of the threat` 
takes international dynamics into account from the perspective of elites. So, the 
combination of a model probing external and internal factors seem to be a viable model 
for US FPA. Several other qualitative and quantitative research reinforce that 
predisposition.  
For example, Luca Tardelli analyses US military interventions in internal conflicts 
with a specific emphasis on elites and domestic politics. His  research highlights the 
dual nature of political elites and elite dynamics connecting international and domestic 
politics (Tardelli, 2013). Tardelli perceives `orthodox` interpretation of NCR to explain 
deviation of US foreign policy from neorealist expectations. 
Amber Aubone posits third-party military intervention as a foreign policy tool used 
by leaders to achieve desired ends and underlines the importance of taking domestic 
politics of the intervening state into consideration. Aubone examines the factors 
employed by various scholars seeking to explain when and why the US militarily 
intervenes in civil conflicts.  This research categorises the determinants of intervention 
into two groups: external and internal. External determinants refer to international 
systemic (balance-of-power) factors, relations between the intervener and target state, 
parity of government – rebel forces and head of state`s perception of the conflict and 




capabilities, socio-economic conditions, domestic politics, processes, structures and 
presidents` perception of threats (Aubone, 2013). 
Paul K. Huth also argues in his empirical analysis of major power interventions 
between 1918 and 1988 that a realist approach can be strengthened by incorporating 
how the domestic political concerns of state leaders may influence their foreign policy 
decisions (Huth, 1998). 
At the beginning of this research, I started with the mainstream NCR School 
pioneered by Gideon Rose, which prioritises the relative power of a state within the 
international structure as a determinant of the parameters of a state`s foreign policy. 
However, in depth analysis of US relative power vis à vis Libya and Syria proved 
insufficient and unsuccessful in identifying ideal or optimal US foreign policy choices. 
However, Colin Dueck`s interpretation of NCR, which starts by examining national 
interests and potential threats to those interests, allows room for analysing multiple 
elements that affect interest and threat perception. Therefore, in this research I will 
follow Colin Dueck`s interpretation of NCR.  
With regards to the set of intervening variables that will be used in the analysis, 
in addition to common intervening variables that stand out in the previous researches 
(summarised below) like elite ideology, public opinion, economic constraints I will also 
look into US FPE perceptions vis-à-vis rebels in Libya and Syria as an additional 
variable. The capability, ideology, and end state objectives of the political and armed 










Author Independent Variables Intervening Variables Dependent Variable 
Lorenzo Cladi & 
Mark Webber 
How changes in the international 
system that emerged at the end of 
the Cold War affected Italy 
- Elite perceptions  
- Distribution of political power  
- Government instability 
Italian foreign policy in the 
post-cold war period 
Kevin Marsh - US national interests in Libya  
 * energy security 
 * regional stability 
 * values 
 * international order 
 
 
- The fiscal and economic crisis 
- Military overstretch 
- US public opinion/war 
weariness 
- Divided Congress 
- President and his advisor`s 
perceptions 
- Intervention/non- 
intervention as a foreign 
policy choice 
- The scope and nature of 
the US intervention in Libya 
Alex Edwards Interests and distribution of power 
within the international system 
- Perceptions of power and 
threat  
- Domestic Institutions  
- Interest groups 
Dual Containment’ Policy in 
the Persian Gulf 
Zenonas 
Tziarras 
- Relative power changes 
- External threat perceptions 
- International economic 
interdependence 
- Elite ideology 
- Domestic interest groups 
Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) 
towards Middle East since 
2002 
  - Revisionism  
  - Status quo 
Jason W. 
Davidson 
International level power and 
security imperatives 
- Alliance value 
- Target threat to national 
interest and prestige 
- Public opinion and electoral 
relevance 
UK, France and Italy`s 
support to US led military 
operations abroad and 
variance in allies burden-
sharing decisions 
James Sperling Shifts in relative distribution of global 
and regional balance of power 
- Material interests (oil and gas 
supplies, bilateral investment 
and trading, mass migration),     
- Constraints on extraction and 
mobilisation of capabilities,        
- Domestic political context 
(public opinion, electoral cycle, 
and vulnerability of 
government),  
National security culture  
Variance in British, 
Canadian, French, German 
and Italian response and 
support to Libya intervention 
Randall 
Schweller 
Balance of power - Elite consensus  
- Government regime 
vulnerability  
- Elite cohesion  
- Social cohesion  
Under balancing behaviours 
of states 
 - Great powers 
 - Small powers  
Figure 3 Researches Using NCR as Theoretical Framework 
I will also adopt a revised version of the hypothesis used by Kevin Marsh, who 
has also applied NCR to understand why the Obama administration intervened in the 
Libyan civil war in 2011.  
     H1:  The US FPE take a decision to intervene militarily first and foremost in 
response to substantial threats to US interests representing the expected 
option for the US. 
     H2:  Domestic constraints (intervening variables) influence the form, timing, and 
scope of the intervention, and the rationale behind the deviation from 
expected intervention strategies can be explained by intervening variables. 
 
 It is also important to establish a framework that can capture case specific 




intervening and dependent variables for the Libya and Syria cases. In that context the 





Figure 4 NCR Framework for the Analysis of US Intervention Decisions Vis-a-Vis Civil Wars 
in Libya and Syria 
 
2.2 Methodology and Research Design  
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett suggest that combined application of 
congruence and process tracing methods is a powerful tool to test theories with case 
studies. Combining two methods enables the investigator to make a sound judgement 
about whether “the congruence between the independent and dependent variables is 
causal or spurious and also provide opportunity to take into consideration intervening 
variables and causal process that connect them” (George & Bennett, 2005,p.182).  








- Elite Perception vis-à-vis rebels
- Public Opinion
Threats to the US`s 
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the outcome of a case (George & Bennett, 2005,p.180) while the process-tracing 
method attempts to establish the causal chain and mechanism between the 
independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable (George & Bennett, 
2005, p.206,207). 
Process tracing is defined by Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel as the 
“examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses 
on how that process took place and generated the outcome of interest”. Thus process 
tracing requires the analysis of the case retrospectively from the outcome to potential 
causal mechanisms in play (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). 
In that sense, process tracing can be used to probe whether a hypothesised 
casual mechanism between independent   and dependent variable is plausible. Jason 
Lyall recommends process tracing to effectively judge whether proposed mechanisms 
linking independent variables to outcomes are viable (Lyall, 2014). Thus, for the Libya 
and Syria cases, process tracing seems essential to identify the sequence of events 
leading up to particular forms of intervention and to gauge why and how a particular 
intervention strategy was pursued by the US.  
In process tracing, the investigator explores and looks for evidence for a chain of 
events or the decision making process to establish the cause–effect link between 
independent variable and outcome (Van Evera, 1997, p.64). Van Evera provides an 
explanation on how to apply congruence and process tracing methods to test theories. 
The author divides the congruence method into three categories to test theories:  
• Type 1 Congruence - Comparison to typical values: First the investigator 
establishes the expected value for the independent variable and the outcome 
of the dependent variable for the theory to be valid. Then the observed values 




measurement of the congruence or incongruence between expectation and 
observation (Van Evera, 1997, p.58). 
• Type 2 Congruence - Multiple within-case comparisons: The investigator 
makes a number of paired observations of values on the independent and 
dependent variables across the spectrum of the case. Then the investigator 
assesses whether these values co-vary with the predictions of the test 
hypothesis (Van Evera, 1997, p.60,61). 
• Hybrids of Congruence Type 1 and Type 2: The investigator makes a 
number of paired observations of values on the independent and dependent 
variables and compares these with each other and the hypothesized typical 
value (Van Evera, 1997, p.63). 
 
I will utilise a hybrid of congruence type 1 and type 2 methods accompanied with 
process tracing.  Type 1 congruence method will be used for the within-case analysis 
of Libya and type 2 congruence method for the multiple episodes and outcomes of 
Syria case. In addition to within case analysis a cross-case comparison will be 
conducted between two cases for the episode depicted as `episode 1` below for both 
Libya and Syria conflicts. 
 I will analyse the interaction among independent and intervening variables 
regarding the intervention choices the US applied or considered over time in one 
episode for Libya and five episodes for the Syrian conflict in a staggered manner. The 
time points annotated with thick dotted lines below correspond to significant shifts in 
the conflicts which provided an opportunity or urge for the US to take more decisive 
action over the course of both conflicts. I will look into the Libya conflict from the 




on 31 October 2011 as one episode.  If this is considered as the first intervention in 
Libya, the second refers to US targeted air strikes against Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) in Libya since 2015. However, this phase was not included in the 
analyses as the scope of the research is to understand the dynamics behind US 
interventions into intra–state conflicts. So, the air strikes or plans for second 
intervention against ISIL in Libya can be considered as part of US efforts to degrade 
and destroy ISIL worldwide. 
 For the Syria case, the first episode starts with the onset of the Syrian 
demonstrations in March 2011. The second episode was initiated with the mass 
killings of protestors perpetrated by the Syrian regime in August 2011 which led to the 
militarisation of the Syrian opposition. The beginning of the third episode was marked 
by the emergence of a united political and armed opposition, which provided the US 
with the opportunity to offer support against the Syrian regime. The fourth period 
started with the use of chemical weapons, which crossed the ‘red line’ drawn firmly by 
the US administration and emergence of ISIL as a prominent actor in Syria. And finally, 
the fifth episode started as ISIL took control of a vast swath of territory in Syria and 
Iraq and declared an Islamic caliphate. That period will be analysed until 30 September 
2015, when Russia started building up its military force inside Syria and assisted the 








Figure 6 Intervention Spectrum: Non-Military and Military Intervention Means 
 




Chapter 3 US Historical Relationship with Libyan and Syrian 
Regimes 
 Before looking into the details of the processes that led to a particular US 
response with regards to the Libya and Syria conflicts the US relationship with both 
Libyan and Syrian regimes in recent history needs to be examined. Such an 
examination provides a baseline context for the detailed analysis of independent, 
intervening, and dependent variables in the following chapters. More specifically, 
understanding the historical context of the bilateral relationship the US developed with 
Libya and Syria over the years will shed light on recent developments. Particular 
references to national security interests, which are examined in Chapter 4 in terms of 
security, prosperity, values and international order domains, will facilitate the tracking 
of the processes that led to particular US choices. Retrospective analysis of recent 
history brings forward several issues like basing privileges US enjoyed in Libya and 
advantages provided to oil companies before Qaddafi, Qaddafi`s support to 
international terrorism until 2001, and his weapons of mass destruction capability 
development efforts until 2004 as the principle issues that can be cross referenced 
with US national security interests by 2011.  
 
3.1 US Historical Relationship with the Libyan Regime 
 The relationship between the US and Libya gradually deteriorated after Qaddafi 
came to power in 1969 after overthrowing King Idris. The attacks on 11 September 
2001 became a turning point for Libya-US relations as Qaddafi saw this watershed as 
an opportunity to reach out to the US. The main features of the relationship will be 
detailed in this section in order to get deeper insights regarding the potential reflection 





3.1.1 Evacuation of US Bases and Increasing Soviet Influence in Libya  
After World War II, the US and the Soviet Union viewed Libya as a strategic 
asset due to its proximity to the Mediterranean and as a transit point for increasing 
political influence in the Middle East and North Africa (St John, 1982). During the cold 
war, US interests required countering potential Soviet expansion into Africa and the 
Mediterranean (Ogunbadejo, 1986). Eventually, the US supported the creation of an 
independent pro-western Libya under a UN mandate to contain Russian involvement 
in Libya. On 21 November 1949 the majority of UN member countries voted in favour 
of Libyan independence (five Soviet-bloc countries and France abstained). The 
decision took effect as of 24 December 1951 (Ronen, 2013).  
King Idris also saw alliance with the US as a shield against external threats. 
The Libyan regime signed  an agreement with the US in 1954 that allowed for the use 
of Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli in exchange for American weapons and the 
development of the Libyan Air Force (US Library of Congress, 1989).  Until the 
discovery of oil in 1959, the monarchy in Libya maintained its pro-Western orientation 
as US basing agreements provided both direct income and access to financial 
assistance (St John, 1982). 
Rising Arab nationalism led by Egypt`s Gamal Abdul Nasser and anti-western 
sentiment within the Libyan population in 1964 led Idris to call for the evacuation of US 
bases in Libya. The complete evacuation of military installations used by the US was 
accomplished by mid-1970 (US Library of Congress, 1989) just after Qaddafi took 
power. Israel’s victory against Syrian, Egyptian, and Jordanian forces in the 1967 Six 




agreement with the US (Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011) that was believed to have 
supported Israel during the war against Arab forces.  
After the 1st September 1969 coup, Qaddafi`s anti-western, anti-colonialist and 
anti-imperialist rhetoric, suspected links with terrorist groups and activities and 
animosity against Israel limited US and Western Europe arms sale to Libya. As part of 
the reorientation strategy and as a means of avoiding isolation, Libya developed closer 
ties with the Soviet Union. Soviet arms sales and technical assistance in nuclear 
energy research to Libya increased rapidly. In 1975 the Soviet Union provided Libya 
with a 10-megawatts research nuclear reactor and in 1978 both parties agreed to 
construct a 300 megawatts capacity nuclear power plant in Libya (St John, 1982). 
In the period of 1969-1975 Libya purchased 2 billion US Dollars (USD) worth of 
Soviet arms (Laird, 1984). While Libya received huge amount of arms from the Soviet 
Union, between 1968 and 1977 it also bought 490 million USD worth arms from 
Western Europe to diversify its sources. However, the sheer magnitude of Soviet 
weaponry increased Qaddafi`s ability  to pursue his regional objectives (Menon, 1982).  
As part of the zero sum game character of the Cold War, both Russia and US 
aimed at curbing the influence of one another. However, after the evacuation of US 
bases in Libya, Moscow was unable to reach an agreement to open a military base in 
Libya, which limited Moscow`s influence over Libya and its leverage in the region. 
 
3.1.2 Nationalisation of US Oil Assets and Companies in Libya  
After Qaddafi seized power in Libya through a military coup, the relationship 
with the US deteriorated gradually, mainly as a result of Qaddafi`s anti-western 
policies. One of the main causes of the deterioration of relations was Qaddafi’s 




Qaddafi pressured US oil companies to renegotiate oil production contracts in order 
to increase Libyan government share of the revenue (Blanchard and  Zanotti, 2011). 
The strained relations between Libya and the US deteriorated further after the 
1973 Arab-Israeli War, in which Libya participated in the Arab oil boycott against the 
United States (Ohaegbulam, 2000). Qaddafi followed this up by announcing in the 
following year that he intended to nationalise US oil companies. 
As Libya provides high quality and low cost oil and gas extraction and export 
opportunities near to Europe, lucrative oil and gas business have always been part of 
international interests in Libya. Currently Libya has 41.5 billion barrels of oil and 51 
billion cubic feet of natural gas reserves (Doha Institute, 2011).  
 
3.1.3 Qaddafi Support to anti-Colonial, separatist and Terrorist Groups 
In parallel to his ideological standpoint, which was based around notion of anti-
colonialism, Arab nationalism and socialism, Qaddafi backed anti-colonial separatists, 
revolutionaries and, in some cases, terrorist groups all around the world (Blanchard & 
Zanotti, 2011).  
Qaddafi declared his objective as overstretching US`s military capability by 
forcing it to fight on multiple fronts throughout the world.  In that context Libya was 
accused of sending arms to insurgency and secessionist groups in Central America 
(El Salvador, Nicaragua),  the Middle East and Africa (Lebanon, Chad, Sudan) and 
Europe (the Irish Republican Army-IRA) (Ogunbadejo, 1986). The US also perceived 
Qaddafi as an actor who attempted to destabilize Libya`s pro-western neighbours 
(Ohaegbulam, 2000).  
Qaddafi’s support of the  IRA from the early 1970s was mainly intended to 




(Ronen, 2013). The notorious image of Qaddafi was also reinforced by his suspected 
links in the killing of Israeli athletes in 1972 at the Munich Olympics and the 
assassination of the US ambassador to  Sudan in 1973 (Ohaegbulam, 2000).  
The US withdrew its Ambassador from Libya in 1972 and the remaining 
embassy personnel were withdrawn after the embassy was completely shut down after 
it was set on fire on the 2nd December 1979 (Embassy of US, 2014). This incident was 
followed on the 29th December 1979 by the US decision to place Libya on the list of 
state sponsors of terrorism (Davenport, 2014). 
In 1981 President Reagan closed Libya's embassy in Washington on the 
grounds that Qaddafi supported international terrorism. Shortly after, US navy jets shot 
down two Libyan aircraft over the Mediterranean (Schumacher, 1986). The incident 
took place during a US naval exercise on 19 August 1981, as two US navy F-14 shot 
down two Libyan SU-22's 60 miles off the Libyan Gulf of Sirte, which Qaddafi 
unilaterally declared as Libyan territorial waters and which the US refused to recognise 
(Gwertzman, 1981). 
Libyan intelligence was also suspected of providing weapons used for the 
simultaneous attacks on the Israeli Airline's check-in counters at the Vienna and Rome 
airports in 1985, which saw dozens lose their lives and many more wounded 
(Ogunbadejo, 1986). 
 
3.1.4 Berlin Disco Attack and US Air Strikes in Libya 
1986 was a significant year for US policies toward Qaddafi as the US militarily 
confronted the Libyan regime twice in that year. In the first instance, ships from US 
Sixth Fleet crossed the self-declared line in the Gulf of Sidra. As Libyan forces 




an anti-aircraft missile site. On 15th April 1986, US aircraft targeted Tripoli and 
Benghazi as a retaliation for  the bomb attack carried out on 5th April 1986 at La Belle 
disco in Berlin, which was regularly frequented by US military personnel (Schumacher, 
1986). The disco attack had killed two US soldiers and a Turkish citizen and injured 
more than 225 individuals, including 200 Germans (Der Spiegel, 2011)2.  In response, 
US aircraft flew from aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean Sea and air fields in Britain. 
The US air strikes culminated in thirty-eight Libyan casualties, including members of 
the Qaddafi family, and the loss of one US F-111 jet with its two pilots (Ohaegbulam, 
2000).  
3.1.5 Pan Am Flight 103 Explosion 
On 21st December 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 bound to the US from London 
exploded over Lockerbie in Scotland, resulting in the deaths of 43 UK, 190 US and 19 
other nationalities. In November 1991, the US accused Libyan nationals Abdelbaset 
Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi and Lamin Khalifa Fhimah of planning and executing the 
bombing and requested Libya to extradite these two individuals (B. Smith, 2011). 
 UNSC Resolution 748, sponsored by the US and the UK, was adopted by the 
Security Council in March 1992 and called upon Libya to cease all forms of terrorism, 
stop supporting terrorist groups and denounce terrorism. The resolution blocked 
Libyan airliners from entering international airspace and prohibited Libyan provision of 
arms related material in all forms (UNSC, 1992). The sanctions against Libya were 
broadened with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 882 on 11th November 1993,  which 
requested  nations to freeze funds and financial resources owned or controlled by the 
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Libyan government or public authorities outside of Libya and banned the transfer of 
material designed for oil production and refinement (UNSC, 1993).  
As the sanctions crippled the Libyan economy, Libya moved to normalise its 
relationship with the West and stopped its support for terrorist groups. Later, Libya 
provided the British government with information about its past links with the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) (Zoubir, 2009). Libya, the US and the UK also agreed in 1998 
to the trial of the two suspects accused of organising the bombing of Pan Am flight 
103. The trial would take place in the Netherlands under Scottish law (Plachta, 2001). 
Eventually Tripoli accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and paid 
compensation estimated at 2.7 billion US dollars to the families of the victims (Zoubir, 
2009). Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al-Megrahi, who had been convicted of the Lockerbie 
bombing on 31 January 2001, was released from prison after serving eight years by 
Scottish Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill on compassionate grounds due to his ill 
health (The Scottish Government, 2009). The US president and the victims’ families 
reacted to the decision and residual hate in the US public was revealed. Nothing 
equivalent happened in Syria.  
 
3.1.6 Qaddafi`s Weapon of Mass Destruction 
As retaliation against Israel’s refusal to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
Libya did not initially sign the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), which took effect 
in 1997. However, Qaddafi changed his position in order to shake off economic 
sanctions and political isolation. After nine months of secret negotiations among the 
US, UK and Libya, Libya agreed to give up its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programme and signed the CWC in January 2004. Depending on the pace of 




(Bahgat, 2008). Libya`s declaration of 24.7 metric tonnes (MT) of sulphur mustard, 
1,390 MT of precursor chemicals, 3,563 unloaded aerial bombs and three former 
chemical weapons production facilities was verified by Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) inspections. Libya destroyed its arsenal of unfilled 
aerial bombs in 2004, and before the Libyan uprising in 2011 Libya also had destroyed 
51% of its sulphur mustard stockpile and 40% of its precursor chemicals (OPCW, 
2013)   
After the overthrow of Qaddafi, the new Libyan government announced the 
discovery of previously undeclared sulphur mustard stockpiles unloaded to munition. 
The newly discovered stockpile was carried to the Ruwagha depot in south eastern 
Libya, where the remaining chemical weapon stockpile of the Qaddafi regime had 
been kept since 2004 (OPCW, 2012). The process, supervised by OPCW, resumed 
in 2012 to destroy the remaining stockpile by the end of 2016 (The Guardian, 2014a)  
Libya’s ballistic missile arsenal, which could be used as a standoff carrier 
platform for WMD capability, was also a source of concern for the US. Libya`s surface 
to surface missile arsenal comprised of Soviet made Scud-Bs (with a 300 km range) 
and a limited number of North Korean supplied Scud-Cs (with a 600 km range) 
(Bahgat, 2008). In accordance with the 19th December 2003 agreement, Libya pledged 
to eliminate all ballistic missiles with ranges of 300 km or greater and payloads of 500 
kg or greater. By 22 September 2004, the verification teams had removed Libya’s five 
SCUD-C missiles and their launchers. Libya initially decided to convert 417 SCUD-B 
missiles to meet the limits imposed by the agreement; later the US managed to 
persuade Qaddafi to destroy all Libya’s SCUD-B missiles. However SCUD-B missiles 





Libya also turned over 4,000 centrifuges used for producing enriched uranium, 
and blueprints for how to build a nuclear bomb to the US in 2004. Upon delivery to the 
US, President Bush stated that the world would be safer and quickly eased restrictions 
on doing business with Libya (Sanger, 2011). Libya’s remaining enriched uranium 
stockpile was completely taken out of the country in December 2009 (US London 
Embassy, 2014). 
We can draw parallels between the dismantling of Libya`s chemical weapons 
and nuclear weapon building capacity and the process initiated by UNSC Resolution 
2118, which aimed to eradicate all chemical weapon related material and sites in Syria, 
and the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), which intended to prevent Iran from acquiring a  
nuclear weapon development capacity.  These initiatives started after 21th August 
2013 chemical weapons attack in Syria and the US-Russian agreement dated 14th 
September 2013.  The UNSC resolution 2118 was adopted on 27th September 2013 
and the JPA commenced on 24th November 2013. The most noticeable common 
characteristics of the international policies of Libya, Syria and Iran was their hostile 
attitude toward Israel, strained relations with West and friendly alliance with Russia. 
This encouraged the US to lead disarmament efforts against perceived threats to 
national and international security.   
 
 
3.1.7 Improving Relations 
Improved relations between the US and Libya began in April 1999 as Libya 
turned over two intelligence agents to stand trial for their suspected links to the 
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 (Blanchard & Zanotti, 2011). Two months later the first 




US and Libya meet under the auspices of Kofi Annan on 11th June 1999 to clarify the 
preconditions to lift the imposed sanctions against Libya (Zoubir, 2002b). 
The US took a cautious approach before restoring full diplomatic relations. 
Qaddafi’s offers of counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation following the terrorist 
attacks of 11th September 2001 and his 2003 decision to dismantle Libya’s weapons 
of mass destruction and long range missile development programs signified further 
steps that improved relations with the US (Blanchard and Zanotti, 2011). After US 
sanctions were gradually removed, full diplomatic relations were restored on 31st May 
2006 and subsequently Libya was removed from the list of states sponsoring terrorism 
(Blanchard and Zanotti, 2011). 
Obama`s first speech after Qaddafi`s death in 2011 referred to the Libyan 
leader’s use of terrorism as a political weapon and reminded Americans that Qaddafi 
supported terrorism. In addition, Obama called for the new government to work with 
the international community to secure dangerous material, and cited Libya as a proof 
of the strength of American leadership across the world alongside the weakening of 
Al-Qaida, the winding up of operations in Iraq, and Afghanistan`s successful transition 
to democracy (White House, 2011). President Obama`s emphasis on two crucial 
national security interest is important to note; terrorism and WMD. Historically, the US 
also targeted the Libyan regime militarily on the grounds that it supported or took part 
in terrorist activities targeting the US and wider international community. This 
reinforces the notion that the US takes first and foremost its security interest into 
consideration before making intervention decisions.  
 However, just before 2011 the US had already resolved it`s most prominent 
concerns vis-à-vis Libya; the Libyan regime had quit supporting international terrorism, 




to get rid of Libya`s WMD capability and capacity. As the US managed to subdue the 
Libyan regime, the process led to a less dangerous and cooperative Libya in the region 
before the Arab spring uprisings and the intervention.  
 
3.2 US Historical Relationship with the Syrian Regime  
Since Syria gained independence from France in 1946, it has had strained 
relations with the US. In US-Syria relations, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet 
influence in the Middle East, stability in Lebanon, Iran-Syria relations and Syria`s 
support of the Iraqi insurgency post 2003 came to the fore before the Arab Spring 
uprisings as the main contentious issues that have influenced the course of mutual 
relations. Looking into those historically important issues provides the necessary 
background to the bilateral relations and has the potential to shed light on the US 
diplomatic efforts in Syria since the civil war started in 2011. 
 
 
3.2.1 The Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet Influence in Middle East 
Ever since the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, which resulted in Israel`s victory over 
Palestinian and regional Arab forces (Ma`oz, 1999), the US’s most pressing concern 
in the Middle East has been regional stability and Israel’s security (Stevenson, 2014)  
Egypt and Syria, the main actors of the war, signed a defence cooperation 
accord in the event of an Israeli assault. After the Soviet Union shared intelligence 
about mass troop build-up on the Syrian-Israel border in May 1967, Egyptian President 
Nasser dispatched his troops into Sinai to curtail upcoming Israeli aggression against 
Syria and closed the Strait of Tiran (Ziser, 2002). The intelligence regarding Israel 




Syria from  taking pre-emptive military action against Israel; the Soviet Union feared 
that as a result of an all-out war,  Israel would defeat Arab armies which would weaken 
the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East (Mann, 2013). Nasser`s announcement 
on the 22nd May 1967 underlined Egypt’s decision not to allow any Israeli ship to 
traverse in and out of the Gulf of Aqaba and set the stage for a renewed war (Barak, 
2007). Israel pre-emptively launched an attack against Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian 
targets and captured the Golan Heights, east Jerusalem and the West Bank. The 
Syrian Ba’ath regime blamed the US for providing Israel with weapons to ensure its 
victory (Mann, 2013). 
UNSC Resolution 242, adopted on 22nd November 1967, stipulated that Israel 
should  withdraw from the territories it captured during the 1967 war (UNSC, 1967) but 
this requirement has not been met. Syria and Egypt attacked Israel on 6 October 1973 
to regain the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, which had been occupied by 
Israel during the 1967 war. Israel had to ask for US aid to repel Arab forces. At that 
point, US intelligence and weapons support to Israel (Operation Nickel Grass) and 
Soviet arms transfer to both Egypt and Syria became preeminent for both parties` 
calculations. As the UK received 80 percent of its oil supplies from the Arab world 
(compared to 5 percent for the US in that period), it avoided risking its interests in the 
region by supporting Israel’s cause and rejected US demands to use the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) base at Akrotiri in Cyprus. The US reportedly intended to use that base 
to conduct intelligence collection mission against Egyptian anti-aircraft defence 
systems, which downed dozens of Israeli aircraft. As anticipated by the UK, Arab oil 
producers imposed an oil embargo against the US on 17th October 1973, conditioning 





US support to Israel in its efforts to defeat Egypt and Syria can be attributed to 
two main US interests in the Middle East: to secure Israel`s existence in the region 
and to curtail Soviet economic and military influence. The US supplied military 
hardware enabled Israel to regain the Golan Heights and Sinai by 25th October 1973 
(Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen, 2013). UNSC Resolution 338, adopted on 22nd October 
1973, also called for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 242, which required 
Israel to roll back to pre-1967 war positions (UNSC, 1973) 
Even though the US brokered a bilateral peace agreement between Israel and 
Egypt at Camp David in 1978 which called on Egypt to demilitarize the Sinai in 
exchange for Israel`s withdrawal and yielding the territory to Egypt, the US 
administration saw that a sustainable Arab-Israeli peace could be realised only if the 
Syrian-Israeli dispute was also resolved (Ma`oz, 1999).  
However, the fact that the US had designated Syria a state sponsor of 
terrorism` in 1979, mainly on the grounds that the Hafiz al-Assad regime supported 
rejectionist Palestinian groups` struggle against Israel, made peace prospects 
unpromising. On the one hand Syria supported the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and other factions as part of its negotiation strategy to have leverage against 
Israel in its effort to regain the Golan Heights, and on the other hand, backing the 
Palestinian cause was a source of legitimacy for Assad`s dominant minority regime by 
exploiting the Arab nationalist sentiment of the Syrian population (Byman, 2005).  
 
3.2.2 Stability in Lebanon  
After the Arab–Israeli War in 1948, Lebanon received over 150,000 Palestinian 
refugees and the Arab defeat of 1967 Arab–Israeli War encouraged Palestinians to 




threat, Israel funded and armed Maronite-Christian Lebanese militias, with the support 
of the US, in their effort to resist Palestinian and predominantly non-Christian 
Lebanese militias worked to secure its northern border (Wight, 2013). 
In 1975, a civil war broke out between the factions in Lebanon. One year later 
Syria intervened in favour of the Maronite-Christian Lebanese militias, weakening 
Palestinians` posture3. However, Syrian intervention could not stop PLO attacks 
against Israel from Lebanon and Israel invaded Southern Lebanon in 1982. Israel’s 
occupation of southern Lebanon increased attacks against Israel and, more 
importantly, stimulated the creation of Hezbollah. Syria withdrew its troops from 
Lebanon when local and international pressure escalated over the assassination of 
Rafik Hariri and amid raising accusations over Syrian involvement in 2005 (Wight, 
2013). 
Rafik Hariri had been critical of  Syria's influence in Lebanon and had recently 
supported the UN resolution calling on Syrian forces to leave the country (Chulov, 
2014b). UNSC Resolution 1559 was drafted by the US, UK, France and Germany and 
adopted on 2nd September 2004. The main emphasis of the resolution was the 
withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces (referring to all remaining Syrian forces), the 
disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese militia (referring primarily to Hezbollah), and 
a free and fair presidential election without foreign interference or influence (referring 
to Syrian pressure to extend incumbent pro-Syrian president`s term by three years) 
(UNSC, 2004).  
                                                          
3 Syria’s choice of allying with Maronite Christian militias against the PLO seems to be 
counterintuitive, however it could be traced back to Syria`s complex patronage network that 
relied on alliance with minorities in Syria, including Christians and Druzes, and threat 





Two distinct power alliances had emerged in Lebanon by 2004, polarising the 
political landscape because of their differing stances on the role of Syria in Lebanon. 
On one side, pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud, Hezbollah, and Syrian President 
Assad, and on the other side an anti-Syrian bloc led by Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri, supported by Druze Walid Jumblat, and Maronite Michel Aoun locally and by 
US, France, and Saudi Arabia internationally.  
Hariri`s overt and strong opposition to Syrian presence in Lebanon (Bosco, 
2009) led to accusations that Syria was responsible for his assassination. The 
international tribunal established by UNSC Resolution 1757 on 30th May 2007 (UNSC, 
2007) started its investigation in 2009. In January 2014, the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (STL) opened the trial of five suspects in absentia who were deemed to be 
the Hezbollah members responsible for the bombing that killed Hariri and 21 others. 
At the time of writing, a verdict is still pending (Lutz, 2014).  
 
3.2.3 Iran-Syria Alliance 
US policy over Syria can be better understood by analysing the Iranian-Syrian 
Alliance that has prospered gradually since 1979. Syria and Iran deepened their 
relations to attain their own goals in the region (Bartell & Gray, 2012). 
 The factors that contributed to the convergence of interest for both countries 
can be primarily grouped in three categories: making sure the Iraqi government under 
Saddam`s reign was not hostile to both nations; opposing Israel policies in the Middle 
East; and ensuring mutual interests in Lebanon by keeping influence over Hezbollah 








Since 1979, Iran and Syria had emerged and consolidated their alliance despite 
their distinct and diametrically opposed ideologies; Iran is a theocratic and Persian 
nationalist country while the Syrian regime is characterised more by its secular, pan-
Arab, and socialist credentials.  
Saddam`s decision to invade Iran in 1980 just a year after the Iranian revolution 
was an important test for the Syrian-Iranian alliance. The alliance played a critical role 
after Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 1980 to prevent Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
becoming the dominant power in the Middle East (Goodarzi, 2013). In 1982 Syria 
supported Iran by closing its border with Iraq and shutting down the Iraqi pipelines that 
crossed its territory (Drysdale, 1992). 
Iran`s military victories over Iraq in 1982 increased the risk of Iraq`s collapse, 
which meant increased Iranian influence throughout the Gulf. This development 
persuaded the US to abandon its neutrality policy and to favour Iraq in the conflict. The 
US also pressured Israel not to provide direct arms sales to Iran, but Iran could still 
get arms from North Korea, Libya and Syria. Gulf States, led by Saudi Arabia, 
predominantly backed Iraq as well on the grounds that Iran posed a direct threat to 
Arab Gulf states. US objectives in the crisis could be summarised as curbing Iran`s 
influence in the Gulf, maintaining  oil supplies  throughout the Gulf and curtailing Iran`s 
efforts to export its revolution beyond its borders in the Middle East (Sterner, 1984). 
Iraq’s assault was perceived by Iran as a war waged against transnational 
rhetoric of Iranian revolution and thus US, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan supported Iraq in 
its effort to defeat Iran. By 1983, the US began providing Iraq with aid and by 1987 
this assistance amounted to 652 million USD. By the late 1980s, annual trade between 




sharing programme with Iraq. The shooting down of an Iranian airliner in July 1988 by 
a US naval vessel was perceived by Iran as the precursor of  a more robust American 
military campaign against Iran and pressured Iran to end the war (Takeyh, 2010). 
 
Persian Gulf War (1990) 
In 1990, two years after the Iran-Iraq war ended, Iraq invaded Kuwait.  During 
the crisis, while Iran remained neutral, Syria joined the US-led coalition to contain Iraq, 
raising its prospects for a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Goodarzi, 2013) and, 
more specifically, regaining the Golan Heights from Israel.  
Syria cooperated with Egypt and Saudi Arabia and organised an Arab League 
Council meeting. The organisation voted to resist the Iraqi occupation by force. Syria 
justified the organisation`s decision to collaborate with western powers on two 
grounds: inter-Arab conflicts should be handled by Arab governments and invasion of 
Kuwait weakened the Arab world in its struggle against Israel (Lawson, 2007). 
The Operation Desert Storm coalition was led by the US and included the UK, 
France, Germany, Japan, and Egypt.  Syria became part of the joint military command 
formed by Egypt to protect Saudi Arabia and contain Iraq in the region. While Egypt 
agreed to offensive action against Iraq in January 1991, Assad accepted sending 
troops to Saudi Arabia for defensive purposes only (Bennett, Lepgold, & Unger, 1994). 
 
Iraq War (2003) 
The invasion and the following war that toppled Saddam Hussein sent a strong 
message to Assad. The US`s key expectations from Syria were to cease its support 
to Palestinian armed groups, moderate its anti-American rhetoric and normalise 
relations with the US (Zisser, 2005). From a joint Syrian and Iranian perspective these 




US effort to follow with targeting both nations as part of the US war on terror (Goodarzi, 
2013). US policy priorities in Syria can also be traced through the Syria Accountability 
and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, signed on 12th December 2003, which 
required sanctions on Syria unless it ceased its support of  international terrorist 
groups, ended its occupation of Lebanon, ceased the development of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), and stopped supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq 
(Sharp and Blanchard, 2011). 
The threat perception Syria and Iran shared increased their collaboration to fuel 
an insurgency in Iraq and try to get the US bogged down in Iraq to a level that it cannot 
dare to attack Iran and Syria as well (Goodarzi, 2013). The US accused Syria of 
allowing foreign fighters to enter Iraq through the porous Iraq-Syria border and 
establish a supply line from Syria into Iraq (Rabinovich, 2009). 
 
Opposing Israel 
Iran used his antagonist posture against Israel as a sign of its solidarity with the 
cause of Islam, crossing the boundaries of Arab-Persian nationalism and Shia-Sunni 
sectarian differences to increase its influence in the region. By contrast, Syria`s anti-
Israel stand can be attributed primarily to the Alawite minority regime’s Arab unity 
idealism and its efforts to use this stance to boost its legitimacy domestically and 
regionally (Goodarzi, 2013). 
 
Maintaining Influence in Lebanon and LH 
Israel invaded South Lebanon in 1982 and besieged Beirut to force the PLO 
out of Lebanon and secure its northern border. Between 21st August and 1st 
September 1982, PLO forces were evacuated and the multinational force comprising 




Palestinian civilians withdrew their forces by 10th September 1982. However, the 
assassination of Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Maronite Lebanese forces, on 14 
September 1982, a day after his inauguration as president by the backing of Israel and 
US instigated revenge attack by Phalangists against the Palestinian camps of Sabra 
and Shatilla under Israeli occupation, killing hundreds of Palestinians. This incident 
prompted the arrival of the new Multi National Force (MNF) back to Lebanon. However 
on 23 October 1983 two trucks loaded with TNT hit the US and French barracks in 
Beirut, killing 241 US and 59 French personnel (Wood, 1998).  
This specific attack and following increasing insurgency attacks against Israel 
forces culminated in the withdrawal of MNF forces from Lebanon in early 1984 and the 
partial withdrawal of Israel by January 1985 (Mowles, 1986). The ultimate withdrawal 
of Israel,  after 18 years of occupation, took place in May 2000 as a result of 
increasingly effective guerrilla campaign that inflicted heavy Israeli casualties (Bartell 
& Gray, 2012). Between 1991 and 2000, Syria was reportedly involved in unsuccessful 
US-brokered peace talks with Israel to regain the Golan Heights in exchange for peace 
and the recognition of Israel (Goodarzi, 2013).  
Having looked into historical issues, we can see that a number of things key to 
US security interests and had implications for the international order: securing Israel`s 
existence in the region; curtailing Soviet economic and military influence, particularly 
over Syria; stemming Syrian clout over Lebanon, thus sustaining extremely fragile 
balances in Lebanon; and hindering Syria`s support to extremist/terrorist groups 








Positive US-Libya relations maintained between 1951 and 1969 were followed 
by nearly three decades of strained relations until the late 1990s when US sanctions 
seriously hurt and pressured Libya to take tangible steps toward the normalisation of 
bilateral relations.  During the period of intensively strained relations, the US had three 
significant military confrontations with the Libyan regime, resulting in the US downing 
Libyan aircraft and sinking ships in the Mediterranean Sea, and US aircraft hitting 
targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. The Qaddafi regime`s counterterrorism and 
intelligence cooperation with the US after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
and its signing up to the Chemical Weapon Convention to dismantle its WMD program 
culminated in the US removing Libya from the state sponsors of terrorism list and 
normalising relations. However, even after the relationship started to normalise, in the 
memories of the US public the Libyan regime was mostly remembered for its role in 
promoting terrorism, particularly its involvement in the bombing of Pam Am. It was not 
a coincidence that President Obama referred to both Qaddafi`s use of terrorism as a 
political weapon and necessity to secure dangerous material after his death in 2011. 
The main contentious issue between the US and Syria had been the Syrian 
regime`s confrontation with Israel and its support of anti-Israeli groups, which led to 
the US government putting Syria onto the State Sponsor of Terrorism list in 1979. After 
the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Syria and Iran shared a similar threat perception 
against the US, which pushed them to coordinate efforts to fuel an insurgency in Iraq 
against US forces and to establish a facilitation network through its porous border with 
Iraq. Continuous Syrian cooperation with Iran and support to Hezbollah as being a 
transit route for Iranian arms transfers and suspected Syrian regime complicity in 




Lebanon, were among other contentious issues that negatively influenced bilateral 
relations. 
Thus, when the Arab Spring uprisings started, the US had a gradually improving 
and relatively better relations with the Qaddafi regime in contrast to the Assad regime, 
which was still on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. The US response, taking 
into consideration only the historical relationships, presents an anomaly, where the US 
took a direct intervention decision against the Libyan regime in a very short time which 
culminated in regime change, while the US administration refrained consistently from 
direct military action against Syria despite a sustained negative trend in US-Syria 
relations for decades. This contradiction presents an important incentive to analyse 
the overarching international and domestic US dynamics that could have influenced 
US intervention calculations.  
With that in mind, the following two chapters will be dedicated to the threats to 
US interests vis-à-vis the Libya and Syria conflicts and to US domestic constraints and 






Chapter 4 Threats to US Interests vis-à-vis Libya and Syria 
Conflicts 
The aim of this chapter is to establish the baseline expected US foreign policy 
decisions with regards to military intervention in the Libya and Syria conflicts so that it 
can be used as a benchmark for a deeper analysis of the influence of domestic factors 
or constraints (intervening variables) over the taken decisions. This is to gauge how 
intervening variables reinforce or cause deviation from the expected foreign policy 
decisions that are expected to be driven primarily by US interests and threats posed 
to those interests. An expected foreign policy decision is one that conforms with neo-
realist assumptions of how the US would act, i.e. what we can understand as the US’s 
national interest.  In general, a ‘high’ and ‘very high’ level of threats posed against US 
interests is expected to trigger a combination of non-military and military intervention, 
while a ‘low’ and ‘medium’ threat level is anticipated to prompt non-military options 
instead of military ones, or even result in no intervention at all. 
The expected US response, in line with Hypothesis 1 (H1),4 will be checked 
against actual US foreign policy decisions. If the hypothesis is confirmed through the 
in depth analytical examination of Libya and Syria cases, that will reinforce the 
neorealist premises that foreign policy decisions are driven by national interests and 
threats to those interests. If H1 does not hold for one or both of the cases this will 
provide clear evidence that neorealism doesn't always provide a full explanation for 
                                                          
4    H1:  The US FPE take a decision to intervene militarily first and foremost in response 





foreign policy decisions. That will in turn support and justify the utility of neoclassical 
realist explanations, which will be the focus of the next chapter (Chapter 5).  
 The threat to US national interests will be judged against the evidence available 
by assigning an appropriate threat level (low, medium, high, very high) in each national 
interest category (security, prosperity, values, and international order) for each specific 
episode designated for the analysis of Libya and Syria cases. (One episode for Libya 
and five episodes for Syria). Within those specific episodes a closer focus will be 
placed on catalytic moments that increased expectation for US military intervention: 
Qaddafi`s threat to attack Benghazi; the August 2013 chemical weapon attack in Syria; 
and ISIL beheading US journalists in Syria.  
 As introduced by Walt in his balance of threat theory, offensive power or 
capability and intentions are two key parameters to gauge the extent of the threat 
posed to a nation (Walt, 1992). The following threat levels were adapted to use as a 
metric to identify the level of potential threat posed by state and non-state actors 
against US interests. 
Low: Evidence and indicators of low to medium capability and low 
intention; or evidence and indicators of low capability and low to medium 
intention.  
Medium: Evidence and indicators of high capability/low intention; medium 
capability/medium intention; low capability/ high intention. 
High: Evidence of high capability/medium intention; medium capability/ 
high intention. 





Figure 7 Threat Matrix based on Capability & Intention 
 
The US National Security Strategy (NSS), dated February 2015 and endorsed 
by President Obama, outlines US national security interests under four categories 
(Obama, 2015a)5:  
- Security: Addressing global terrorism threat and preventing the spread 
and use of weapons of mass destruction to ensure the security of the US, its citizens, 
allies and partners. 
- Prosperity: Maintaining an open international economic system that 
promotes growing US economy, ensures free flow of commerce and energy security 
of US allies in Europe and elsewhere. 
                                                          
5 2010 US National Security Strategy (NSS) dated May 2010 also lays out US national 
interests under the same categories stated in 2015 NSS. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, 
Accessed on 17 March 2015. 






















- Values: Defending peaceful democratic change and human rights against 
authoritarian states and support emerging democracies in the Arab world in the 
Middle East and North Africa, preventing mass killing of civilians (responsibility to 
protect civilians from mass atrocities) 
- International Order: A rule-based international order that promotes peace 
and security through reinforcing, shaping, creating the rules, norms, and institutions.  
 
In the NSS document particular US interests in the Middle East and North Africa 
are articulated as: 
Dismantling terrorist networks, confront aggression against allies and 
partners, ensure the free flow of energy from the region to the world, 
prevent the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass 
destruction, and promote peaceful and prosperous Middle East where 
democracy takes root and human rights are upheld (Obama, 2015a). 
 
 US interests in the Middle East and North Africa outlined in the NSS document 
were consistent with the core US interests articulated by President Obama in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings. On 28 March 2011, President Obama 
underlined that the US had a strategic interest in preventing Qaddafi from killing his 
own people in Benghazi, which would drive thousands of additional refugees across 
Libya’s borders, endanger transitions in Egypt and Tunisia and present violence as 
the best strategy to cling to power for other dictators in the region, and cripple the UN`s 
credibility in upholding global peace and security  (Obama, 2011d).  On 19th May 2011 
he defined US interests in the region as: 
Countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing 
the free flow of commerce and safe-guarding the security of the region; 
standing up for Israel’s security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace; ensuring 
stability of nations and the self-determination of individuals (Obama, 2011f). 
 
 Similarly, US interests in the Middle East were  outlined by Philip Gordon, who 




and 2015, as maintaining stability and supporting friends and allies, preventing nuclear 
proliferation, defending human life, keeping sea lanes open to ensure free trade and 
making sure that oil continues to flow freely around the world in order to control global 
oil prices and preventing ISIL from having safe heavens (Gordon, 2015). 
 US interests articulated in policy documents were also consistently brought 
forward as common themes in the interviews I conducted. Those themes were: the 
promotion of democracy; the support to partners and friends with a particular focus on 
Israel, opposition and effort to contain terrorism; opposition to proliferation, and 
commercial access to the resources of the Middle East, particularly oil and natural gas 
(Interviewee 8, 2015). Thus, the main objective of this chapter will be to outline how 
those interests and threats shaped the optimal or expected US foreign policy decisions 
with regards to the Libya and Syria conflicts. 
 During the US Senate discussions in Congress on 14th March 2011, then Senator 
Joseph Lieberman outlined US national interests in Libya as: allowing the mass killing 
of civilians would devastate US’s moral leadership image; letting Libya become a failed 
state would provide religious extremist groups safe heavens that they could exploit; 
defeat of the uprising by Qaddafi would encourage other dictators to use brutal 
violence to stop democratic protests;  a protracted conflict and instability in Libya would 
negatively influence oil prices (Joe Lieberman, 2011). 
 Senator Howard Lawrence Berman also underscored that stemming the 
refugee flow from Libya and preventing Qaddafi from massacring civilians 
corresponded with US national interests. Additionally, he suggested that solidarity with 
NATO allies  was an important US interest and that a refusal to help them would send 
a message that the US is not a dependable partner (Berman, 2011). Similarly, Senator 




Afghanistan and so it was the US`s turn to help those allies who had more interests at 
stake in Libya (Graham, 2011), implying the EU countries in close proximity to Libya. 
US Congressman Mike Rogers also indicated that preventing Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) from accessing chemical weapons and anti-aircraft weapons in Libya 
was in the US`s national security interest (Rogers, 2011a). 
 Referring to Syria, Senator McCain explained that the US had strategic and 
geopolitical interests which took precedence over moral and humanitarian 
considerations. He explained why the US had to force Assad to give up power and 
why the stakes were higher in Syria than in Libya. The Syrian regime served as the 
main forward operating base of the Iranian regime and the collapse of Assad’s regime 
would sever Hezbollah’s lifeline to Iran, as Syria funnelled arms to Hezbollah in 
Lebanon. Syria also posed a direct threat to Israel, had large stockpiles of chemical 
weapons and materials, and sought to develop a nuclear weapons capability whilst 
serving as the primary gateway for foreign fighters who infiltrated Iraq and killed 
American troops (Mccain, 2012). 
 Having briefly touched upon US interest in the Middle East, North Africa, Libya 
and Syria in this section I will look into threats facing US ‘security’ interests in both 
Libya and Syria in terms of: 1) power struggles and stability, 2) proliferation of weapons 
and terrorism, 3) preventing spread and use of weapons of mass destruction, and 4) 
refugee flow destabilising neighbours titles. The security threats will be followed by 








4.1 Threats to American Security 
4.1.1 Libya 
 The US militarily intervened to enforce United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1973 by conducting initial strikes to gain air supremacy and implement a 
no-fly zone in Libya between 19th and 31st March 2011, under an operation dubbed 
Operation Odyssey Dawn. That operation continued under NATO command with the 
new operation code, NATO Operation Unified Protector, between 31st March and 31st 
October 2011. So, we would expect a perception of a high or very high threat that 
would be manifested in: security, prosperity, values, and international order domains; 
official documents; US Congressional speeches and discussions; and speeches made 
by the President and other key Foreign Policy Executives.  
Security  
As Arnold Wolfers points out, it is difficult to separate power and influence in 
international politics; nations strive to attain, maintain, or enhance coercive power and 
persuasive influence to ensure their security. Any change in relative power or influence 
of opponents urges a counter effort to restore the balance or outdo its opponents 
(Wolfers, 1962:103-104,123).  
When Libya is considered within the context of what was going on in the wider 
regional dynamics, the outcome of the Libyan civil war was prominent for the potential 
change of balance of power and influence in the North Africa and Middle East region, 
with potential repercussions for regional stability. The interconnected uprisings in 
North Africa and the Middle East that started in Tunisia on 17th December 2010 
resulted in the collapse of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime as he fled to Saudi Arabia 
on 14th January 2011. This event had a domino effect in Egypt which led to the transfer 




and the weakening of regimes during the Arab Spring resulted in a power vacuum in 
the region which fuelled rivalries between regional powers (Akpınar, 2015). Libya was 
the third country in a row to succumb, after Tunisia and Egypt, and the outcome of the 
Libya conflict would have broader complications for the wider region.   
In contrast to Syria, which was supported by strong regional and global partners, 
Qaddafi had no influential allies; there was no major country capable of providing 
substantial economic, political or military support to the Qaddafi regime (Interviewee 
2, 2015). All of Libya`s neighbouring states were considered opponents of Qaddafi, 
and Qaddafi had substantially isolated himself prior the Arab Spring uprisings. Assad, 
by comparison, had managed to sustain strong and consistent backing from Russia, 
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), Iraqi Shia militias, and the Iranian regime (Pack, 2015).  
Contrary to the firm Russian stance on Syria, Russia had voted in favour of 
UNSC Resolution 1970, adopted on 26th February 2011, which condemned the use of 
lethal force against protestors in Libya, imposed sanctions on military and economic 
activities, and banned key figures in the Qaddafi regime from travelling abroad (UN, 
2011a). However on 17th March 2011 Russia abstained from the vote for UNSC 
Resolution 1973 on Libya, which authorised member states to take all necessary 
measures to protect civilians nationally or through regional organizations (UN, 2011b).  
Libya was much more important for Italy and France, as they had significant 
energy interests in Libya (Interviewee 3, 2015). The US administration was pressured 
by France and Britain (Guerlain, 2014) to intervene in Libya as they saw the refugee 
influx as a threat to their security (Bellamy and Williams 2011). Libya served as a focal 
point connecting Africa to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea and as a transit 
route for migrants and weapons trafficking (Pack, 2015).  




reinforced by then Secretary of Defence Robert Gates in his testimony to the House 
Armed Services Committee on 31 March 2011. He said that allies, particularly Britain 
and France, had assisted the US in Afghanistan, which was a vital security interest for 
the US administration. He saw that assisting Britain and France was in line with US 
interests (Gates, 2011b).  
Power struggles and their implications for regional stability were not significant 
in the case of Libya, as it lacked allies and the capability to pose a viable threat. The 
stability in Libya was challenged after Qaddafi was toppled, as rival groups (Operation 
Dignity, Libya Dawn) were supported by distinct group of external actors, for various 
reasons. On the one hand, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia 
sided with Operation Dignity to counter Muslim Brotherhood6 and extremist groups in 
Libya, while Qatar, Sudan and Turkey supported Libya Dawn which is perceived as 
religiously oriented. On the other hand, France, US, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya’s 
southern neighbours in the Sahel, including Niger, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal 
were more preoccupied with the rising terrorist threat (Reeve, 2015). The structure of 
two blocks supporting rival political and armed groups inside Libya was reminiscent of 
Syrian civil war. However, at nascent phase of the Libya conflict all rebel groups and 
external actors had been unified against the Qaddafi regime.   
 Another dimension of security was the proliferation of weapons feeding conflicts 
and existing ungoverned spaces, which provide safe havens and breeding grounds 
for trans-regional terrorism. The lack of effective border controls in the Sahel region 
                                                          
6 The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 and has influenced 
other religiously oriented movements throughout the world. The group mixed political activism 
with charity work, and renounced violence in the 1970s and subscribed to democratic 
principles. MB seeks to introduce Islam into the political sphere and endorses the concept of 
political parties and participating in elections to integrate Islam into broader segments of the 





facilitated the transfer of large quantities of weapons and ammunition from existing 
Libyan stockpiles, with experienced fighters exacerbating the already volatile security 
situation. It is believed that some of these weapons had been smuggled into the Sahel 
by returnees, in particular former fighters who had either been members of the Libyan 
regular army or mercenaries during the conflict (UN Security Counsil, 2012). The 
amount of weapons coming out of the Libyan conflict was unprecedented, with 
estimates suggesting that it was ten times greater than conflicts in Iraq, Somalia and 
Afghanistan (Washington Post, 2013). A protracted conflict and a civil war in Libya 
would worsen the proliferation of weapons and result in empowering terrorist groups 
in the region. However, toppling Qaddafi was also not a remedy for that problem. The 
chaos that prevailed in the post Qaddafi period provided a more conducive 
environment for weapons proliferation. 
 With the end of the war in Libya, weapons used to topple Qaddafi spread far and 
wide across the Middle East and Africa. Following Qaddafi's demise, some Libyan 
fighters travelled to Syria to support the armed uprising and supplied weapons to 
rebels fighting against the Syrian regime (Doornbos, Harald and Moussa, 2013). 
 Other significant destinations for fighters and munitions were Mali and the Sinai 
Peninsula. The Malian combatants who had fought for Qaddafi, fled back home with 
weapons at the end of 2011 and formed a powerful Tuareg-led rebel group in the 
region known as the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA). On 22 March 
2012, disgruntled Malian soldiers, upset about lack of support, staged a coup d’état, 
overthrowing the elected government (Flood, 2012). 
 Historically, weapons entered the Sinai Peninsula from Sudan, in the south.  The 
conflict in Libya created entirely new smuggling routes to Sinai (Gold, 2013). Sinai 




ideal location for arms sales. The looted weapons from Libyan stockpiles arrived in the 
Sinai Peninsula in late 2011 as militant factions took advantage of newer weapons 
(Ditz, 2013). The Sinai Peninsula has since the fall of the Mubarak regime, also seen 
the emergence of new armed groups fighting against the Egyptian authorities.  In that 
period, the Egyptian authorities conducted operations against these groups and 
seized multiple cargos that included anti-aircraft machine guns, mortars and 
MANPADs near the border with Libya and in the volatile Sinai Peninsula. (Washington 
Post, 2013)  
 Addressing global terrorism threats was another significant dimension in both 
Libya and the Syrian conflicts. Potential safe havens created as a result of the 
ungoverned spaces in Libya and Syria for terrorists, battle hardened foreign fighters 
returning to home countries in the region and gradually increasing extremist trends 
among Libya and Syria opposition have been a constant concern for US and western 
allies.  
 By the early 2000s, the Libyan regime had renounced terrorism and effectively 
targeted terrorist groups in Libya, which was later praised by the US administration (S. 
G. Jones, 2014). Qaddafi had decisively opposed Al Qaeda (AQ) and cooperated with 
the West on security matters. However, the destabilization caused by the civil war that 
started in February 2011 provided a window of opportunity to Al Qaeda to exploit the 
vulnerabilities in the region. Although Al Qaeda members that fought against Qaddafi 
were in the minority, the vacuum created by the lack of cohesion in the political and 
military domain in the post-Qaddafi era enabled AQ affiliated groups to expand 
(Larémont, 2011). After the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi, the number of Salafi 




in 2012 highlights the emergence of Salafi extremists in the country (S. G. Jones, 
2014).  
Potential Ansar al Sharia involvement in the terrorist attack that took place on 11 
September 2012 on the US Consulate in Benghazi, killing four Americans, including 
Ambassador Christopher Stevens (Joscelyn, 2014), was a contentious topic 
discussed both in the media and the US Congress. The vast stores of weapons, 
coupled with a weak state structure and hundreds of battle hardened militias created 
a conducive environment for extremist groups (Chivvis & Liepman, 2013).  
 During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Benghazi attack 
that killed US Ambassador Stevens, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
mentioned that heavily armed militants carried out a terrorist attack at US consulate in 
Benghazi without referring to AQ (H. Clinton, 2013). However, during the hearing, 
Senator John McCain argued that “the attacks were conducted by people who were 
at least connected to Al Qaeda” (Mccain, 2013).  Ambassador Christopher Stevens 
had served as deputy chief of mission in Tripoli from 2007 to 2009 and special 
representative to the Libyan National Transitional Council from March 2011 to 
November 2011 before he became the first Ambassador to Libya in May 2012 after 
the fall of the Qaddafi regime. (Feinstein, 2012)  
 Hillary Clinton also drew attention to the MANPADs and other dangerous 
weapons mostly coming out of Libya and onto the black markets. These weapons were 
seized by militias and made their way into other countries in the region, including Syria. 
She stated that Algerian and the Malian remnants of AQIM acquired weapons from 
Libya. (H. Clinton, 2013) 
 Proliferation of weapons and terrorism during the Libyan conflict constituted a 




proliferation of weapons and terrorism factored into the US calculations for 
intervention, as a protracted civil war would attract more extremist groups into Libya 
from other countries and, in light of the porous borders that accompany civil war 
environments, weapon smuggling would be difficult to control. It is plausible to think 
that this concern was projected forward by the US administration and elites and was 
eventuality factored into the formulation of the US response to curb or control the 
proliferation of weapons and terrorism by an early intervention. However, the unilateral 
US and following NATO intervention, coupled with the power struggle among Libyan 
rebels and rivalry in external support, made the situation worse. In particular, 
MANPADs became a significant threat for both military and civilian aviation in the 
region. Safe havens created in Libya and Syria became a breeding ground for trans-
regional terrorism, constituting great threat to the people of the Middle East and US 
citizens, personnel and facilities. 
 Preventing the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction was also a 
significant component of US security interests globally, and Libya was an important 
element in that regard too. President Obama had promised in his presidential 
campaign speech to ‘lead a global effort to secure all loose nuclear materials around 
the world’ (Obama, 2008a).  
 One of the US’s foremost security interests was to prevent the use and 
proliferation of chemical weapons. In the case of Libya, Qaddafi had agreed to give up 
its WMD programme in 2004 (Bahgat, 2008). However, the fact that the Arab Spring 
uprisings had started the residual chemical weapon capacity and delivery means in 
Libya was a source of concern for both European countries and the US, since they 




Qaddafi regime had 10 tons (out of an original 25 tons) of mustard gas left when the 
uprisings started (Spencer, 2011). 
While Libya became part of the Chemical Weapon Convention in 2004 and 
agreed to give up its WMD programme, the residual capability consisting of chemical 
agents and delivery means constituted a threat to the US, since the regime could use 
it as a last resort or they could end up in the hands of extremists groups at the outset 
of the conflict. The significance of the WMD threat in Libya was revealed by the first 
move of the US and allied forces; they secured those capabilities as soon as the Libya 
intervention started.  
The last dimension of security interests were the refugees and the destabilising 
effect an increase in refugees would have on neighbouring countries. The flow of 
foreign workers and mercenaries from Libya back into their originating countries and 
refugees/immigrants moving into neighbouring countries (predominantly Egypt and 
Tunisia) and into Europe had substantial destabilising effects during the Libya conflict. 
 Since Libya was so close to some of the US`s European partners, such as Italy 
(which is just across the Mediterranean), the US administration was also concerned 
of potential security risks to Europe (Interviewee 4, 2015). The main US fear was that 
if Libya continued to destabilise, tens of thousands of refugees would continue to pour 
towards European borders (Interviewee 7, 2015)  
 Before the uprising, Libya had been a destination for African migrants, enticed 
by the country’s oil-rich economy, as well as refugees fleeing conflict and persecution 
in other neighbouring African countries.  Qaddafi also employed significant number of 
mercenaries from sub-Saharan Africa in his army (Wheeler, William and Oghanna, 
2011). There are conflicting figures for the number of mercenaries who fought with 




10,000 African mercenaries, predominantly from Sudan, Chad, Mali and Niger, to fight 
in Libya against the rebels (Plaut, 2011). The International Federation of Human 
Rights` estimate was 6,000, whereas Human Rights Solidarity gave an estimate of 
30,000 (Balde, 2011).  
While the refugee flow mainly influenced Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia (Zoubir & Rózsa, 2012), thousands of people also 
departed from Libya for Italy as well (Wheeler, William and Oghanna, 2011).  The 
massive influx of returnees and refugees negatively affected the receiving countries, 
with their already strained social structures and limited resources (UN Security 
Counsil, 2012). 
The refugees and immigrants fleeing from both the Libyan and Syrian conflicts 
and the wider regional instability constituted a significant threat to Europe. In Libya, 
quick enforcement of a no fly zone and targeting of Libyan armed forces was the 
expected US option to increase the security of the Libyan people. However, contrary 
to expectations, as the intervention could not bring stability in Libya the number of 
migrants attempting to cross Mediterranean Sea to reach Italy, Malta and Greece from 
Libya’s coast increased gradually.  
 
Prosperity 
 While bilateral trade with Libya or Syria was not a primary interest for the US, 
ensuring free flow of commerce and energy security of US allies, particularly European 
partners, is a significant US interest in the region.  
 After Qaddafi`s decision in 2003 to dismantle his WMDs and downgrade his 
long range missile capability, gradual improvements in US-Libya bilateral trade were 




equipment imports from Libya; in 2010, before the US intervened militarily, US exports 
and imports to and from Libya accounted for 665.5 million and 2.1168 billion USD 
respectively (US Census Bureau, 2015). 
-  
Figure 8 US Trade in Goods with Libya, US Census Bureau 
 
 Crude oil and petroleum products from Libya in 2010 totalled 25,595,000 barrels 
(eia, 2015a), which constituted 0.5 % of US’s total crude oil imports. On the other hand, 
before 2011, European countries received 85% of Libya’s crude exports. In that 
context, while Libyan oil seemed not to be crucial for the US, it was important for 
multiple European countries, including: Ireland, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, France, 
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Figure 10 China’s Oil Imports from Libya, ChinaAfricaRealstory.com 
 
On the other hand, Libyan oil and gas was more important for European partners 
like France and the UK, and the disruption of the global oil supply and the consequent 
rise in oil prices (Zoubir & Rózsa, 2012) was also important for the US to stabilise 
















supplies (Interviewee 2, 2015). So, in Libya,  significant oil and natural gas resources 
were important incentives for the US to stabilise the country (Interviewee 7, 2015). The 
potential threat to Libyan oil and gas infrastructure stemming from a protracted conflict 
and AQ and ISIL affiliated group’s capturing and profiting from captured oil 
infrastructure was a threat to the US and EU and had potential implications for global 





  The conflict in Libya was also a challenge for other US interests, such as 
advocating democracy and upholding human rights. The US viewed both uprisings, 
likewise the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, as an opportunity to establish democracy 
in those countries. 
 Just before the Libya intervention, Anne-Marie Slaughter of the New York Times 
argued that it was in the US’s strategic interests to transform autocratic regimes in the 
region into accountable governments which could consequently decrease support for 
terrorist groups and violent extremism (Slaughter, 2011). 
 During the Senate hearing on the Benghazi attacks, former Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton mentioned that instability and terrorism would not fade away unless 
democratic institutions were established in the Middle East and North Africa (H. 
Clinton, 2013). As the successful regime changes in Egypt and Tunisia set precedents 
in the region, the Libya and the Syria conflicts were perceived as an extension of 
ongoing, inevitable change in the region. As the revolutions were regarded as the will 




regimes, the US felt obliged to choose “the right side of the history” (Tziarras, 2015). 
Siding with the revolution was a tough decision and major shift for the US in the region 
as the Tunisian and Egyptian autocratic regimes were allies of the US. However, the 
US often supported the push for democracy and economic freedom, which were in its 
long term interests (Interviewee 2, 2015). 
 President Obama characterised Qaddafi`s action against the rebellion as a war 
against his own people where he said:  
In Libya, we saw the prospect of imminent massacre, we had a mandate 
for action, and heard the Libyan people’s call for help.  Had we not acted 
along with our NATO allies and regional coalition partners, thousands would 
have been killed (Obama, 2011f). 
 
During the House Armed Services Committee testimony Robert Gates linked 
the prosperity and security of the US to Middle East by saying: 
Security and prosperity of the US is linked to the security and prosperity of 
the broader Middle East. I believe it was American national interest as part 
of a multinational coalition with broad international support to prevent a 
humanitarian crisis in eastern Libya that could have destabilised the entire 
region at a delicate time. What happens in Libya is in our interest, what 
happens in Middle East is in our vital interest. What is going on in Libya has 
an impact on the region. Qaddafi unrestrained could have had negative 
effect on democratic revolution that are taking place across the region. 
(Gates, 2011b) 
 
 During an interview just after the intervention commenced in Libya Hillary 
Clinton advocated the intervention decision by saying: 
Imagine we were sitting here and Benghazi had been overrun, a city of 
700,000 people, and tens of thousands of people had been slaughtered, 
hundreds of thousands had fled and, either with nowhere to go or 
overwhelming Egypt while it's in its own difficult transition. And we were 
sitting here, the cries would be, why did the United States not do anything? 
Why -- how could you stand by when, you know, France and the United 
Kingdom and other Europeans and the Arab League and your Arab 






 Similarly, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates answered a question asking why 
US intervened in Libya but not Syria by saying:  
The engagement of the Arabs, the engagement of the Europeans, the 
general humanitarian question that was at stake. You've had revolutions on 
both the East and the West of Libya. Egypt and Tunisia. So you had a 
potentially significantly destabilizing event taking place in Libya that put at 
risk potentially the revolutions in both Tunisia and Egypt (Gates, 2011c). 
 
 During a Senate Armed Services Committee testimony on 29th March 2011 dual 
hatted US European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) drew historical parallels between Benghazi and the Srebrenica Massacre.  
He said, Benghazi looked as it was going to fall and potentially will have a similar 
scenario like Srebrenica, based on the statements of Qaddafi and his son. He 
highlighted the fact that the imminent possibility of a massive slaughter in Benghazi 
catalysed NATO decisions about intervention, coupled with its proximity to Europe, 
potential mass migration, and destabilisation in Egypt (Stavridis, 2011).  
The clear objective put forward by the US in defending peaceful democratic 
change in the region and preventing mass killing of civilians and the displacement of 
people in the region required the use of both non-military and military intervention 




 The elite perception that the US occupied a leading position in the international 
system and had a responsibility to enforce international law places an extra burden to 
act commensurate with that position. The primary challenges to the international order 
during the Libya and Syria conflicts were the relevance of the UN as a guarantor of 




norms on chemical weapons. The basic ordering principle of international relations 
since 1648 has been the primacy of the sovereign state. The contemporary consensus 
requires UNSC authorisation for humanitarian intervention, the definition of which is 
“the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international organization 
primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from wide-
spread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights” (Goodman, 2006).  
 However, the failures of the UNSC to act in Rwanda and Kosovo (in 1994 and 
1999 respectively) had a major impact on normative debate about intervention for 
humanitarian purposes. In this respect, the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS)`s report on “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) 
promoted the idea that sovereign states have the responsibility to protect their own 
citizens from massacre, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and starvation. If states are 
unwilling or unable to fulfil their responsibility, or the state itself is the one perpetrating 
these atrocities against its own population, then the wider international community 
should authorise intervention (ICISS, 2001). That normative shift brings about flexibility 
for military intervention outside the scope of UNSC approval and in practice translates 
into a ‘responsibility to intervene’ for the international community to end the violence 
of intrastate conflicts (Woodward, 2007). So, R2P is perceived as justification for 
intervention outside of the UN framework in case UNSC permanent members exercise 
veto power to block resolution for intervention. The idea is to have an alternate tool in 
case the UNSC fails to act, in case of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity. 
 R2P conceives human rights violations as a threat to international peace and 
security, as declared in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Intervention in another state for 




as legitimate and necessary (Bin Talal & Schwarz, 2013). R2P underlines that the 
state sovereignty cannot be viewed in absolutist terms as an obstacle to international 
action if states fail to protect their population (Cottey, 2008). 
 
Interpretation and Analysis 
  
 For the Libya case, the episode encompasses the February to October 2011 
timeframe, which corresponds with the time between the start of the uprising and the 
end of the NATO operation in the country.  From the perspective of the ‘security’ 
interest from the regional and global power struggle, Libya was, on the one hand, not 
supported by influential regional and global partners, which could have destabilised 
the region further. On the other hand, the conflict did not have a sectarian angle, unlike 
Syria. With regards to the proliferation of weapons and terrorism, the creation of 
ungoverned spaces in Libya and smuggling of weapons as a result of protracted 
conflict was a significant concern for the US. However, that exclusively took place after 
the intervention started and was completed. Even though Qaddafi had taken a firm 
stance against extremists in Libya and cooperated with the US on security matters 
before the Arab Spring, the destabilization caused by the civil war provided a window 
of opportunity for extremists. In preventing the spread and use of weapons of mass 
destruction, Qaddafi had cooperated with the US and destroyed a significant portion 
of its chemical weapon capability before the Libyan uprising. However, the residual 
capability and the delivery means posed risks in the region and was a source of 
concern for both European countries and the US. Finally, the flow of foreign workers 
and mercenaries from Libya back into their originating countries and refugees and 
immigrants moving into neighbouring (predominantly Egypt and Tunisia) and EU 




interests could be assed to be ‘medium’, but that threat perception was augmented to 
‘high’ because of the European allies’ heightened threat considerations due to Libya`s 
proximity.    
When it comes to the ‘prosperity’ domain, while Libyan oil and gas was more 
important for European partners, a disruption of the global oil supply and a 
consequent rise in oil prices was significant concern for the US. However, that did not 
pose a direct threat to the US, so the overall threat posed by the Libyan conflict to US 
`prosperity` interests was assessed to be ‘medium’.  
When it comes to ‘values’, the US strongly felt the need to be on the right side 
of history and support the establishment of democracy in Libya as part of long term 
strategy to decrease violent extremism in the region. A potential mass killing in 
Benghazi and risks of inaction would threaten the credibility of the global US moral 
leadership. So the overall threats to US values are assessed to be ‘very high’ in 
Libya.  
Finally, upholding international norms and particularly preventing the Qaddafi 
regime killing its own people was a primary driver in the context of the ‘responsibility 
to protect’. So, the threat to international norms was assessed to be ‘very high’ in 
the Libya conflict.  
 
  Threat to US Interests in Libya   
  Security-stability Prosperity Values International Norm Overall 
Phase 1 High Medium Very High Very High High 
Table 1 Threat to US Interests in Libya 
 
So, because of a combination of shared security considerations with European 




overall threat to US interests was high and the expected US foreign policy decision 
vis-à-vis Libya conflict was intervention against the Qaddafi regime. The evidence 
across the four domains confirm that a neorealist explanation focusing on national 
interest and threats to those interests holds, as the US intervened militarily in Libya 
conflict. This confirms the validity of H1.    
If this explanation were true across the cases, it would also need to explain the 
non-intervention in Syria. Consequently, in the non-intervention scenario in Syria we 
would expect to see a much lower US threat perception relative to Libya. If that is not 
the case and the threat perceptions were in fact high and very high, both in relation to 
the indicators and in comparison with Libya, then this will prove neorealism doesn't 




The threats to US security interests in Syria will be analysed in a similar way to 
those in Libya by focusing on: power struggle; proliferation of weapons and terrorism; 
preventing the spread and use of WMDs; and the destabilising effect of refuges in the 
region. That will be followed by threats to prosperity, values and international order.  
The multidimensional power struggle manifested itself in Syria and led to a Cold 
War era type of bloc structure; a Western alliance formulated on the basis of the Assad 
threat while a counter alliance was formed against the threat of a potential US 
intervention in Syria.  That had been preceded by US troop withdrawals from Iraq in 
2011, leading to further strengthening of a Shia front led by Iran. Russia and China, 
both of whom favoured limiting US influence in the Middle East, backed the Shia front 




of influence in the region. All those developments overlapped with US policy to pivot 
its attention to Asia-Pacific region because of China (Tziarras, 2015).    
In this section I will focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel and 
Russia as potential influencers of US policy in the region.   
 
Iran  
The most significant change in the region before the uprisings of the Arab Spring 
was the favourable environment created in the region for Iran after the collapse of 
hostile regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively. (Juneau, 
2015,p.1,7)  
Whether Iran has yet become a regional power or not is still debatable, however 
it is beyond doubt that it has increased its clout in the region over the years. Both the 
US military intervention in Afghanistan that ended the Taliban rule and the overthrow 
of Iran`s arch enemy Saddam Hussein resulted in an amplified Iranian influence in the 
region (Bardají, 2016). Morady argues that key to Iran’s success in becoming a 
regional power is down to it having access to nuclear weapon capability and does not 
see Iran’s geostrategic location, economic and military strength, and hydrocarbon 
energy resources alone as sufficient enough to bring about such an outcome (Morady, 
2011).  
After the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Syrian-Iranian relations were 
strengthened as a result  of shared concern at  being the next target for regime change, 
as both countries were on the US “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list (Gelbart, 2010). 
The replacement of a Sunni regime under Saddam Hussein with a Shia 
dominated government in Iraq resulted in a significant shift of power in the region at 




influence in the region coupled with its nuclear ambitions posed an existential threat 
to Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)7 member countries. Iranian influence 
was also seen in Syria and Lebanon, where Iran has had close cooperation with 
Assad’s regime and Hezbollah respectively (Kessler, 2008). 
   
At the nascent phase of the Arab Spring uprisings, Iran was supportive of 
rebellions against the autocratic regimes in the Middle East calculating that toppling 
anti-Iranian regimes and reducing the US footprint in the region would translate into 
expanded Iranian influence. However, as the Syrian uprising started, Iran changed its 
rhetoric and provided full support to the Assad regime which strained Iranian relations 
with Arab League countries and Turkey (Bleek & Stein, 2012). 
Iran has substantially influenced the conflict in Syria since its onset. Iranian 
armed forces and intelligence organisations have advised and trained Syrian security 
services, provided material and intelligence support, and mobilised its Shia proxies in 
Lebanon and Iraq in support of the Assad regime. These moves were of critical 
importance in helping Assad retain his grip on power, especially as Assad diverted 
regime resources to secure western Syria, and Damascus, and consequently lost 
ground in eastern and northern Syria during the summer of 2012. Iranian Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces and IRGC Quds Forces provided an 
advisory and assistance mission to consolidate Assad`s power in central and southern 
Syria and supported Assad’s counterinsurgency operations against armed opposition 
in order to restore control throughout the country. LH’s intervention in Syria in February 
2013, with direct combat support alongside Iranian forces, was also instrumental in 
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sustaining the Syrian regime (Fullton, Holliday, & Wyer, 2013). As the unrestrained 
Iranian support to Syria against Sunni armed opposition groups portrayed the conflict 
more as a sectarian based struggle, Syria turned into a battle front between Shia and 
Sunni powers or proxies. Saudi Arabia led GCC countries who were anxious about 
increasing Iranian regional influence threw their full support behind the anti-regime 
opposition while the Iran-Iraq-LH axis supported Assad. As a consequence, a mirror 
image of divided regional powers was reflected in the divided opposition, with 
respective backers and their priorities that further protracted the conflict. Within that 
equation Iran could not risk leaving Syria  under the control of any Sunni dominated 
pro-western rebels, nor to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) at later stages 
(Akbarzadeh, 2015) which would significantly harm Iranian regional interests. 
What makes the Assad regime so crucial for Iran? That question can be better 
explained within the broader Middle East context. It can be argued that Iran`s major 
concern is not even the collapse of the Assad regime itself but more so its replacement 
with either a moderate or extremist Sunni regime allied with Saudi Arabia, which would 
staunchly oppose Iran and its Shi`a politics. An integral part of that concern is losing 
its major conduit for Iranian weapon and material support to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, 
which has been reinforced by constant Syrian and Iranian support since the 2006 
Lebanon conflict (Goodarzi, 2013). Iran also sees Syria as a counterweight against 
Sunni regimes in the region and even highly likely contemplated the possibility of the 
collapse of Assad and creation of an Alawite-led mini-state in western Syria (P. Jones, 
2013), which would retain Iranian influence in the region and sustain its reach to LH. 
Maintaining LH links through Syria not only provides Iran leverage against Israel but 





When LH participated in the Syrian conflict, Al Nusra Front and ISIL attacks 
inside Lebanon increased, the aim of which was to intimidate LH and put pressure on 
the Lebanese government and army to curb the involvement of LH. The car bombs 
and suicide attacks began in June 2013 targeting Beirut and Tripoli, mainly LH and 
Iranian targets, and continued in 2014, inflicting hundreds of causalities (US 
Department of State, 2014).  
 From the US perspective, at the nascent phase of the conflict, removing Syria, 
a strategic player in the anti-Western front in the Middle East, from ‘axis of evil’ would 
reduce regional Iranian power and influence. However, the red lines drawn by Russia 
and Iran aiming to ensure the survival of the Assad regime constituted very strong 
deterrence for the US and other western countries to get involved in Syria directly 
(Tziarras, 2015).  
Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the US sided with the majority of Sunni 
states against Iran. However the recent developments in the region caused the US to 
reconsider the sectarian balance of power in the region and question the policy of 
Sunni support over the years (Interviewee 3, 2015). In particular, the ISIL treat that 
engulfed the whole region and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), signed 
in Vienna in July of 2015 and which aimed to curtail Iran acquiring nuclear weapon 
capability, influenced Washington-Tehran relations (Devine, 2015) and resulted in a 










The importance of Iran, Syria and LH cannot be fully comprehended without 
looking into the Israeli dimension. The situation in Syria affects US interests through 
the conflict`s direct bearing on the security of the US’s most important regional partner, 
Israel. Israel perceived the Arab Spring uprisings and status quo change in the Middle 
East through the collapse of Arab regimes as a significant threat to its own security 
and the US took the Israeli position seriously. Israel’s threat perception was three-fold: 
the collapse of secular status quo governments who recognized Israel as a state; the 
emergence of religiously oriented parties as major political victors through democratic 
elections with a constituency deeply resentful against Israel and enthusiastic to 
change the status quo; and, lastly, a decreased US footprint in the Middle East and 
increasing cooperation among Arab countries (Morton & Shortt, 2012).  
Israel was particularly concerned about the regional implications and change in 
the  balance of power in the region that might potentially increase Saudi Arabia and/or 
Turkey`s influence in Damascus and in the wider region or, more alarmingly, Muslim 
Brotherhood domination in Syria (Carpenter, 2013).  
 The presence of extremist groups, particularly in south western Syria, and the 
transfer of advanced weapon systems from Syria to Hezbollah, especially long range 
surface to surface missiles and rocket launchers, or advanced air defence systems 
were two other main security concerns for Israel during the Syrian conflict, which 
prompted Israel to conduct targeted air strikes on numerous occasions. However, 
Israel avoided taking sides and focused on protecting its security interests. Israel 
thought that a protracted conflict between its longstanding foe Assad and the 
opposition, which it deemed extremist-dominated, would weaken both sides and that 




regional state and non-state actors in Syria serves Israel`s interests, which could lead 
to a partition along sectarian or ethnic lines and result in an unstable political system 
that posed no threat to any of its neighbours. In that respect, terrorism started helping 
the reformulation of the alliance structure in the region (Kahf, 2016) 
 
Russia 
With the US entrenched in Afghanistan and Iraq, proliferation of Russian 
advanced weapon systems and know-how transfer to Iran and Syria (ballistic missile 
technology, air defence systems, and combat aircraft) over the years solidified the 
alliance among those nations and changed the balance of capability regionally before 
the Arab Spring uprisings. That also provided Russia political leverage and reinforced 
the Russian client state status of Syria and Iran (Trofino & Nemets, 2009). Since the 
onset of the Syria conflict, external support provided by Russia and Iran was critical 
for regime stability and survival. Russia saw the power vacuums created in the Middle 
East and North Africa in 2011 as an opportunity to come back into the game of foreign 
policy and geopolitics (Interviewee 7, 2015) Mordechai Chaziza described Russian 
and Chinese counterbalancing efforts as soft balancing ,which aims to undermine and 
impose additional cost on US foreign policy choices. As both Russia and China was 
under the impression that the US violated the terms of the UNSC resolution 1973 on 
Libya, they threw their full support behind the Syrian regime to prevent another 
western intervention that would strengthen US hegemony and weaken Iran in the 
region (Chaziza, 2014). As the US’s arch-rival, Russia`s main effort revolved primarily 
around two fronts: providing diplomatic shield for Syria to prevent any type of military 




the tide on the battle ground in favour of the regime in its struggle against armed 
opposition groups.  
In addition to Russia`s firm stance at the UNSC against any action that threatens 
and aims to weaken the Syrian regime, Russia also disregarded an Arab League 
decision to impose sanctions and did not follow mainstream Arab criticism of the Assad 
regime (Allison, 2013). These two main issues differentiated the Russian posture in 
the Libya and Syria conflicts.  
An important question to ask is why Russia placed greater importance on the 
survival of the Syrian regime relative to Libya and how these efforts affected the policy 
choices of the US? Russia’s stance can be attributed primarily to geopolitical 
considerations and resistance against Western interventions.   
US-led interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya led Russia to adopt 
a more active stance against any Western military interventions (Charap, 2013). 
Russia strongly condemned regime change in Libya, which was not covered under 
UNSC Resolution 1973. This was one of the factors that influenced Russia’s policy 
towards the West’s pursuits of regime change in Syria.   
Russia opposes the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) and the western 
interpretation of human rights, fearing that it was used as an excuse to change regimes 
in pursuit of geopolitical goals (Bagdonas, 2012).  
Moreover, Russian support in the economic and military domain was also vital 
for the Syrian regime. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIRPI), Russia provided 48% of Syria’s military hardware imports during 
2006-2010, which mainly consisted of air defence systems and anti-ship missiles 
(Wezeman, 2013). Between 2007 and 2011 Russia’s share was 78%, which points to 




the Syrian regime since the outset of the conflict in 2011 helped Assad to sustain his 
hold on the country. In the energy sector, despite Syria`s limited oil and gas resources, 
Russian oil and gas companies had taken part in the exploration of natural resources 
as well as the building of Syria’s infrastructure (Allison, 2013; Bagdonas, 2012).  
Other dimensions of Russian-Syrian cooperation are military privileges for 
Russian forces and intelligence sharing. The Tartus naval facilities on the Syrian coast 
and electronic eavesdropping post in Latakia gave Russia leverage to oversee any 
activity on the Mediterranean Sea, as well as providing it a base in the Middle East. 
The Tartus naval facility was primarily used by Russia for supply and maintenance 
purposes and enabled Russian fleets to refuel in the Mediterranean without returning 
to their Black Sea bases. Despite its limited support function, Tartus reinforced 
Russian geopolitical influence and geostrategic reach to the Middle East (Allison, 
2013; Bagdonas, 2012). In addition, Tartus proved to be critical for Syria during the 
course of the conflict as it facilitated a constant flow of supplies to the regime. Russia 
took the opportunity to alter the security balance in Middle East by deploying 
substantial weapon and air defence systems into Syria since 30th September 2015, 
particularly to Latakia and Tartus (Weinberger, 2016). This provided Russia leverage 
to influence any future security and political arrangement for Syria. Since then, the US 
had to take Russian military presence in the region into account and at some 
occasions inform and coordinate with Russian security establishments before taking 
action in Syria. Russia reportedly provided Syria additional aircraft, air defence 
systems and anti-tank weapons after 2011 to intimidate any western intervention as 
part of a contract signed in May 2010 (Saunders, 2014; Reuters, 2010). 
Russia`s main concern for Syria was the potential repercussions of regime 




religious extremist groups. Russia perceived the conflict in Syria between a secular 
state and opposition predominantly seeking a state based on religion. The involvement 
of Chechen fighters in the Syrian conflict was alarming for Russia.  The Chechens did 
not fight against Qaddafi in Libya, as the conflict did not have a sectarian characteristic 
in terms of a Shia-Sunni struggle (Allison, 2013).  
From the US perspective, while fighting against terrorism seemed to be a 
converging interest between Russia and the US, increasingly assertive Russian 
Middle East policy, particularly that of Syria, in conjunction with stiffening solidarity 
among Russia, Iran and Syria was perceived by the US to run counter to its interests 
in the region. On the other hand, Russia and the US mostly disagreed on which groups 
within the Syrian opposition to designate as terrorists, except for ISIL, and direct 
Russian military engagement on 30th September 2015 revealed the significance of 
Syria for Russia in the Middle East and, to a certain extent, turned it into the site of a 
‘proxy U.S.-Russian conflict’ (Stent, 2016). 
The Middle East and Eastern Europe are seen as significantly contested regions 
between Russia and the US. It can be argued that both power`s struggle to control 
and protect the strategic regions of vital interests played a key role in crafting their 
strategies and policies in both Syria and later Ukraine (particularly Crimea). Russia 
and the US supported opposite sides in both conflicts, one supporting the current 
government forces versus the rebels, and vice versa. On the one hand, curbing 
growing Russian influence, preventing Iran gaining more clout and finally ensuring 
Israel`s security seemed to be the vital interests of the US. On the other hand, the 
Russian-Iranian-Syrian alliance was viewed as a significant threat to Sunni dominated 





Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has espoused a zero-sum game 
policy; Russia has focused on rebuilding Russia’s power and influence on the global 
scene at the expense of that of the US. That mentality revealed itself recently in 
Ukraine and Syria. Russia sized the opportunity in Syrian conflict to use it as a spring 
board to return to the Middle East as a significant power player.(Cornell, 2016) 
The axis formed by Russia, Syria, Iran and Hezbollah forces with the obvious 
intention of diminishing US influence in the region and inflicting unacceptable costs 
upon a potential US intervention in Syria posed a significant threat to the US. The 
capability component of the threat is represented by sophisticated military and the 
intelligence collection capabilities Iran and Russia brought to the alliance; Iranian 
expanding power and influence in the region with nuclear weapon ambition; Syrian 
regime’s long-term efforts to increase its deterrence by reinforcing its air defence and 
ballistic missile systems, and chemical weapon capability; and LH`s ability to reach 
the US’s regional allies. In Syria, confronting the Syrian-Iranian-Russian-Hezbollah 
alliance was in the US interest in the beginning of the conflict before the potential cost 
of intervention increased as the conflict protracted. A similar military intervention 
enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria, which would require air strikes against key regime 
targets and a targeting of the Syrian Air Force, providing close air support, lethal and 
non-lethal weapons to moderate opposition armed groups could have led to a regime 
change in Syria.  
 
Lebanon 
 As a consequence of long lasting sectarian civil war (1975-1990), delicate 
executive power-sharing arrangements distributed political offices by sect, and the 




Lebanese political parties’ constituency are predominantly comprised of their 
respective sectarian background as well (Cammett, 2013). 
 Based on a US Commission on International Religious Freedom report, the 
Lebanon population consisted of 28% Sunni Muslim, 28% Shia Muslim, 22% Maronite 
Christian, 8% Greek Orthodox Christian, 6% Druze and 4% Greek Catholic  before the 
mass refugee flow post-2011 (Minority Rights Group International, 2008) 
 Lebanon feared that regime change in Syria would destabilize its fragile ethnic 
and sectarian balance. Therefore, it supported the Syrian regime and voted against 
the suspension of Syria’s Arab League membership and an imposition of economic 
sanctions. However, Lebanese domestic political actors and society does not 
represent a unified stance against Syria conflict (Küçükkeleş, 2012). The 
demonstrations against Syria`s long lasting influence in Lebanese political life and 
military presence in Lebanon, known as the Cedar Revolution, were triggered by Rafik 
Hariri`s assassination on 14th February 2005. As a result Lebanese society was 
divided sharply into two major blocks: March 8, a pro-Syria alliance established by 
Shia Amal Movement, Hezbollah and Christian-based Free Patriotic Movement; and 
March 14, an anti-Syrian alliance comprising Sunni (Rafiq Hariri’s Future Movement), 
Druze and Maronite political movements (Knio, 2013). A similar division was reflected 
at the regional and global level as Syria and Iran backed March 8, and Saudi Arabia 
and the United States supported March 14 (Al Jazeera, 2012). 
 Knio also highlights different structure-agency approaches that define the role of 
LH in Lebanon. The agency based approach perceives Hezbollah as a proxy client 
financed by Iran and logistically supported by Syria. On the other hand, a structure 




branches and emphasises Lebanese socioeconomic roots and its constituency (Knio, 
2013). That distinction proved to be important during the Syria conflict, since LH 
intended to strike a balance between two roles regarding its involvement in Syrian 
conflict.  
 LH provided direct combat support to the Syrian struggle against Sunni armed 
opposition groups. At least 2,000 LH fighters reportedly supported Assad forces to 
capture al-Qusayr, located at a strategic position along the Damascus, Homs coastal 
region (O`Bagy, 2013; Byman, 2014). In the summer of 2013, fighting between regime 
and opposition armed groups further concentrated on the Damascus-Homs supply 
route passing through Qalamoun. Hezbollah prioritised blocking logistic support from 
Lebanese Arsal town, in the eastern Bekaa Valley, to armed opposition groups in 
Syrian Qalamoun region and at the same time secure the route for transfer of weapons 
from Syria into Lebanon (Nassief, 2013). Arsal served as a crucial logistical support 
node for Syrian armed opposition in the struggle against the Assad regime (Daniels, 
2014). 
 LH support to Syrian regime can be attributed to short term self-interest mainly 
aiming to control spill-over effects of conflict by sealing the borders and cutting the 
supply routes of rebels flowing back and forth between Lebanon and Syria. However, 
more importantly in the long term, LH took also into consideration the risks of losing 
its reliable regional ally Syria and potentially face a Sunni majority administration in 
Syria dissociated with Iran.   
 As LH participated in the conflict within Syria initially, ANF and ISIL attacks inside 
Lebanon increased, which aimed to intimidate LH involvement in the Syrian conflict 




of LH. The car bombs and suicide attacks began in June 2013, targeting LH and 
Iranian targets, mainly in Beirut and Tripoli, and continued in 2014 to inflict hundreds 
of causalities. (US Department of State, 2014) 
 The US had been concerned about the possible transfer of chemical weapons to 
LH before the Syrian chemical weapon disposal process. However, after the threat 
posed by chemical weapons has been diminished, the US and Lebanon, including LH, 
shared the threat perception that stemmed from the increasing ISIL and ANF threat. 
US policy to keep the delicate status quo in Lebanon intact converged with its policy 
to prevent Syria falling into the hands of religious extremist groups inspired by 
sectarian lines, which would affect Lebanon as well.  
 
Iraq 
Maliki`s discrimination policies against the Sunni minority and Syrian Sunni-led 
armed opposition mainly encouraged al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to increase its attacks 
against Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Shiite neighbourhoods and Maliki`s Sunni 
supporters (Katzman, 2013). As a result, a substantial increase in the number of 
civilian casualties was observed in Iraq after 2013.  
In addition to Maliki`s sectarian agenda, the prolonged armed conflict in Syria 
also contributed to a surge in the number of Sunni insurgency attacks in Iraq against 
Shia targets, further exacerbating an already volatile security situation and sectarian 
tension within the country. Iraq, with a population made up of 60%-65% Shia and 32%-
37% Sunni (CIA, 2013), had experienced a two-fold spill over effect from Syria. First, 
Maliki government`s support to the Assad regime and Iraqi Shia militias fighting in 
Syria, along with the Syrian regime and Iranian forces, made the Maliki administration 




insurgency expanded its struggle from Iraq to Syria and, with the emergence of ISIL, 
both Iraq and Syria became a common battleground and focal point that attracted 
more foreign fighters from the region and elsewhere the world.  
 
 
Figure 11 Civilian causalities between 2008 and 2014 
Based on http://www.uniraq.org/ data as of 1 October 2014  
 
Iraqi Shia militias fighting in Syria were mainly from three groups: Asaib Ahl al-
Haqq (AAH), Kataib Hezbollah (KH), and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS). AAH had 
2000-3000 militias supported and organized by IRGC Qods Force and LH. KH and 
KSS were composed of 400 and 200 men respectively and reported to Qods Force 
(Knights, 2013).  
Since the Iraqi government perceived a potential post-Assad Sunni-led 
government as a threat to its polarised society’s ethno-sectarian baseline, it opposed 
economic sanctions targeting Syria proposed by the Arab League and abstained 
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The Shia-dominated Maliki government’s sectarian based policies side-lining 
Sunni minority, coupled with poor governance and corruption, facilitated the Sunni 
insurgency gaining more traction in Iraq. In response to Iraq`s role in the Syrian conflict 
and as a reflection of sectarian divide ISIL seized control in the western parts of Iraq 
in January 2014. (Byman, 2014) 
This was followed by the seizure of Mosul in June 2014 by ISIL and rapid 
advance into Iraqi territory. Dodge attributes ISIL’s success to flaws within the political 
system led by Maliki government (2014). Dodge proposes three preconditions for any 
given state to sustain its governance and explains that the Maliki government 
established in post-2003 failed in all three aspects. It failed: to build national capacity 
to deter and decapitate internal and external threats; develop and maintain 
infrastructural power to deliver government services and provide rule based and law 
enforced authority; and to foster ideological power that ties the population together, 
regardless of sectarian or social status under a unifying nationalist perspective 
(Dodge, 2014). 
As US troops left Iraq in 2011 after 8 years of presence and a long lasting 
struggle against insurgency, the stability of Iraq seemed to be much more important 
than Syria for US considerations. That was manifested in the US refraining from use 
of direct military force against ISIL until the conflict spilled over into Iraq and ISIL 









Saudi Arabia`s primary goals during the Arab Spring uprisings were containing 
the instability from spreading to GCC monarchies, preserving the status quo in Middle 
East by preventing the fall of the monarchies, and, if regime change appears to be 
inevitable, then prevent pro-Iranian/Shia factions seizing the power that eventually 
would alter the regional balance of power. In Syria, Riyadh relinquished its `maintain 
status quo` policy and perceived the uprising as an opportunity to dissociate Syria 
from Iran sphere of influence and replace Alawite/Shia led minority regime with the 
rule of the Syrian Sunni majority (Ennis & Momani, 2013).   
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran interpreted the long lasting sectarian rivalry as a 
zero-sum game. In particular, increased Iranian influence in Iraq after the collapse of 
dominant minority Sunni regime and growing Hezbollah influence in Lebanon, with 
consistent support from Iran, deepened the rivalry in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia 
regarded Syria as an opportunity to roll back Iranian gains in the region (Küçükkeleş, 
2012). Saudi Arabia also saw the Syria conflict as an opportunity to weaken LH and 
contain Iranian influence in Lebanon, as the majority of the weapon flow from Iran to 
Hezbollah has been reportedly through and facilitated by Syria (Manfreda, 2011).  
Saudi Arabia was equally concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), as it 
was uncomfortable with Iranian influence in the region. In particular, the rise of MB 
affiliated and pro-democracy Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and Al-Nahda Party 
in Tunisia into power aggrieved Saudi Arabia (Karon, 2011). GCC monarchies 
interpreted the shift as a threat to their reign, which also translated into a similar 
concern for the potential successor of Assad regime; exceptionally, Qatar was a 




As the Saud family have been in alliance with Wahhabi and Salafist clerics to 
gain legitimacy within the Saudi population, it supported Wahhabi armed opposition 
groups in Syria to propagate the ideology. So Syria turned into a proxy conflict where 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar armed and supported Sunni and Wahhabi groups and Iran 
backed the Syrian regime (Mabon, 2012). As the conflict protracted and extremist 
groups got the upper hand among the armed opposition, the kingdom shifted its 
support to predominantly more secular and nationalist, and less extreme, armed 
opposition groups, fearing the potential backlash of a proliferation of religious extremist 
movements in Syria into gulf monarchies (Byman, 2014).  
  Saudi Arabia’s strategic alliance with the US and its influence among regional 
actors aligned with Western interests in the Middle East and is a significant factor for 
US calculations. It is reasonable that the US was as concerned as Saudi Arabia was 
about the spread of the unrest to GCC monarchies.  
 Saudi Arabia have been committed to the removal of Assad, more so at the 
nascent phase of the conflict, to counter Iran’s influence in the region in relation to 
Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq (Devine, 2015). However, as ISIL started dominating the 
extremist spectrum of the armed groups and posing serious threat to GCC countries, 
Saudi Arabia`s focus turned back to terrorism.  
Qatar 
Qatar, with its relatively small size and a population of only 2.1 million (of which 
only 15 % are citizens) (Blanchard, 2014), has disproportionate diplomatic relevance 
and influence in the Middle East and Africa. The financial capital surplus earned by its 
substantial gas and oil output, coupled with its endeavours to resolve regional 
problems by mediating between the parties and the Arab world`s first 24-hour news 




regional  public opinion. This was particularly true in the context of the Arab Spring 
uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria (Khatib, 2013). However, despite being 
politically active, Qatar’s limited military capability meant it had to fine tune its policies 
to align them with those of the GCC, to balance its policies with those of Saudi Arabia`s 
in the region and to seek security the protection of US in exchange for allowing major 
US bases and headquarters in Qatar.  
Qatar’s approach to the conflict in Syria has evolved over time, which is the 
case for most of the regional powers. Qatar initially promoted dialogue, however as 
the regime continued targeting civilians during 2012 and 2013 it took a more 
confrontational approach towards the Syrian regime (Blanchard, 2014) in parallel with 
the US, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.  
Qatar’s image as a mediator significantly changed with its intervention into the 
Libya and Syria conflicts in the economic, diplomatic and military domains, which saw 
it aid rebel groups by providing weapons and equipment, training and financial and 
logistic assistance. Qatar provided support to both political and armed Syrian 
opposition; it armed the Free Syrian Army on the one hand and successfully led the 
efforts in November 2012 to establish a more inclusive political opposition, the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, in Doha on the other. The 
fact that Qatar took more prominent role in Syria and provided support to the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria strained its relations with Saudi Arabia 
(Khatib, 2013). In response, Saudi Arabia attempted to reign in both political and 
armed opposition in Syria by reinstating pro-Saudi leaders. The first Saudi-Qatar 
rivalry for leadership took place between pro-Qatar candidate Mustafa Sabbagh and 
pro-Saudi Arabia Ahmad al Jarba for the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary 




2013 and served until 12th July 2014 (Barnard, 2013). In February 2014 this was 
followed by the replacement of Free Syrian Army commander Selim Idris, seen as pro-
Qatar, with Saudi backed Free Syrian Army field commander Abdullah al Bashir 
(Khatib, 2014). 
 Against the backdrop of leadership changes within the Syrian opposition, a 
significant transfer of authority took place within both Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Qatar 
emir, Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, ceded power to his western educated 34 year old 
son, Sheik Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, on 23rd July 2013 (Nordland, 2013). This was 
followed by the replacement of Qatar’s dual hatted prime and foreign minister, Sheikh 
Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, with two distinct figures (Bollier, 2013); on the Saudi side 
Prince Bandar bin Sultan was removed from his role as head of Saudi intelligence on 
16th April 2014 (Black, 2014a) and was replaced with Prince Khalid bin Bandar on 1st 
July 2014 (Al Arabiya, 2014). 
The change of key leaders who had been leading the respective Syrian policies 
of both countries since the outset of the conflict could be interpreted as an intended 
policy change for Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which were both criticized by the US (and 
in the Saudi case, internally too) for their Syrian policy, particularly with regards to the 
selection of armed opposition groups to support.  
The fact that Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Yemen, Libya, and Syria with the prospect of broadening its political influence on those 
countries during post-transition period strained its relations with not only the rest of the 
GCC countries but also the US. As Saudi Arabia and the UAE designated the Muslim 




existential threat to their dynastic rule, in March 2014 Saudi Arabia, UAE and 
additionally Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha (Khatib, 2014). 
Even though the US was also concerned with Qatar’s regional policy initiatives, 
an 11 billion US Dollar arms sales agreement  signed in July 2014, and which included 
Patriot missile batteries, attack helicopters, and anti-tank missiles (Blanchard, 2014) 
could be a significant sign that the differences were resolved and an unveiled 
agreement were brokered.  
In September 2014, seven senior MB figures were asked by Qatari officials to 
leave the country. Qatar also agreed to cease targeting the Egyptian government, led 
by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, through its al-Jazeera broadcast channel (Black, 2014b). 
Egypt being the relatively significant factor, Qatar`s support to Muslim Brotherhood in 
Middle East in general and more specifically in Syria and accusations regarding 
Qatar`s alleged support to Salafi groups like Al Nusra Front in Syria could have been 
important factors that prompted pressure from multiple actors on Qatar and enabled 
the shift. Consequently, on 16 November 2014, just before the 35th GCC summit that 
took place in December 2014 in Doha, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain decided to 
return their ambassadors to Qatar, normalising relations (Al Omran, 2014).  
Qatar used its financial capacity to foster the religiously oriented armed 
opposition groups for them to tip the balance against the Assad regime. Qatar is 
believed to have provided 400 million US Dollars to the opposition in Libya and 3 billion 
US Dollars in Syria (Akpınar, 2015) 
The process that led to Qatar giving up its role as the lead organiser of the 
Syrian opposition (Hammond, 2014) seems to have far reaching consequences for the 




scrutinised by US. However, rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia as a result of 
diverging agendas, coupled with politically and militarily diverging support strategies 
exacerbated the division among the rebels competing for resources. Overall, resulting 




Turkey attempted to mediate between Qaddafi and the opposition in Libya to 
realise a ceasefire and positioned itself against a military intervention in Libya. At that 
time Turkey had 15 billion US Dollar worth of business in Libya, so it can be argued 
that Turkey could have been driven by its own interest in defining its position against 
the Libyan uprising. Turkey also tried to find common ground in Syria. As Turkey`s 
arbitration efforts failed, Turkey relinquished its initial neutral position in Syria and 
shifted towards supporting the Syrian opposition against the Syrian regime (Akpınar, 
2015). 
Turkish-Syrian relations gradually developed after Abdullah Ocalan, the leader 
of Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)8, listed as a terrorist organisation by the EU, 
NATO, and US, had been deported from Syria after intensive Turkish pressure. The 
relationship prospered, especially under Turkey`s ‘zero problems with the neighbours’ 
policy after 2001, leading to numerous accords, including a free-trade agreement 
(Barkey, 2012). 
As the conflict started, Turkey continued communicating with both the Assad 
regime and the opposition in an effort to find a peaceful solution that could meet the 
                                                          
8 Kurdistan Workers' Party. Formed in 1978 and launched an armed struggle against the 




democratisation demands of the protestors gradually. However, Assad’s reluctance to 
initiate reforms and continued brutal crackdown of civilians altered Turkey’s stance 
against Assad regime. Turkey adopted sanctions on the Syrian regime and called on 
Assad to step down (Küçükkeleş, 2012). Turkey broke with the Syrian regime at a time 
when bilateral economic investments and relations were strong (Ennis & Momani, 
2013). Turkey’s policy change in August 2011 coincided with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and Bahrain’s decision to withdraw their ambassadors from Syria (Bleek & Stein, 
2012) and US President Obama’s call for Assad to step down, which reinforced the 
regional and global opposition against Assad regime.  
Barkey attributes Turkey’s policy change over Syria to three factors: 
displeasure at state official level stemming from Assad`s reluctance to reform; the 
government’s conviction that the Assad regime was about to collapse; and the belief 
that as brutal crackdown of opposition continued the more likely the conflict would 
morph into a protracted sectarian civil war, damaging Syrian social fabric and spilling 
into neighbouring countries, especially Iraq and Turkey (Barkey, 2012).  
In that context, Ankara rallied to expedite the departure of the Assad regime to 
mitigate the damage to both Syria and the region. So, Ankara openly proposed 
creating a “buffer zone” inside Syria to protect refugees within Syrian territory on the 
Turkish border and hosted the Syrian National Council in Turkey as the political 
opposition meant to be legitimate representatives of the Syrian opposition and people 
(Karon, 2011).  
Turkey followed a mediation role on three fronts: a mediation role which proved 
unsuccessful with the Assad regime; efforts to bring various opposition groups 




mediation to open up constructive engagement of regional and global actors (Aras, 
2014). 
The first acute tension between Syria and Turkey arose over the shooting down 
of a Turkish reconnaissance aircraft by a surface to air missile on 22nd June 2012 while 
it was flying over Mediterranean international airspace 15 minutes after it momentarily 
drifted into Syria's air space (The Telegraph, 2012). On 11th May 2013 two powerful 
car bombs killed at least 43 people in Reyhanli, a town near Turkey’s border with Syria. 
The attackers reportedly belonged to an organisation linked to Assad’s intelligence 
services (NYTimes, 2013). On 17th September 2013 a car bomb exploded on the 
Syrian side of the main Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey, killing at least 7 
people and wounding 20. The explosion in Bab al-Hawa took place a day after Turkish 
forces shot down a Syrian helicopter that had entered Turkey's airspace (Reuters, 
2013). 
Turkey also has perceived the presence of the Democratic Union Party (PYD)/ 
the People’s Protection Units (YPG)9 in the northern part of Syria, where it meets the 
Turkish border, as a threat to its security. Turkey was particularly concerned that US 
weapons supplied to PYD/YPG forces in their fight against ISIL in Kobane could be 
later used against Turkey. It also believed that US-led coalition efforts to degrade and 
destruct ISIL without targeting the Assad regime, (which Turkey believes to be the root 
causes of the instability and rise of ISIL) would be counterproductive (Sly, 2014). 
Turkey prioritised removing the Assad regime, while the US strived to defeat ISIL first 
and foremost and prevent the fall of Iraq to ISIL control. The disagreement over the 
                                                          
9 The Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat-PYD) and its armed wing, the 






priorities and goals led Turkey to decline US demands to use the Incirlik Base as a 
staging ground for operations against ISIL (Ratnam & Hudson, 2014). 
Another sticking point between Turkey and the US was the establishment of a 
no-fly zone, similar to the one employed in the Libya conflict. The Obama 
administration consistently opposed establishing no-fly zone in Syria, initially and more 
profoundly at the nascent phase of the civil war and subsequently in the wake of 
chemical weapon attack by the Syrian regime in August 2013. The US’s reluctance to 
establish no-fly zone, particularly after August 2013, led regional actors such as 
Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to more strongly promote a ‘no-fly zone’ or a `safe 
zone` in Syria (Kahf, 2016) and contributed to the increased civilian toll, further 
destruction of infrastructure and the lack of safety in the territories claimed by rebels 
(Lucas, 2016)  
Another consequence of a lack of direct military action from the US after the 
use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against civilians and the opposition 
was seen as a shift in support given by regional actors to more fundamentalist rebel 
groups. The Wilson Centre’s Middle East Program Director, Henri J. Barkey, argues 
that the US’s refusal to establish no-fly zones in Syria was one of the primary factors 
that led Turkish authorities to lean towards Islamic oriented opposition groups (Barkey, 
2014) in parallel to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The genuine Turkish ambition to 
establish a no-fly zone in Northern Syria is also a contradictory issue. On one hand, 
Ankara publicly attributed its demand for establishing a no-fly zone or buffer zone in 
Syria on the basis of ‘humanitarian necessity’, given that it would provide a safe area 
for displaced refugees and prevent the Syrian conflict further spill over into Turkey. 




curb Kurdish groups in Northern Syria from seeking autonomy by controlling a 
continuous swath of territory (Beehner & Meibauer, 2016). 
Initially Turkey prioritised overthrowing the Assad regime and strongly 
supported the FSA. However, as it proved difficult to topple Assad regime – largely 
because of the support given by Russia, Iran, Hezbollah and other Shia groups – 
Turkey allegedly turned a blind eye for a period to more extreme elements who were 
organising, recruiting and provisioning from inside Turkey. However, as ISIL became 
a direct threat to Turkey and for the region in the first half of 2015, Turkey felt 
compelled to tighten security on the border and restrict the free movement of 
extremists transiting the country towards Syria. Similarly, initially Turkey pursued an 
active policy to establish an internationally safeguarded and rebel-administered safe 
zone inside Syria (Strategic Comments, 2016) to support the rebel cause against the 
Assad regime. However, Turkey`s motivation for a no-fly zone or safe zone changed 
over time from allowing Syrian rebels to prosper and self-administer, to relieving the 
pressure inside Turkey stemming from refugees and preventing the PYD establishing 
continuous land control in Northern Syria. The most profound dilemma Turkey faced 
after 6 years of Syrian civil war was the emergence PYD/YPG as a viable 
counterweight to ISIL and partner for the US on the ground. The empowerment of 
PYD/YPG and US support to this group also became the biggest source of 
confrontation between the US and Turkey. 
 Having looked into regional countries` political and security calculations vis-à-vis 
the Libya and Syria conflicts and its impact on US policy, the following section will 
focus on the impact of a proliferation of weapons and terrorism on US security 
interests. While a power struggle among regional and global actors exacerbated the 




perceptions. The number of Salafi extremist fighters (in, say, the Al Nusra Front and 
ISIL) dramatically increased between 2010 and 2013. The proximity of extremist threat 
to US allies like Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and the European Union made the threat more 
prominent for the US (S. G. Jones, 2014) 
 The Al Nusra Front was established in late 2011 by Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). The 
US designated the Al Nusra Front as a terrorist organization in December 2012. 
Throughout 2012, a group of Al Qaeda (AQ) veterans dubbed the `Khorasan Group` 
reportedly began to arrive in Syria to plan international terror plots (Stanford, 2015a). 
US administration officials described the Khorasan Group as “a cell of Al Qaeda 
veterans plotting attacks against the US and Europe, most likely an attempt to blow 
up an airplane in flight” (Dilanian, 2014). In late September 2014, President Obama 
announced that the US had “conducted strikes to disrupt terror plots against the US 
and our allies by seasoned AQ operatives in Syria, known as the Khorasan Group” 
(Obama, 2014b). 
 AQI expanded into Syria and, in April 2013, the group changed its name to ISIL. 
The ISIL leadership declared the merger of the group with the Al Nusra Front. 
However, both AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Al Nusra Front leadership denied 
the merger. AQ officially refuted any connection with ISIL in February 2014.  After 
seizing territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIL declared the establishment of a Caliphate on 
29th June 2014 (Stanford, 2015b). 
 ISIL’s battlefield successes and increasingly sectarian tone during the Syrian 
conflict created a conducive environment for the group to recruit Sunni militants from 
across the world. ISIL managed to control large territory in the east and north of Syria 
(Laub, 2016) , established a caliphate, controlled territory and attempted to exercise 




weapons, munitions and equipment from Syrian and Iraqi military stocks and from 
other armed groups in Syria that had been armed by the Gulf States, the US and 
Turkey, were instrumental in ISIL gaining the upper hand among the armed groups in 
Syria (Amnesty International, 2015). 
On 10th September 2014, President Obama underlined the threat posed by 
ISIL at the regional and global level when he said:  
ISIL poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and the broader Middle 
East -- including American citizens, personnel and facilities. If left 
unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that 
region, including to the United States. …Our Intelligence Community 
believes that thousands of foreigners -- including Europeans and some 
Americans -- have joined them in Syria and Iraq.  Trained and battle-
hardened, these fighters could try to return to their home countries and 
carry out deadly attacks (Obama, 2014g). 
 
 Joe Klein from Time magazine argues that defeating ISIL came to fore as a 
prioritised US national-security interest, which also necessitated keeping President 
Assad in power (Klein, 2015) in order to avoiding creating a further security void that 
could be exploited and filled by ISIL and other extremist groups.   
 In addition to the emergence of ISIL as a prominent extremist force in Syria, the 
establishment of a new coalition among the most powerful seven other Salafist 
factions in September 2013 aiming to establish a state governed under Sharia law in 
Syria (Szybala, 2013) was a significant blow to the Syrian National Coalition and 
Supreme Military Council. The fact that the new alliance declared they did not 
recognise the Syrian National Coalition and Supreme Military Council undermined the 
credibility and viability of political and military opposition (BBC News, 2013b).  
 In particular, ISIL and the AQ affiliated Al Nusra Front constituted a significant 
threat to the US, with their clear intention and capabilities to target US interests in the 
region and conduct attacks abroad through both battle hardened and indoctrinated 




has been the number one priority in US foreign policy since the 9/11 attacks, as it 
constitutes a direct threat to US citizens and interests. So, the expected US response 
to a growing terrorism threat in Libya and Syria since 2011 was to apply all elements 
of the intervention spectrum to counter extremism and terrorism in the region. The only 
element the US reserved so far has been boots on the ground in a combat role, even 
though multiple regional allies pledged to support potential US ground operations 
against ISIL. Instead of that option, the US preferred to support local proxies against 
ISIL through their train-advise-assist program conducted by Special Operation Forces, 
share intelligence, provide lethal and non-lethal weapons and equipment, conduct 
close air support, air strikes and strikes from sea based platforms coupled and 
undertake non-military intervention to undermine the extremist group’s funding, 
recruitment and propaganda efforts.  
Another dimension which came to the fore several times during the Syrian 
conflict was preventing the spread and use of WMDs. Before the conflict, Syria 
possessed more than 1,000 tons of chemical agents and precursor chemicals. This 
stockpile included the nerve agent, sarin mustard agent, and nerve agent VX 
(Blanchard, Humud, & Nikitin, 2014).   
 As the Obama administration saw mass Syrian chemical weapon stockpiles as 
a threat to its security interests and those of its allies` in the region, President Obama 
set the red line as `the transfer or the use of those weapons` in a press conference in 
August 2012. 
That’s an issue that doesn’t just concern Syria; it concerns our close allies 
in the region, including Israel.  It concerns us.  We cannot have a situation 
where chemical or biological weapons are falling into the hands of the 
wrong people.  We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to 
other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a 
whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.  We 




that that’s a red line for us and that there would be enormous 
consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons 
front or the use of chemical weapons (Obama, 2012c). 
 
The Obama administration’s chemical weapons red-line was necessitated by 
the security consequences of inaction, rather than the civilian casualties the use of 
these weapons would cause. This argument can be confirmed by looking at the 
proportion and the scale of casualties through conventional weapons and means as 
opposed to the tiny fraction of deaths caused by chemical weapon usage. The US 
primarily feared that the weapons could fall into the hands of terrorist groups and 
spread of chemical weapons in the region could destabilise the region by provoking 
greater refugee flows (Hamid, 2013) 
The most prominent incident during the course of the conflict was the use of 
chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21st August 2013. The UN 
dedicated teams of experts from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons and the World Health Organization. Their report, issued on 13th September 
2013, concluded that “chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing conflict 
between the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic”, and that “surface-to-surface rockets 
containing the nerve agent sarin were used in Ghouta area of Damascus” (United 
Nations, 2013).  
Even though UK Prime Minister David Cameron had lost the vote for military 
action against President Assad on 29th August 2013 for using chemical weapons 
(Anthony, 2013), White House officials indicated that the US would proceed without 
British support, since Obama believed core US interests were at stake and that 
international norms regarding chemical weapon needed to be upheld (Stacey, Rigby, 




 In his speech on 31st August 2013, Obama called the attack an assault on human 
dignity and a danger to US national security.  He also underscored that the attack 
undermined the global prohibition of chemical weapons, endangered allies like Israel, 
Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq and increased the risk of a further use of chemical 
weapons or those weapons ending up in the hands of terrorist groups (Obama, 2013f). 
In his address to the nation on 10th September 2013 President Obama 
explained why he believed the US should take military action against Syrian regime: 
The Assad regime will see no reason to stop using chemical weapons. As 
the ban against these weapons erodes, other tyrants will have no reason to 
think twice about acquiring poison gas, and using them.  Over time, our 
troops would again face the prospect of chemical warfare on the battlefield.  
And it could be easier for terrorist organizations to obtain these weapons, 
and to use them to attack civilians. If fighting spills beyond Syria’s borders, 
these weapons could threaten allies like Turkey, Jordan, and Israel.  And a 
failure to stand against the use of chemical weapons would weaken 
prohibitions against other weapons of mass destruction, and embolden 
Assad’s ally, Iran -- which must decide whether to ignore international law 
by building a nuclear weapon, or to take a more peaceful path. Our ideals 
and principles, as well as our national security, are at stake in Syria, along 
with our leadership of a world where we seek to ensure that the worst 
weapons will never be used (Obama, 2013c). 
 
When the Syrian regime crossed the ‘red line’ by using chemical weapons, the 
threat of military intervention was a real possibility. At that point an alternative option 
was presented when the US and Russia agreed to the elimination of Syria’s chemical 
weapons stockpile. The same day Syria signed the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(Trapp, 2014). UNSC resolution 2118 was adopted on 27th September 2013 to ensure 
the transfer of Syria’s chemical weapons to international control (UNSC 2118, 2013). 
On 14th November 2013 the OPCW approved the destruction of Syria’s 
chemical weapons. The agents were transferred from storage facilities to the Syrian 
port of Latakia. From the port, Danish and Norwegian ships picked up the chemicals. 
The most dangerous compounds were transferred at an Italian port to Cape Ray, a 




neutralised at sea. Less sensitive chemicals were shipped to commercial facilities in 
Finland, the UK and the US (Blanchard et al., 2014). However, the US publicly voiced 
its suspicions that the Assad regime kept a residual chemical weapon capability and 
accused Assad of using chlorine on many occasions, despite binding resolutions (T. 
Juneau, 2015).  
The start of the dismantling process had almost coincided with Iranian 
President Hasan Rouhani`s assuming office in August 2013. As Rouhani was known 
as a pragmatic reformist, a promising expectation to broker a deal with Iran to ensure 
it abandons nuclear weapon development ambition in exchange for sanctions relief 
emerged under P5+1 negotiations. The US did not want to endanger the negotiation 
process, which provided a golden opportunity to resolve long lasting problems with 
Iran by directly intervening in Syria and confronting Iran and Russia (Stevenson, 
2014). The Obama administration opted to work with Russia on both the Iranian and 
Syrian problems so as to not jeopardize its chances of success, especially on the 
nuclear deal with Iran (Rugh, 2013). 
While a lack of direct military intervention of the US against Syrian regime over 
the chemical weapon usage was largely interpreted as a failure to impose a clearly 
defined red line, some argued that using the threat of force accomplished the intended 
outcome of the red line itself. Derek Chollet, who served in the Obama Administration 
in the White House, State Department, and Pentagon, argued that through “coercive 
diplomacy”, the Obama administration managed to address the threat from Syria’s 
chemical weapons, the outcome intended by the red line which military power would 
not achieve (Chollet, 2016). 
 On the other hand, the nuclear talks that seemed to be progressing with Iran 




backer of Assad, potential US involvement in Syria would make life very difficult for 
the Iranians, which could also threaten the success of the nuclear talks. So, the level 
of US support to the opposition could have been used by the US as a tool to pressure 
Iran into negotiations (Interviewee 3, 2015), or at least the risk of disrupting the whole 
process could have caused the US to refrain from taking direct action even after the 
use of chemical weapon.  
 The more sophisticated WMD programme Syria had, with various agents and 
multiple delivery means, meant that it was capable of reaching key US allies and some 
US facilities in the region. This constituted a significant threat to US interests. The 
Syrian regime crossed the red line drawn by the US by using chemical agents during 
the civil war on multiple occasions. Potential residual capability undeclared during the 
2013 deal and the constant use of chlorine gas against the opposition and civilians still 
means that Syrian WMD capability is a threat to the region and US interests.  
 The level of threat posed by the Syrian chemical weapons program 
necessitated a direct military response from the US, including the use of Special 
Forces or other US forces in combat roles. However, potential regional implications 
and domestic constraints seem to have prevented the US following that path. 
Lastly, the destabilising effect of a refugee inflow on neighbouring countries 
influenced regional calculations and had security knock-on effects. The civil war in 
Syria led to a humanitarian catastrophe and a refugee crisis. This was especially the 
case since the beginning of 2013 as the intensity of the conflict increased and many 
Syrians sought shelter outside of Syria (Beauchamp, 2015).  
The overwhelming majority of those who have fled Syria ended up in five 
neighbouring countries: Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. (Canadian Council 




4.8 million (Egypt: 118,000, Iraq: 245,000, Turkey: 2,700,000, Lebanon: 1,067,000, 
Jordan 639,000) (UNHCR, 2016).  
Europe’s rising vulnerability to instability in North Africa and the Middle East 
compelled it to adopt a more assertive foreign policy (Sperling, 2016). According to a 
Migration Policy Institute report, more than 120,000 migrants and refugees departing 
from Libya, Tunisia, or Egypt arrived in Europe between January and September 2015 
through the central Mediterranean Route (primarily Italy and Malta). On the other hand, 
more than 350,000 individuals, mainly from Syria, crossed from Turkey to Greece 
through the eastern Mediterranean route in the first nine months of 2015 (Banulescu-
bogdan & Fratzke, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 12 Number of Syrian Refugees, March 2012-August 2015 
 
In his testimony to the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 1st March 
2016, NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, General  Philip Breedlove, firmly 
argued that the Russian and Syrian regime was using the refugee crisis purposefully 
to “overwhelm” and “break” Europe`s cohesion and as a ‘weapon’, through targeting 




Together Russian and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing 
migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break 
European resolve. Barrel bombs are designed to terrorize, get people out of 
their homes and get them on the road and make them someone else's 
problem. These indiscriminate weapons used by both Bashar al-Assad, and 
the non-precision use of weapons by the Russian forces, I can't find any other 
reason for them other than to cause refugees to be on the move and make 
them someone else's problem (Breedlove, 2016). 
 Similar views were articulated by US Senator John McCain in his speech at the 
Munich Security Conference. He defined Russian strategy as an attempt “to 
exacerbate the refugee crisis and use it as a weapon to divide the transatlantic alliance 
and undermine the European project” by increasing the flow of refugees towards 
Turkey and Europe (S. Jones, 2016). By November 2015, just a month after the 
Russian’s direct military involvement (which started on the 30th September 2015) in 
Syria, the number of refugees leaving Syria for Europe had already increased by 26%, 
according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees figures (Stent, 
2016). 
The refugees and immigrants fleeing from both the Libyan and Syrian conflicts 
and the wider regional instability constituted a significant threat to Europe. The 
numbers of refugees increased alongside a rise in the intensity of fighting on the 
ground and put pressure on neighbouring countries and the EU to find a quick fix to 
the refugee crisis. In Libya, quick enforcement of a no fly zone and targeting of Libyan 
armed forces was the expected US option to increase the security of Libyan people. 
Establishment of a no-fly zone could have helped protect the Syrian people within their 
borders. These options could have easily reduced both the number of refugees and 








 US export and import figures to and from Syria were significantly lower compared 
to those with Libya. Even at a time when bilateral trade volume reached its peak in 
2010, US exports and imports accounted for 503.3 million and 429.3 million USD 




Figure 13 U.S. trade in goods with Syria, US Census Bureau 
 
 
 In similar vein,  US imports of crude oil and petroleum products from Syria in 
2010 was approximately 3,188,000 Barrels (eia, 2015b), which corresponded to 0.06%  
of the US’s total crude oil imports. US economic interests in Syria was not significant 
enough on its own to urge the US to take militarily action. The potential threat to oil 
and gas infrastructure in the region stemming from the protracted conflict in Syria and 
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was a threat to the US interests. Particularly, ISIL captured and used oil fields in Syria 
and posed risk to energy transit routes and sources in the neighbouring states.  
 





 President Obama underlined that the Arab Spring was a chance for the US to 
‘pursue the world as it should be’ based on shared values. He said that, “the United 
States supports a set of universal rights. And these rights include free speech, the 
freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women 
under the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders…Our support for these 
principles is not a secondary interest.” (Goldberg, 2016) 
 The US administration saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity to bring stability 
and peace to the Middle East and North Africa by replacing long-time dictatorships 

















capitalize on public support among the Middle East and North African populations for 
democratic change in the region (Interviewee 3, 2015). 
 As the Syrian conflict became militarised and the Syrian regime started using 
conventional weapon systems against the population and rebels in August 2011, the 
death toll started increasing dramatically. While there are different figures about the 
total death toll in Syria as a result of the civil conflict (because of the difficulties in 
tracking the actual figures) the highest estimated figure from the Syrian Centre for 
Policy Research is 470,000 (as of February 2016). 400,000 of the deaths are attributed 
directly to violence in Syria, while the remaining 70,000 are believed to come from the 
consequences of war such as the lack of adequate health services, medicine, shortage 
of food, clean water, sanitation and proper housing. In addition to the massive  toll 
45% of population have been displaced either as refugees (more than 4 million 
abroad) or internally displaced (6.36 million) (Black, 2016) 
 However, the US failed to respond in the Syrian conflict to protect civilians and 
support political and armed opposition in a decisive fashion in their effort to establish 
democracy, attain basic human rights and political and economic freedom. To prevent 
the mass killings of civilians in Syria, the enforcement of a no fly zone, targeting of 
Syrian long range ballistic missile capability, and decapitating the Syrian Air Force 
were the bare minimum responses expected from the US since the vast majority of 
civilian casualties were inflicted through air strikes. With regards to establishment of 
democracy in Syria, since the Assad regime stopped short of political reform the only 
option left was to support and prepare vetted political and armed opposition for regime 
change and post-conflict Syria. However, the intervening variables (which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters) seemed to have prevented the US 





 It can be argued that all the conditions that led to application of R2P in Libya 
were all valid in Syria. In particular, after the Assad regime started targeting civilians 
with conventional weapons and subsequently chemical weapons it was a direct threat 
to international order. During the discussions in the US Congress regarding the use of 
chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, Democratic 
Senator Carl Lewin underscored that failure to act against the use of chemical 
weapons would weaken the international prohibition on chemical weapons use and 
eventually lead to greater proliferation of these weapons an increase the potential of 
them falling into the hands of terrorists (Lewin, 2013) 
 Democrat Party Senator Tim Kaine also believed that the US should act to uphold 
the most important international norm that weapons of mass destruction can’t be used 
against civilians (Kaine, 2013). Republican Senator Charlie Dent highlighted two US 
national interests in Syria: limiting Iranian influence in the region and securing 
chemical weapons from both the Assad regime and extremist elements of the Syrian 
opposition (Dent, 2013). 
Democratic Party Senator Barbara Boxer also mentioned that if the US fails to 
act in the face of chemical weapons usage against civilians, North Korea and Iran 
would be emboldened to pursue their nuclear weapon development, putting US troops 
and Israeli troops at risk (Boxer, 2013). Not only was the credibility of the US at stake 
as a consequence of inaction, but also that of the international community.  
 UNSC Resolution 2139, adopted on 22nd February 2014, demands all parties 
immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the indiscriminate 
employment of weapons in populated areas, including shelling and aerial 




 During the discussions about UNSC Resolution 2235, which aimed to establish 
a mechanism to identify those using chemical weapons in Syria, on 7th August 2015 
Samantha Power admitted that, despite previous efforts to end the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria — including the adoption of UNSC Resolutions 2118 in September 
2013 (Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons) and 2209 in March 2015, 
(Security Council Condemns Use of Chlorine Gas as Weapon in Syria) — the attacks 
had continued (UNSCR 2235, 2015).  
Both the Libya and Syria conflict met the criteria for the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
that would have justified US action. However, lack of action in Syria undermined the 
UN’s credibility as the guarantor of peace and security. Use of conventional armed 
forces, barrel bombs and chlorine gas intentionally against civilians and, in particular, 
clear breaches of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the Syrian regime (which 
was, then, also a violation of the US administration`s red line) necessitated military 
response.  
 
Interpretation and Analysis 
For the Syria case the analysis will be based on five distinct phases.  
  Start End  
Phase 1 
The onset of the Syrian demonstrations 
in March 2011 
 Mass killings of protestors by Syrian 
regime in August 2011 
Phase 2 
Mass killings of protestors by Syrian 
regime in August 2011 
Emergence of united political and armed 
opposition in Nov/Dec 2012 
Phase 3 
Emergence of united political and 
armed opposition in Nov/Dec 2012 
The use of chemical weapons by Syrian 
regime in August 2013 
Phase 4 
The use of chemical weapons by Syrian 
regime in August 2013 
ISIL took control of vast swath of 
territory in Syria and declared caliphate 
in Summer 2014 
Phase 5 
ISIL took control of vast swath of 
territory in Syria and declared a 
caliphate in Summer 2014 
Russia started building up military force 
inside Syria in support of Syrian 
operation in September 2015 





In the first phase of the Syrian conflict the prospect for a political solution was 
held by the US and regional allies such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. However, with 
regards to ‘security’ and stability, gradually increasing Iranian influence in the region 
on the basis of a sectarian agenda and shared threat perception between Iran and 
Syria against the US and Israel were against US security interests. The Syrian regime 
also had funnelled Iranian arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon and had large stockpiles of 
chemical weapons and materials, which posed threat to the US and regional allies. 
So, the threat to security and instability from the Syrian conflict for US interests was 
assessed to be ‘high’. 
US economic interests in Syria were, on their own, not significant enough to 
urge the US to take militarily action. Neither bilateral trade nor energy were important 
factors for the US in the Syria context. Furthermore, at the nascent phase of the 
conflict the threat to energy transition routes that could have affected the flow of 
energy from Middle East was also not a source of a significant concern. So, the 
‘prosperity’ interest was assessed to be ‘low’  
 Even at the nascent phase of the conflict during the protests, the Syrian regime 
security forces opened fire, killed and imprisoned civilians. Long lasting human rights 
violations increasingly continued during the uprising. So, the US saw the regional 
uprisings as a chance to initiate a new beginning in the Middle East that could lead to 
democratic and accountable governments, which, in turn, could decrease violent 
extremism. So, the threat to ‘values’ was assessed to be ‘high’.  
As the protests gradually evolved into armed conflict a `responsibility to 
protect` was articulated within the US administration and, in that regard, the Syria 




of atrocities against its own population, the US and wider international community 
saw that as a violation of the emerging norm. So, the threat posed to upholding 
‘international norms’ was assessed to be `high’. 
In the second phase of the Syrian conflict, it became further militarised. With 
regards to security, Russia, Iran, and LH provided full support to the Syrian regime, 
whereas Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and much of the Gulf became heavily involved, 
because of the sectarian element in the Syria conflict.  That increased the risks for 
intensified sectarian war and spill over effects in the region. So, the threat to ‘security’ 
interest is assessed to be ‘high’ 
Potential spill over effects into neighbouring countries increased the threat to 
energy production and transition routes in the region. So, the ‘prosperity’ interest 
was assessed to be ‘medium’.  
The use of state violence and military force against the protesters and armed 
opposition intensified throughout 2011 and early 2012.  The death toll started 
dramatically increasing in that time frame. So, the threat to US ‘values’ is assessed 
to be ‘high’. 
As the regime`s use of conventional forces against the protestors and civilians 
increased, the number of causalities, refugees and internally displaced people 
increased. That urged action under the `responsibility to protect`. So, the threat to 
upholding ‘international norms’ interest was assessed to be `High`.   
In the third phase of the conflict a united moderate opposition provided a 
golden opportunity for the US to support political and armed opposition and make a 
meaningful change on the ground. As the regime started losing ground to the armed 
opposition Hezbollah, alongside Iranian forces, increased direct combat support to 




danger in Syria started gaining more traction, particularly after the killing of the US 
Ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, by armed militants in Benghazi (an attack 
which had a potential AQ connection). Concurrently, within the armed opposition, the 
Al Nusra Front and ISIL started becoming more prominent and attracting foreign 
fighters from all across the world, including Europe and the US. The increased 
sectarian tone and scaled up Russian and Iranian support also stimulated more 
foreign fighters to travel Syria. As a result of increased fighting among Syrian regime 
forces, western backed armed opposition, Al Nusra Front and ISIL the number of 
Syrian refugees, particularly since the beginning of 2013, escalated to a degree which 
was enough to destabilise the receiving states by stretching social-economic 
conditions. So the threat to the US’s ‘security’ interest was assessed to be ‘high’. 
An increased extremist threat and potential spill over effects into neighbouring 
countries increased potential threat to energy production and transition routes in the 
region. So, the threat to the `prosperity` interest was assessed to be `high`.  
Increased fighting among armed opposition groups, extremists groups, the 
regime and Hezbollah fighters led to a steep upsurge in the death toll and, with it, a 
fading in the prospects for political solution and a democratic Syria. So, the threat to 
‘values’ was assessed to be ‘high’.  
As the regime indiscriminately employed weapons in populated areas, 
including shelling, aerial bombardment and the use of barrel bombs, the number of 
causalities, refugees, internally displaced people increased. That urged action under 
the `responsibility to protect`; the inability of the UNSC to prevent mass killings and 
to ease humanitarian crisis also undermined the credibility of the UN. So the threat to 




In the fourth phase of the Syrian conflict, the chemical weapon threat and 
extremist groups dominating the opposition significantly changed the dynamics in 
Syria. As ISIL managed to control large swaths of territory, it created safe havens 
inside Syria. Al Nusra Front and ISIL started targeting LH and Iranian targets within 
Lebanon, which further increased the concern of spill-over effects in the region. 
Salafist factions united to establish a Syrian state governed under Sharia law and 
declared they did not recognise Syrian National Coalition and Supreme Military 
Council. That undermined the credibility and viability of moderate political and military 
opposition. The most prominent incident during the course of the conflict was the use 
of chemical weapons in Damascus, which killed more than a thousand civilians. 
President Obama saw core US security interests at stake. As the attack undermined 
the global prohibition of chemical weapons, increased risk of further use posed 
existential threat to US allies in the region (Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq) 
and increased the risks of chemical weapons ending up in the hands of terrorist 
groups. The start of Syrian chemical weapon dismantling process had almost 
coincided with preparations for increased negotiations with Iran to stop its nuclear 
weapon development program, which was another strategic US interest. So, the 
threat to US ‘security’ interest was assessed to be ‘very high’.   
Increased extremist threat and potential spill over effects into neighbouring 
countries, coupled with chemical weapon proliferation, maintained the potential threat 
to energy production and transition routes in the region. So, the threat to `prosperity` 
interest was assessed to be `high`.  
An increased extremist threat and ISIL holding territory in Syria and imposing 
Sharia under its controlled zone directly threatened US values of free will and 




importantly, red lines drawn by President Obama with regards to use of chemical 
weapons was crossed bluntly by the Syrian regime. Even after Syria agreed to 
dismantle its chemical weapon program, use of chlorine continued and employment 
of conventional weapons against the civilians increased, causing thousands of civilian 
casualties. So the threat to ‘values’ was assessed to be ‘very high’. 
The responsibility to protect, credibility of the UN and international norm 
prohibiting the use of chemical weapons was challenged by the Syrian regime by 
using chemical weapons against civilians in Damascus. The failure by the US and 
international community to take immediate action to uphold the most important 
international norm that weapons of mass destruction can’t be used against civilians 
would weaken the international prohibition on chemical weapons and pave the way 
for greater proliferation of these weapons. It would also increase the potential of these 
weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Inaction would also embolden North 
Korea and Iran in their effort to pursue nuclear weapon development and thus put the 
US and Israeli troops at risk in the region. So the threat against holding ‘international 
norms’ was assessed to be ‘very high’. 
In the fifth phase of the Syrian conflict ISIL became the primary threat in Syria. 
After seizing further territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIL declared the establishment of a 
self-declared caliphate. Increased plans and calls for lone wolf attacks by both AQ 
and ISIL in Europe and the US, escalated the threat perception. Increased number of 
groups pledging allegiance to ISIL started conducting attacks in North Africa and the 
Middle East, inflicting mass casualties. The lack of prospects for a better future in 
Syria prompted a wave of refugees crossing over into Europe, which threatened the 




foreign policy vis-à-vis the Syrian conflict, impacting the US`s position as well. So, the 
threat to `security` interests was assessed to be `Very High`.  
Increased cross-border extremist threats in the region posed a significant 
threat to energy production and transition routes in the region. So, the prosperity 
interest was assessed to be `high`.  
Expanded territory controlled by ISIL, their connection to Iraq and the 
establishment of self-declared caliphate continued threatening neighbouring 
countries and western values, particularly those concerning democratisation efforts. 
That was a significant direct threat to US values.  So, the threat to US `values` was 
assessed to be `very high`. 
As the Syrian regime continued to use chlorine despite signing a chemical 
weapon convention, the credibility of UN and international norms prohibiting the use 
of chemical weapons was further challenged by the Syrian regime, despite their 
legally binding obligations. So, the threat against upholding `international norms` 
was assessed to be `very high`. 
 
  Threat to US Interests in Syria   
  Security-stability Prosperity Values International Norm Overall 
Phase 1 High Low High High High 
Phase 2 High Medium High High High 
Phase 3 High High High High High 
Phase 4 Very High High 
Very 
High Very High Very High 
Phase 5 Very High High 
Very 
High Very High Very High 
Table 3 Threat to US Interests in Syria 
 
Looking into expected US foreign policy decisions for the Syrian conflict from the 




through both military and non-military intervention would serve its security interest, 
would reinforce democratisation efforts and help sustain the credibility of the US, UN 
and international norms aiming to protect basic human rights. Despite substantial 
threats to US interests in Syria during the first three episodes, the US stopped short 
of decisively engaging against the Assad regime, limited its response to sanctions, 
and provided very narrowly framed support to the rebels; it stopped short of providing 
lethal weapons of vital importance for them to confront the Assad regime’s 
conventional army. That stance was contrary to neorealist expectations, thus 
disconfirming H110. 
Even the use of chemical weapons by Assad regime in Syria at the beginning of 
fourth period, in breach of the red line clearly drawn by President Obama, did not 
significantly change US strategy against the Assad regime. That period overlapped 
with the emergence and empowerment of trans-regional extremist threats (particularly 
ISIL and AQ affiliated groups) targeting US citizens, regional US allies, international 
security, international prosperity, western values, and international norms. As a result, 
military intervention against extremist groups in Syria, rather than against the Syrian 
regime itself, became more important. Even though the Assad regime and ISIL posed 
a substantial, ‘very high’ threat to US interests, the US refrained from taking decisive 
action against both actors. That was contrary to neorealist expectations.  On the one 
hand, the US opted to eliminate Syria`s chemical weapons stockpile through 
diplomacy and used the threat of use of force to facilitate its US-Russia joint effort. On 
the other hand, instead of directly targeting ISIL in Syria with its own military means 
the US chose to support PYD/YPG forces in their confrontation with ISIL. The first US 
                                                          
10 H1:The US FPE take a decision to intervene militarily first and foremost in response to 




airstrikes against ISIL were spared until 23rd September 2014. Finally, in the fifth 
episode, US focus turned to fighting against ISIL, which posed an existential threat to 
US interests. However, even though the US administration was aware that without 
boots on the ground it was almost impossible to defeat ISIL, the US refrained from 
sending US troops to the region in a combat role and instead used its strike capability. 
The US either directly targeted ISIL and AQ positions and facilities or directed its 
strikes in support of PYD/YPG led Syrian Democratic Forces11 operations. That 
strategy serves to partially confirm H1, however as the US interests were at stake and 
threat posed to those interests were very high, the expected US action was an all-out 
war against ISIL, including boots on the ground.  
Having examined expected US foreign policy decisions for the Libyan and Syrian 
conflicts exclusively from the perspective of international incentives, key US interest 
and threats posed to those interest, it became evident that the US stopped short of 
adopting neorealist premises in the first place. While US interests in the Syrian case 
were high or very high, direct military action against the Syrian regime similar to that 
in the Libyan case did not materialise. That was also mostly true for US strategy 
against ISIL. This implies that international factors were not consequential in a causal 
sense in defining US foreign policy in Syria. That requires focusing the analyses on 
intervening variables, in line with neoclassical realist explanations, to understand other 
factors that altered US foreign policy decisions.  In the next chapter the effort will focus 
on how and to what extent the intervening variables affected and impeded the optimal 
foreign policy choices the US administration followed (H2).  
 
                                                          





Chapter 5 Intervening Variables 
Having analysed the threats to US interests pertaining to the Libya and Syria 
conflicts and established expected US behaviour, this chapter will be devoted to the 
potential impact of four intervening variables on US decision making: the Obama 
Doctrine; US economic constraints; elite perception of the opposition in Libya and 
Syria; and Congressional dynamics and public opinion. Intervening variables act either 
to reinforce the expected US decision – and so influence the timing, form and the scale 
of the intervention – or, alternatively, act to divert US behaviour from its expected 
course. The   aim of this chapter is to establish how far intervening variables   can 
explain the concordance (and discrepancy) between expected and actual foreign 
policy behaviour. H2 will be tested to understand if the analytical gap a pure neorealist 
perspective failed to fill could be sufficiently explained by a neoclassical realist outlook. 
For reference:  
     H2:  Domestic constraints (intervening variables) influence the form, timing, and 
scope of the intervention, and the rationale behind the deviation from 
expected intervention strategies can be explained by intervening variables.  
  
5.1 Elite Ideology/Obama Doctrine 
This part of the chapter firstly examines the contours of the Obama doctrine, 
and, secondly, considers how the basic tenets of the doctrine informed and contributed 
to the formulation of observed foreign policy behaviour in each episode for both the 
Libya and Syria cases. Embedded into the analysis are identified time periods, three 
salient turning points or catalytic moments (Qaddafi`s threat to attack Benghazi,  the 




in Syria). Associated US posturing will be analysed from the perspective of `Elite 
Ideology’ or, more colloquially, the ‘Obama Doctrine`.    
The elite ideology as an intervening variable encapsulates features of Obama 
Doctrine as a system of beliefs shaping the administration, particularly President 
Obama`s, strategic perceptions with regards to intervention as a foreign policy tool. 
The president and  his advisors enjoy primacy in determining foreign policy direction 
(Interviewee 3, 2015) as they constitute the American Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) 
(Lobell, 2009,p.56). So, getting into the details of their thinking and perceptions will be 
crucial to understand the Obama Doctrine, which was informed and shaped as a 
collective effort of FPE.  
The principal tenets of the Obama Doctrine can be summarised as follows 
(Atlas, 2012; R. G. Kaufman, 2014; Stepak & Whitlark, 2012) 
- Political and economic leadership, versus militarised dominance 
- Reduced military presence overseas, and the redistribution of America’s 
global military responsibilities to regional allies  
- A greater focus on soft power to deal with international threats and the use 
force as a last resort  
- Use force to sustain US interests and American values 
- Increased selectivity in the deployment and use of force, smaller military 
footprint abroad 
- Use force multilaterally, proportionally, for limited goals, with limited means  
- Use air power only with no or very limited “boots on the ground”  
- Focus on unconventional threats particularly global terrorism. 
Colin Dueck briefly summarises Obama Doctrine`s stance against intervention 
as ‘a more light-footed, cautious, multilateral, and low-cost approach toward US 
military interventions overseas’ in order to focus on nation-building at home (Dueck, 
2015, p.45). In broader terms, Dueck argues that President Obama had implicit grand 




on one hand and internationally retrenching America`s military presence overseas and 
accommodating international rivalries on the other in a way not to endanger the 
internal agenda (Dueck, 2015, p.2-3).  
President Obama`s campaign policy speech on Iraq, delivered on the 15th July 
2008, provides the initial blueprint of the Obama Doctrine as a foreign policy decision 
making framework with regards to US’s response to ongoing and emerging conflicts. 
President Obama reminded his audience that he had opposed going to war in Iraq and 
also declared his decision to redeploy US combat troops in Iraq by 2011 and keep 
only a residual force to target remnants of Al-Qaida and train and support the Iraqi 
Security Forces. President Obama argued that as a result of the Iraq War, thousands 
of American troops lost their lives, a trillion dollars had been spent, numerous allies 
were alienated and prominent emerging threats were neglected. He also particularly 
emphasised two main pillars of Obama Doctrine: using all elements of American power 
instead of exclusively relying on the US military as a foreign policy tool; and building 
and leading a coalition instead of alienating the US from the rest of world. President 
Obama also explained the five components of his foreign policy strategy to make 
America safer: “ending the war in Iraq responsibly; finishing the fight against Al Qaida 
and the Taliban; securing all nuclear weapons and materials from terrorists and rogue 
states; achieving true energy security; and rebuilding alliances to meet the challenges 
of the 21st century”. (Obama, 2008a) 
After Obama took office as US President in early 2009, he committed himself to 
repairing the US`s relationship with Muslim majority countries and ending the US 
military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. He expressed the details of his foreign 
policy strategy initially in his Cairo speech and then in the 2010 National Security 




President Obama delivered a key speech at Cairo University on 4th June 2009 
during an event co-hosted by Al Azhar University. As the title of the speech, `The New 
Beginning`, suggested, the President endeavoured to convey his message to Muslims 
around the world that his administration would open a new page and act differently in 
its engagement with the  Muslim world. “I've come here to Cairo to seek a new 
beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on 
mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and 
Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition,” he said.  President Obama 
made a distinction between the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions by stating that US 
involvement in the former was out of necessity while the latter was a war of choice. He 
stated that “…events in Iraq have reminded America of the need to use diplomacy and 
build international consensus to resolve our problems whenever possible. Indeed, we 
can recall the words of Thomas Jefferson:  I hope that our wisdom will grow with our 
power, and teach us that the less we use our power the greater it will be." (Obama, 
2009a). This reflects his dominant philosophy, which prioritises the use of non-military 
means to solve problems.  
In his Nobel Prize speech on 10th December 2009 Obama referred to the `just 
war` concept and stated that war can be justified if it is waged for self-defence, as a 
last resort, with proportional force and if it spares civilians from violence. With regards 
to international standards that govern the use of force he said “adhering to standards 
strengthens those who do, and isolates and weakens those who don't”. He also 
referred to the slaughter of civilians by their own government, and civil wars engulfing 
an entire region and said “force can be justified on humanitarian grounds”. As for global 
security, he stated that America cannot act alone and secure the peace. He highlighted 




rules and laws. He also denoted the contrasts between realists and idealists and said 
that he rejects “a stark choice between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless 
campaign to impose our values around the world`. He also said `No matter how 
callously defined, neither America's interests -- nor the world's -- are served by the 
denial of human aspirations”. (Obama, 2009b) 
In the National Security Strategy (NSS), published in 2010, President Obama 
stated that his administration`s priority was renewing the US economy as the primary 
source of American power in the aftermath of 2008 economic recession. The 
document  also highlighted that the adversaries of the US were trying to overextend 
US power in multiple domains and that the US would  not succeed by stepping outside 
the currents of international cooperation (Obama, 2010). With regards to the use of 
force, President Obama defined the conditions under which the US ought to take 
military action. His binary classification of multilateral and unilateral action was based 
on the threat perception against US interests and security.  
While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other 
options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and 
risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is 
necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and 
strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, 
working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council. The 
United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to 
defend our nation and our interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to 
standards that govern the use of force. Doing so strengthens those who 
act in line with international standards, while isolating and weakening 
those who do not. We will also outline a clear mandate and specific 
objectives and thoroughly consider the consequences —intended and 
unintended—of our actions (Obama, 2010). 
The NSS also called for a rebalancing of America’s global commitments away 
from Iraq and Afghanistan toward challenges the US was facing in Asia-Pacific region 




At a Joint Press Conference President Obama held with President Aquino on 
28th April 2014 in Manila, Philippines, President Obama was asked to explain `the 
Obama Doctrine` as guiding principles for his foreign policy decisions regarding 
ongoing crisis. In his response, Obama underlined the prominent tenets of his doctrine 
as: deploy military forces wisely as a last resort when core US security interests are 
at stake, avoid casualties and financial cost. His remarks implicitly questioned the US 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the outcome.  
Typically, criticism of our foreign policy has been directed at the failure to 
use military force.  And the question I think I would have is, why is it that 
everybody is so eager to use military force after we’ve just gone through a 
decade of war at enormous costs to our troops and to our budget?  And 
what is it exactly that these critics think would have been accomplished? 
My job as Commander-in-Chief is to deploy military force as a last resort, 
and to deploy it wisely.  And, frankly, most of the foreign policy 
commentators that have questioned our policies would go headlong into a 
bunch of military adventures that the American people had no interest in 
participating in and would not advance our core security interests (Obama, 
2014d).  
He used the Syria conflict as an example of this foreign policy perspective which 
focused on key US security interests. He said: 
So if you look at Syria, for example, our interest is in helping the Syrian 
people, but nobody suggests that us being involved in a land war in Syria 
would necessarily accomplish this goal.  And I would note that those who 
criticize our foreign policy with respect to Syria, they themselves say, no, 
no, no, we don’t mean sending in troops.  Well, what do you mean?  Well, 
you should be assisting the opposition -- well, we’re assisting the 
opposition.  What else do you mean?  Well, perhaps you should have 
taken a strike in Syria to get chemical weapons out of Syria.  Well, it turns 
out we’re getting chemical weapons out of Syria without having initiated a 
strike (Obama, 2014d).  
Remarks by President Obama at the United States Military Academy 
Commencement Ceremony on 28th May 2014 also delineated the fundamentals of 
Obama Doctrine with regards to the use of force. Obama stated his sensitivity about 
using US military power and suggested that the use of force should not be the only or 




hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.” He made a clear distinction 
between the US right to take unilateral action when core US interests and security of 
US citizens and allies are threatened and issues of global concern that do not pose a 
direct threat to US (Obama, 2014e). 
The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our 
core interests demand it -- when our people are threatened, when our 
livelihoods are at stake, when the security of our allies is in danger. …On the 
other hand, when issues of global concern do not pose a direct threat to the 
United States, when such issues are at stake -- when crises arise that stir our 
conscience or push the world in a more dangerous direction but do not 
directly threaten us -- then the threshold for military action must be higher.  In 
such circumstances, we should not go it alone.  Instead, we must mobilize 
allies and partners to take collective action.  We have to broaden our tools to 
include diplomacy and development; sanctions and isolation; appeals to 
international law; and, if just, necessary and effective, multilateral military 
action (Obama, 2014e).   
In his reference to the ongoing crisis in Syria President Obama described the 
issue as a conflict of global concern that does not pose direct threat to US. He stated 
that there was no easy military solution to the conflict and he justified his decision of 
not committing American troops to a sectarian war. He also mentioned his stance did 
not mean inaction and highlighted the role of international institutions such as NATO, 
the United Nations, the World Bank and the IMF as force multipliers in reducing the 
need for unilateral American action (Obama, 2014e). 
The indirect references to the main tenets of Obama Doctrine in his speeches 
on Libya and Syria conflicts also point to the desirability of multilateral US responses 
to global crises, more burden sharing with regional allies, limited intervention in scope 
and time, and putting no boots in harm’s way.  
A week after the protests started in eastern Libya, on 23rd February 2011 Obama 
stated that UN Security Council unanimously condemned the violence in Libya and 




African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and many individual 
nations”. He reassured that his administration was preparing a full range of options to 
respond to the crisis. He drew a distinction between actions the US could take 
unilaterally, those the US could coordinate with its allies and partner nations and those 
that could be carried out through multilateral institutions (Obama, 2011c).   
On 25th February, Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, announced that mass killings, arbitrary arrests, detention and torture of 
protestors had reportedly escalated and that tanks, helicopters and military aircraft had 
been used indiscriminately killing or injuring possibly thousands (Spencer, 2011). On 
26th February, the UN Security Council voted unanimously and adopted UNSC 
Resolution 1970 to impose sanctions on the Libyan regime. By this stage the UN 
reported that 1,000 people had died (BBC News, 2011a). 
In her memoirs, then Secretary of State Clinton draws attention to a National 
Security Council meeting in the White House on 9 March 2011 about the potential US 
intervention in Libya and underlines the lack of appetite and division among President 
Obama`s national security team for direct military intervention. Defence Secretary 
Gates firmly opposed intervention on the grounds that core national interests were not 
at stake in Libya. The Pentagon believed a no-fly zone would “unlikely be enough” to 
tip the balance in favour of rebels. UN Ambassador Susan Rice and National Security 
Council aide Samantha Power argued that the US had responsibility to protect civilians 
and prevent a massacre. (H. R. Clinton, 2015, 298-302) Similarly, Defence Secretary 
Gates memoirs reveal the division among foreign policy executives:.  
“Biden, Donilon, Daley, Mullen, McDonough, Brennan, and Robert Gates urging 
caution about military involvement, and UN Ambassador Susan Rice and NSS 
staffers Ben Rhodes and Samantha Power urging aggressive US action to 
prevent an anticipated massacre of the rebels as Qaddafi fought to remain in 




clout behind Rice, Rhode, and Power. I believed that what was happening in 
Libya was not a vital national interest of the US. (Gates, 2015,p.511) 
 
In response to the Libyan security forces use of conventional military forces 
against protesters and the increasing number of civilian casualties, the Arab League 
called on the UNSC on 12th March 2011 to impose a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya to protect 
civilians (Omorogbe, 2012). On 17th March 2011 the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, 
which authorized member states to take all necessary measures to protect civilians 
and establish a ban on all flights in the airspace (UN, 2011). 
Defence Secretary Robert Gates notes that in a private conversation, President  
Obama said that “the Libyan military operation had been a 51-49 call for him”. Gates 
also points out that the intervention was supposed to be a coordinated and joint 
operation, but French President Sarkozy sent aircraft several hours before the agreed 
start time. (Gates, 2015,p.519) 
On 18th March 2011, President Obama reassured that the international 
community would enforce the no-fly zone through military action. He highlighted that 
the US would act as part of an international coalition, which included European and 
Arab partners. He said that “American leadership is essential, but that does not mean 
acting alone -– it means shaping the conditions for the international community to act 
together…. this is precisely how the international community should work, as more 
nations bear both the responsibility and the cost of enforcing international law”. He 
also reaffirmed that the US was not going to deploy ground troops into Libya (Obama, 
2011a). 
The first US attacks against the Qaddafi regime occurred on 19th March and 
consisted mostly of Tomahawk attacks against air defence systems, radar sites, 




of Misurata and Sirte, in an effort to set the conditions for the no-fly zone 
implementation (NYTimes, 2011). US and UK cruise missiles fired from ships and 
submarines in the Mediterranean hit more than 20 Libyan air defence targets, firing 
more than 110 missiles, while French air attacks on 19 March focused on Libyan 
mechanized and motorised forces attacking rebel-held Benghazi (BBC News, 2011). 
 After the strikes started, Obama made clear that efforts to enforce a no-fly zone 
in Libya would be led by international partners and that the US would contribute with 
its distinctive capabilities, without deploying any US troops on the ground (Obama, 
2011e). 
On 28th March 2011 President Obama outlined why the US had responded to the 
Libya conflict. President Obama explained that the situation in Libya was a case where 
the safety of the US was not directly threatened, but its interests and values were, 
which brought about a responsibility to act. On the value domain he said:  
It’s true that America cannot use our military wherever repression 
occurs….In this particular country -Libya - at this particular moment, we 
were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale.  We had a 
unique ability to stop that violence:  an international mandate for action, a 
broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a 
plea for help from the Libyan people themselves.  We also had the ability 
to stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on 
the ground. (Obama, 2011d) 
  
President Obama also reiterated that the burden of action in response to Libya 
type of crisis should not be America’s alone.  He said:  
 
As we have in Libya, our task is instead to mobilize the international 
community for collective action.  Because contrary to the claims of some, 
American leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing all 
of the burden ourselves.  Real leadership creates the conditions and 
coalitions for others to step up as well; to work with allies and partners so 
that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs; 
and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by 
all….In this effort, the United States has not acted alone. Instead, we have 
been joined by a strong and growing coalition. This includes our closest 




Norway, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Turkey –- all of whom have fought by our 
sides for decades.  And it includes Arab partners like Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates, who have chosen to meet their responsibilities to defend the 
Libyan people (Obama, 2011d). 
 
On 20th September 2011 President Obama also emphasised the role of the 
international community in confronting global challenges at the United Nations High-
Level Meeting on Libya. He state that “this is how the international community should 
work in the 21st century -- more nations bearing the responsibility and the costs of 
meeting global challenges”(Obama, 2011g). 
The interviews that Jeffrey Goldberg, editor in chief of The Atlantic, conducted 
with President Obama as he was nearing to the end of his presidency highlights the 
significant tenets of Obama Doctrine and how the Libya experience influenced 
President Obama`s future calculus with regards to the Syrian civil war. Goldberg 
defines Obama as a retrenchment president, pursuing a policy focusing on cutting the 
costs, risks and sharing the burden with allies. Goldberg provides first-hand account 
of Obama`s candid evaluation of the Libya intervention in 2011. Obama acknowledges 
that the intervention did not work and the country was drifted into a deeper chaos since 
then. Obama also outlines basic issues that shaped his foreign policy choices with 
regards to Libya: 1) the social order in Libya was broken down, 2) massive protests 
took place against Qaddafi, 3) tribal divisions were significant, 4) Benghazi was the 
focal point for the opposition, 5) Qaddafi was about to attack Benghazi exclaiming ‘We 
will kill them like rats.’ (Goldberg, 2016). 
Goldberg also provides Obama`s discourse explaining why US intervened in 
Libya in a limited fashion. 
The way I looked at it was that it would be our problem if, in fact, complete 
chaos and civil war broke out in Libya. But this is not so at the core of U.S. 
interests that it makes sense for us to unilaterally strike against the Qaddafi 
regime. At that point, you’ve got Europe and a number of Gulf countries 
who despise Qaddafi, or are concerned on a humanitarian basis, who are 




need to get a UN mandate; we need Europeans and Gulf countries to be 
actively involved in the coalition; we will apply the military capabilities that 
are unique to us, but we expect others to carry their weight. And we worked 
with our defense teams to ensure that we could execute a strategy without 
putting boots on the ground and without a long- term military commitment 
in Libya.  
 
President Obama and his administration`s stance against the Syria conflict was 
not so different, particularly at the nascent phase of the conflict. After Syrian regime 
forces crushed protests in Hama in July 2011, killing up to 100 people (Black, 2011b), 
Hilary Clinton stated that “Assad has lost legitimacy, failed to deliver on the promises 
he has made, he is not indispensable and we have absolutely nothing invested in him 
remaining in power” (The Washington Post, 2011). 
The Secretary of State`s statement was reinforced a month later on 18th August 
2011 by Obama`s call for Assad to step down: 
My administration is announcing unprecedented sanctions to deepen the 
financial isolation of the Assad regime and further disrupt its ability to 
finance a campaign of violence against the Syrian people.  I have signed a 
new Executive Order requiring the immediate freeze of all assets of the 
Government of Syria subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting U.S. 
persons from engaging in any transaction involving the Government of 
Syria.  This E.O. also bans U.S. imports of Syrian-origin, petroleum or 
petroleum products; prohibits U.S. persons from having any dealings in or 
related to Syria’s petroleum or petroleum products; and prohibits U.S. 
persons from operating or investing in Syria (Obama, 2011i). 
 
However, the US administration was reluctant to take direct military action 
against the Syrian regime until the allegations emerged regarding the Syrian Armed 
Forces` use of chemical weapons. During a press conference on 30th April 2013 
President Obama referred to use of chemical weapons in Syria by Assad regime as a 
`game-changer` that would lead him to reconsider the spectrum of options at his 
disposal to prevent  further attacks and the dissemination of chemical weapons, which 




When chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21st August 2013 
were used,  White House officials indicated that the US would act militarily against the 
Syrian regime, since Obama believed core US interests were at stake and countries 
violating international norms regarding chemical weapons needed to be held 
accountable (Stacey et al., 2013). 
The National Security Council was posturing towards punitive strikes against the 
Assad regime and President Obama seemed to have inclined towards military action 
too in the wake of the attack. However, on 30th August 2013, a day after UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron lost a vote in Parliament to authorize participation in an allied 
strike against Syria, Obama decided to seek Congressional approval for military 
action. President Obama revealed his surprising decision to National Security Council 
members after a walk with White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough (Todd, 2013). 
Goldberg claims Denis McDonough warned President Obama about the risks of 
intervention while President Obama shared his own worries with regard to intervention: 
1) Assad would place civilians as “human shields” around obvious targets, 2) Security 
concerns would prevent targeting directly chemical weapons, 3) Missile strikes would 
jeopardise UN inspectors on the ground, 4) Cameron failed to obtain consent of his 
parliament for military action in Syria,  5) A limited strike which will result in Assad`s 
survival would strengthen his hand, 6) Obama believed that the scope of executive 
power in national security domain was not limitless (Goldberg, 2016). 
On 31st August 2013 Obama portrayed Assad`s use of chemical weapon against 
civilians in Syria as a national security danger. He vowed to take military action against 
Syrian regime targets on the condition that a mandate from the `American people's 
representatives in Congress is gained. President Obama emphasised that there would 




scope to deter and degrade the Assad regime`s capability to carry out chemical 
weapon attack in the future (Obama, 2013e).  
What influenced and shaped President Obama`s thinking in the wake of the 
chemical weapon attack and what led him to forgo his decision to take military action 
against Assad regime is a crucial analytical puzzle. Goldberg partly attributes 
President Obama`s refusal to follow the “the Washington playbook, which calls for 
militarily action against the Assad regime, to Obama`s disposition regarding the Middle 
East and the perceived second or third order effects of a limited missile strike.  Obama 
feared Assad and his allies would escalate the tension in response to a limited strike, 
which could have led to an all-out war against the Syrian regime similar to that in Iraq. 
Obama feared being dragged into this kind of situation. Obama believed American all-
out involvement would make the situation in Syria worse, not better, and that a limited 
missile strike targeting airbases would be ineffectual and counterproductive. Instead, 
President Obama preferred eliminating the preponderance of Syria`s chemical 
weapons stockpile: `Obama was proud of doing something without war that could not 
have been achieved with war` (Goldberg, 2017).  
In his 10th September 2013 speech, Obama announced his decision to postpone 
a congressional vote in order to pursue a diplomatic path with Russia to dismantle 
Syria`s chemical weapons capability. He reiterated that he saw Assad`s use of 
chemical weapons against civilians as a threat to national security interests. He 
referred to potential threats to regional allies Turkey, Jordan, and Israel and mentioned 
that a failure to confront the use of chemical weapons would embolden Iran to ignore 
international law by building nuclear weapons. Another important point in Obama`s 
speech to showcase why he was not planning regime change in Syria by force  can 




learned from Iraq that doing so makes us responsible for all that comes next”. He 
explained his alternative military strategy should the diplomatic initiative with Russia 
to dismantle Syrian chemical weapon capability fail: “I will not put American boots on 
the ground in Syria.  I will not pursue an open-ended action like Iraq or Afghanistan.  I 
will not pursue a prolonged air campaign like Libya or Kosovo.  This would be a 
targeted strike to achieve a clear objective:  deterring the use of chemical weapons, 
and degrading Assad’s capabilities” (Obama, 2013c). In practice, the Obama 
administration kept the limited use of force as a last resort while the main objective 
seemed to be the threat of action to compel the Assad regime to eliminate its chemical 
weapon programme. 
President Obama`s reaction to the chemical weapon attack confirms the validity 
of the influence of Obama Doctrine over his foreign policy choices. While the vast 
majority of his National Security Council members were advocating military action 
and the domestic and international public was ready for unilateral US military action 
President Obama resisted. His decision can be construed as a proof that basic tenets 
of Obama Doctrine of retrenchment and accommodation were consistently in play 
and were framing Obama`s decisions regarding the civil wars. President Obama 
prioritised avoiding and reducing US international and military costs and 
commitments on the  one hand and accommodated Russia through a deal to 
eliminate Syria`s chemical weapons stockpile on the other.  
Another major turning point in the Syrian conflict was US air strikes against ISIL 
targets in Syria on 23rd September 2014. US strikes were preceded initially by ISIL`s 
capture of 60 villages in Northern Syria as ISIL was approaching a key town, Kobane, 




September (The Guardian, 2014b) and before that by the beheading of two American 
journalist in Syria.  
Upon the beheading of Jim Foley, a US Journalist operating in Syria, Obama 
avoided accepting explicitly that ISIL was at war with the US. His statement on 20th 
August 2014 reflects his ambivalence and reluctance to using force unilaterally. 
“They may claim out of expediency that they are at war with the United States or the 
West… The United States of America will continue to do what we must do to protect 
our people… When people harm Americans anywhere, we do what’s necessary to 
see that justice is done and we act against ISIL, standing alongside others. The 
people of Syria, whose story Jim Foley told, do not deserve to live under the shadow 
of a tyrant or terrorists… From governments and peoples across the Middle East, 
there has to be a common effort to extract this cancer so that it does not spread” 
(Obama, 2014c). 
On 3rd September 2014, President Obama strongly condemned the beheading 
of a second American journalist, Steven Sotloff, by ISIL in Syria. “ …like people 
around the world, Americans are repulsed by their barbarism. We will not be 
intimidated. Their horrific acts only unite us as a country to stiffen our resolve to take 
the fight against these terrorists.” (Obama, 2014a) 
On 13th September 2014, in his weekly address, President Obama declared the 
boundaries of its strategy to target ISIL in Syria: “American military power is 
unmatched, but this can’t be America’s fight alone. And the best way to defeat a 
group like ISIL isn’t by sending large numbers of American combat forces to wage a 
ground war in the heart of the Middle East.  That wouldn’t serve our interests.  In 
fact, it would only risk fuelling extremism even more. What’s needed now is a 




air power, contributions from allies and partners, and more support to forces that are 
fighting these terrorists on the ground”(Obama, 2014j) 
On 23rd September 2014, President Obama announced that the US had 
conducted its first anti-ISIL air operations in Syria with partners (namely Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar).  He also highlighted 
the fact that the US administration would ramp up its effort to train and equip the 
Syrian opposition to counteract ISIL. President Obama underlined that air strikes 
were part of broader campaign to target ISIL in both Iraq and Syria, along with 
supporting moderate opposition fighting against ISIL, cutting off ISIL`s financing, 
countering ISIL`s ideology and stopping the flow of fighters in and out of Syria  
(Obama, 2014f). While the US had been planning to initiate a concerted effort to 
target ISIL in Syria, the brutal killing of two US journalists in Syria served as a catalyst 
to expedite US plans for action. While the US had backed away from targeting the 
Assad regime in September 2013 in the wake of Syrian regime`s chemical attack, he 
was resolved to take action against ISIL as the group became a more direct threat 
to US interests and security. Nonetheless, President Obama`s overall strategy 
against ISIL was still in conformity with the basic parameters of the Obama Doctrine. 
While the intervention decision was taken on the basis of US security interests, the 
Obama Doctrine seemed to have led to limited US military action in Syria. The US 
military response was designed as a broad coalition effort rather than a unilateral 








Impact of Obama Doctrine 
President Obama`s decision for military intervention in Libya was predominantly 
framed by the threat posed to core US interests. President Obama was under the 
impression that those interests were not directly threatened significantly so unilateral 
intervention without UN mandate was not necessary. Instead a coalition of 
international forces from Europe and the Middle East under the auspices of a UN 
mandate would ensure that the US would share the responsibility and costs without a 
long- term US military commitment in Libya and without putting boots on the ground. 
In the Libya case the legitimacy of action through UN resolutions, regional and 
international support provided by the Arab League, the African Union, sharing the 
intervention responsibilities with NATO and regional partners, and the preclusion of 
deploying `boots on the ground` in a combat role were all in line with Obama Doctrine.   
 For the Syria case during the first three episodes of the conflict, even though 
US interests and values were seriously threatened by the Syrian regime and the 
ongoing civil conflict, the lack of broad international support for action against the 
Syrian regime and the potential risk of a protracted US entanglement were all factors 
that affected the US response. The risk of a long term US commitment in Syria akin to 
that in Iraq and Afghanistan was also an important factor in US considerations. 
President Obama`s significant concerns with regards to `retrenchment` prevented him 
from taking direct military action against the Syria regime; his understanding was that 
any direct military involvement would require long-term US commitment and give rise 
to direct confrontation with Russia and Iran, which is in contrast with the Obama 
Doctrine`s `accommodating rivalries` principle.  
In the fourth episode of the Syrian conflict, where the US would have been 




chemical weapon attack, the US sought a diplomatic solution with Russia, a position 
in line with the Obama doctrine’s use of military force as a last resort. Even before the 
diplomatic deal struck between Russia and US to eliminate Syria`s chemical weapon 
stockpile, the threat of force Obama declared was framed as a limited strike in scope 
and duration against military bases used by Assad regime to deliver chemical 
weapons. The primary aim was to avoid being dragged into an all-out war against the 
Syrian regime (i.e. retrenchment) and to avoid provoking Russian and Iranian action, 
which would escalate the tension further in the region (i.e. accommodating rivalries).  
However, as the ISIL threat begun to pose a direct threat to the region and US 
interests in the fifth episode, international support for action and the willingness of 
regional and Western allies to share the responsibility and burden were instrumental 
for the US taking direct military action against ISIL and increasing efforts to empower 
local forces in their fight against ISIL. The beheading of two American journalist and 
the likelihood of the massacre of Syrian Kurds living in the villages on the Turkish-
Syrian border by ISIL prompted US military action. However, Obama categorically 
rejected the idea of sending large numbers of American combat forces to Syria, as he 
believed that it would fuel extremism in the region and not serve US interests.  Instead, 
he embarked upon his long-term strategy of targeting ISIL in multiple domains in Syria 
by expanding airstrikes into ISIL targets in Syria and including allies into the operation. 
President Obama did not hesitate in targeting ISIL in Syria, as it was a common threat 
to the world, including Russia and Iran.  
In conclusion, in both the Libya and Syria cases, President Obama attempted 
to exhaust other options before military intervention. When intervention was deemed 
necessary, the Obama doctrine seemed to have informed and set the limits of foreign 




with regional and international actors rather than acting alone, rallying international 
institutions for action, pursuing a limited intervention strategy in scope and time in 
support of local forces without deploying US ground combatant troops constituted the 
general framework for US action.  
It is imperative to look at the intervening variables collectively to be able to 
understand why the US refrained from direct military action in the first three episodes 
of the Syrian conflict against the Syrian regime and also the fourth episode against 
ISIL as a deflection from expected US behaviour.  It was contrary to the expected US 
behaviour to wait until ISIL announced its caliphate in June 2014 for military action, 
since the group had started operating in Syria as of April 2013 and had captured area.  
 
5.2 US Economic Constraints 
This section considers the influence of economic considerations on US foreign 
policy choices vis-à-vis the Libya and Syria conflicts. Economic constraints would be 
expected to impact upon the form and the scale of intervention.  
The 2008 global financial crisis affected the US economy substantially, 
culminating in a sharp decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by adversely 
impacting output, consumption, and investment (Labonte, 2010). The 2008 global 
financial crisis reduced the fiscal resources available to the US. Coupled with the 
multiple security challenges which it was confronted with, in particular Afghanistan and 
Iraq, this gave rise to a “light footprint” strategy in order to compensate for over-
stretched US military capability. This approach represented a shift from relying on 
massive military force to accomplish national security objectives to one which relied 
on a small number of specialised military forces abroad to support both air strikes and 




emphasised that US would no longer conduct large-scale stability operations like Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Obama, 2012d).  
One of the primary drivers of the Obama Doctrine was the president’s 
determination, declared in August 2011,  to reduce  the defence budget by 500 billion 
USD over the following decade, mainly by downsizing the US military and eventually 
limiting defence spending to below three percent of  GDP. These cuts encompassed 
various procurement programmes, entailed the closure of military bases, particularly 
in Europe, and would entail the demobilisation of some 100,000 military personnel by 
2017 (R. G. Kaufman, 2014; Stepak & Whitlark, 2012) 
 In the 2008 Presidential election campaign, President Obama had constantly 
accused the Bush administration of mismanaging the US economy during the 2008 
global economic crisis and of pursuing misguided policies in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Jost, 2009). In that context, the interplay between these two dimensions and their 
collective role in shaping Obama`s foreign policy approach for Libya and Syria conflicts 
will be considered as an intervening variable. Specifically, the intervening variable of 
economic constraints covers the impact of the 2008 recession, the state of the US 
economy before 2011, the cost of war against the backdrop of protracted nation 
building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the impact of defence budget cuts on US 
foreign policy choices in Libya and Syria. 
 The 2008-2009 recession was seen as the most severe economic crisis since 
the 1930s great depression. As a result of a steep decline in output, consumption, and 
investment, real GDP fell 5.1% (680 billion USD) in the second half of 2009. The 
unemployment rate went up to 10.1% in October 2009 (from 4.6% in 2007); 
Approximately 7 million people were put out of work during the recession in the US 




President Obama referred back to 2008-2009 and noted that the US economy had 
contracted by 9% and lost four million jobs before he was sworn in and another four 
million jobs in three months after he was sworn in (Obama, 2011b). 
 President Obama`s 13th October 2008 speech in Toledo, Ohio was dedicated 
to his plan to overcome the economic crisis. He particularly underlined the increasing 
unemployment trend. He said: “We've already lost three-quarters of a million jobs this 
year, and some experts say that unemployment may rise to 8% by the end of next 
year” (Obama, 2008b). The election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 was widely  
seen as an electoral response to economic crisis (Bartels, 2013).  
 As the economic indicators got worse, the costly, long-lasting American military 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were questioned widely. In his February 2009 
speech President Obama outlined his recovery plan aimed at putting the economy 
back on track by creating jobs and affordable housing, reinstating lending systems, 
bringing the deficit down, and investing in energy, health care, and education. Obama 
promised the upcoming budget for the first time would include the full cost of fighting 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (Obama, 2009c). 
 A Harvard Kennedy School research paper published in 2013 estimates the 
cost of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars to US up until 2013 to be between 4 to 6 trillion 
US. This figure includes long-term social and economic costs, replenishment of worn-
out equipment, medical care, disability and compensation expenses. The research 
also suggested that the Iraq and Afghanistan wars had added 2 trillion USD to the 
national debt, accounting for 20% of the debt accumulated between 2001 and 2012 
(Bilmes, 2013). In addition to the economic costs, the fact that 6,700 American service 
members lost their lives and additional 51,000 were wounded in the two wars was a 




 Before and during the Libya intervention the financial cost of US involvement 
was frequently debated in the US Congress, most of the time by drawing parallels to 
the Afghan and Iraq interventions. During the no-fly zone discussions in US Congress 
hearings before the intervention in Libya, Republican House of Representatives 
member Ron Paul noted that the US lost 4,500 military personnel, while over 30,000 
suffered severe injuries in Iraq over the last ten years. He warned that if the US were 
to enforce a no-fly zone it would eventually lead to a full-scale war and an additional 
budgetary burden (Ron Paul, 2011). 
Just after the US military intervention in Libya, President Obama was criticised 
by both Republican and Democrat members of the Congress on the grounds that the 
US faced no threat to its national security and had no strategic interests in Libya. New 
Mexico Republican House of Representatives member Steve Pearce cautioned that 
the intervention would put further pressure on an already strained budget and would 
contribute to the national debt reaching 15 trillion US Dollars. He argued that these 
resources should be funnelled to job creation in the US instead (Pearce, 2011). 
Another Republican House of Representative member, Tim Johnson, highlighted that 
defence spending had reached 700 billion a year, of which an important portion was 
earmarked for the Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya wars (Johnson, 2011). 
Democratic House of Representative member from California, Lynn Woolsey, 
drew attention to a potential 1 billion USD additional burden to taxpayers as the cost 
of US intervention in Libya. She referred to the 7 billion USD a month cost of prolonged 
US military presence in Afghanistan and its negative influence on domestic welfare 
programs (Woolsey, 2011). 
Democratic House member Brad Sherman even suggested that the 30 billion 




applied should be used to fund US military intervention instead of using money 
collected from American taxpayers, claiming that the weekly cost was billions of US 
Dollars  (Sherman, 2011). 
Republican House member John Duncan criticised unaffordable permanent 
wars by stating that the Appropriations Defence Subcommittee had approved 119 
billion USD for wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Duncan suggested that the money 
should be spent on defending against real threats rather than nation building abroad. 
Within this framework, Duncan described the Libya intervention as useless and 
suggested that rebuilding the US and coping with the 14 trillion USD debt instead was 
more important (Duncan, 2011). 
Republican House member Dan Burton also criticised the fact that in excess of 
1 billion USD of taxpayer money was being spent on the Libya intervention at a time 
when budget deficit was close to 1.5 trillion USD and  total debt stood at  over 14 trillion 
(Burton, 2011a). 
 The impact of economic crisis and the cost of entrenched US involvement in 
Iraq and Afghanistan prompted defence cuts within the US administration. President 
Barack Obama announced a defence strategy in 2012, which mandated cutting 
defence spending gradually over the next ten years as part of reductions to federal 
spending. Obama underlined the fact that the US defence budget had grown at an 
extraordinary pace since 9/11 as a result of long-term nation-building commitments 
that required large military footprints in Iraq and Afghanistan over extended periods. 
He explained that his strategy was to maintain the superiority of US military power by 
keeping leaner but agile, flexible conventional ground forces with slowly growing 






Figure 15 US Military Spending in Years 
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 Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta presented the defence strategy as a 
strategic turning point, precipitated by two concurrent wars and the large increase in 
defence spending. Panetta reiterated that the US was facing a very serious deficit and 
debt problem and a reduction of defence spending by 487 billion US Dollars over 10 
years was part of fiscal responsibility. However, he also said that the crisis provided 
the US military with the opportunity to adapt a new environment, one that required 
rapidly deployable, smaller and leaner US joint forces. He also pointed out rebalancing 
US global posturing by increasing presence and power projection in Asia- Pacific. After 
the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences the Army and Marine Corps no longer would 
need to be sized to support large-scale, long-term stability operations. Instead the 
resources earmarked for special operations forces, Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance and unmanned systems, space and mobilisation capabilities would 




In addition to 450 billion US Dollar cuts over a decade which corresponds to 8 
percent of the Pentagon’s base budget a further 500 billion in cuts articulated within 
the administration, caused concerns among national security commentators  (Bumiller 
& Shanker, 2012). In that context critics questioned whether the US could afford to 
open a third front in Libya and sustain it militarily over an extended period. Particularly 
as US B-2 stealth planes dropped bombs in Libya and 200 cruise missiles launched 
from submarines in the Mediterranean during the first week of Libya operations, the 
possibility of extended campaign costing additional billions of US Dollars was a source 
of concern. However, as NATO quickly assumed responsibility for the enforcement of 
no-fly zone the burden was shared by others. The US military provided mostly force 
multipliers like aerial refuelling tankers, electronic jamming, and ISR assets (Baron, 
2011). 
Even though the foreign policy decisions are made by the President and his 
Foreign Policy Executives the influence of opposition within Democrat Party and from 
Republican Party members cannot be disregarded. Despite the fact that saying 
intervention would have been very costly can very well be an excuse for not wanting 
to do it for other reasons, they might limit the leeway US decision makers have.  
 During the Congressional discussions on Libya, Democrat member of the US 
House of Representatives Dennis Kucinich quoted the long-term costs of the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars to the US as 0.5 trillion and 3 trillion USD respectively and 
criticised extended Libya intervention at a time when the government was deep in debt 
(Kucinich, 2011). 
Republican member of the US Senate, Marco Rubio, touched upon defence 
budget cuts in his foreign policy speech delivered at the Jesse Helms Centre on 13th 




budget and substantial cuts in the defence budget would have devastating effects on 
national defence.  Senator Rubio reminded that Secretary of Defence Gates had 
already cut 300 billion worth of procurement programmes in 2009 and 2010 and that 
the President and Congressional leaders had agreed on another 350 billion to be cut 
from the defence budget over the next ten years. He also speculated that total defence 
budget cuts could reach up to 1 trillion USD over ten years (Rubio, 2011) 
 The cost of war discussions resurfaced with Syria, but only after the US decided 
to take action against the Syrian Armed Forces` use of chemical weapons in Syria in 
September 2013. Republican member of the House of Representatives, Mo Brooks, 
argued that the US should not spend US resources by intervening in the Syrian civil 
war. He argued that such an intervention would undermine the US economy and 
national security by increasing debt, as well as potential additional defence layoffs and 
furloughs (Brooks, 2013)  
 During the discussions on the 10th September 2013 about authorising the 
limited and specified use of US Armed Forces against Syria, the Democrat member of 
the Senate from Vermont, Bernie Sanders, raised his objection to US intervention in 
Syria and stated the administration should focus first on the US`s socio-economic 
problems. He referred to unemployment figures and said that the unemployment rate 
was 14% (as opposed to officially declared 7.4%) that youth unemployment was 20% 
and that black youth unemployment was 40% (Sanders, 2013) This approach is in line 
with Obama Doctrine that prioritises diverting more resources to domestic agenda. 
 Republican member of the US Senate James Inhofe also criticised the drastic 
defence budget cuts, 487 billion USD during the previous four–years, with austerity 
measures requiring automatic spending cuts of another 1.5 trillion, and said that the 




where meeting national security requirements had become challenging. He 
specifically alluded to sixteen Air Force combat flying squadrons being grounded for 3 
months, the naval fleet being reduced to historically low levels, ground forces being 
cut by more than 100,000 personnel, and many US Department of Defence civilian 
employees been furloughed (Inhofe, 2013). 
 The common theme that arose from the interviews conducted for this research 
was that the US`s costly experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan had an impact on it’s 
calculations regarding the Libya and Syria conflicts. However, the US administration 
would not hesitate to act militarily whenever their key security interests were at stake 
(Interviewee 2, 2015; Juneau, 2016). So, the economic constraints seem to have 
influenced the means applied rather than whether to intervene or not; different 
intervention options bring about varying costs to US (Interviewee 3, 2015). 
Another significant theme that was repeatedly brought forward during the 
interviews was that potential military engagement by the US against the Syrian regime 
would have most certainly gone beyond the expense of Afghanistan and Iraq, because 
of the multiple actors involved and, in particular, the conventional threat coming from 
Iran and Russia and with much more sophisticated militaries, and asymmetric 
difficulties coming from non-state actors within Syria. That would require a long term 
commitment, which would bring with it a substantial fiscal burden (Interviewee 4, 
2015). 
 In summary, the Obama administration inherited an economy heavily crippled 
by the great recession and, as part of its recovery plan, initiated large-scale defence 
spending cuts. The particular cost of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars influenced how 
the US perceived the Libya and Syria conflicts in financial terms. Despite the fact that 




consideration solely economic constraints, the financial cost of intervention was a 
source of concern for the administration, leading to the selection of less costly options 
like conducting air strikes in support of local proxies versus relying on large US military 
force on the ground. The US administration followed a cautious policy not to repeat 
what they saw as mistakes of the Bush administration. In Libya the US preferred to be 
part of a coalition effort to enforce a no-fly zone and target regime forces and the 
military through air power, mostly relying on other coalition countries and NATO. The 
high financial costs and casualties inflicted by the Afghanistan and Iraq wars also led 
US to put no-boots-on the ground and not pursue a direct military intervention strategy 
that would eventually require a nation building effort. In the case of Syria, the conflict 
and its potential regional implications were so complex that the US did not want to risk 
another Afghanistan or Iraq type situation (or worse) by targeting Assad and depleting 
limited resources. Even after the ISIL threat emerged and grew and even after US 
journalists were beheaded, the US response was based by and large on less costly 
options like air strikes and providing training, weapons and close air support to vetted 
rebel groups fighting ISIL.  
 
5.3 Libya/Syrian Opposition and the US Elite Perception  
This section examines the composition, ideology and end state objectives of 
political and armed opposition during the Arab Spring era in Libya and Syria within a 
historical context. It also considers how the US administration perceived these 
opposition groups and how such perceptions could have impacted upon US decision-
making in the form, scale and timing of support provided to the opposition groups.  
Before considering the details of the Libya and Syria cases it could be useful to 




empirically analyse the connection between strategic and geopolitical interests and 
decisions to intervene into ongoing civil conflicts. They claim that the interests 
attributed to a conflict necessitates siding with whichever party (government or 
opposition) best supports the potential intervener's interests (Findley & Teo, 2006).  
Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham attribute the decision over whether to 
support the government or particular rebel groups during civil wars and the specific 
type of support provided to two criteria: the ability of rebel groups to challenge the 
target regime; and the degree of congruence in preferences between the supporter 
and the opposing groups for the future of the country (Salehyan, Gleditsch, & 
Cunningham, 2011).  
 Retrospective analysis of the literature on intervention in civil wars by Regan also 
highlights the importance of a systematic examination of the goals of interveners and 
the motivation of rebels (Regan, 2010). So, in practice, two dimensions, the capacity 
and capability of the opposition to propose a viable alternative to a current regime and 
the congruence in the worldview and preferences of those groups relative to the 
intervener, seem to serve as important factors during the intervention decision making 
process.  
 Before looking into composition, capabilities and ideologies of rebels who played 
a significant role during the uprising against Qaddafi and Assad regimes, historical 
opposition in both countries will be briefly probed in the next section.  
 
Libyan Opposition in Historical Perspective 
Qaddafi has historically perceived any type of opposition with ideological, 
political, regional and tribal motives as a threat to the regime. However, opposition 




by Qaddafi. After the military coup in 1969, Qaddafi initially targeted the Sanusi 
religious establishment, which was primarily based throughout Cyrenaica. However, 
the threat from the Muslim Brotherhood was considered far greater than the Sanusi-
inspired opposition since it was deemed to pose a direct challenge to the regime's 
alleged Islamic credentials. The Qaddafi regime successfully neutralized religiously 
motivated opposition through repression and, in the long run, by integrating Islam as 
an underpinning, legitimizing feature. Qaddafi adapted a religious vision to consolidate 
the Islamic unity rhetoric based mainly on Arab nationalism as being the core ideology 
(Joffe, 1988). `The Jamahiriya system` was outlined by Qaddafi in his 1975 Green 
Book as a middle way between capitalist democracies and single-party socialist states, 
with a blend of elements from pan-Arabism, socialism, and Islam (Bell, Anthony & 
Witter, 2011). Overall a portion of Libyan opposition can be considered a by-product 
of the violence wielded against religious opposition in historical perspective, which was 
coupled with conflicting ideological, political, regional and tribal motives (Ogbonnaya, 
2013). 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
 
The first cadre of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Libya consists of MB members 
who fled a crackdown in Egypt in 1949 and took refuge in Benghazi, hosted by king 
Idris al-Senussi (Ashour, 2012). Following the 1969 coup, led by Qaddafi, all political 
organisations and opposition groups were disbanded in 1972, including MB. In 1973 
and 1998 hundreds of MB members and activists were arrested; several reportedly 
died in custody. Following trials in 2001 and 2002, two prominent MB leaders were 




reconciliation initiative the Libyan administration introduced retrial processes for the 
imprisoned MB members in 2005 and 2006, which led to the release of the remaining 
84 captive members (Blanchard, 2011). On 21st August 2007, Saif al-Islam Qaddafi 
publicised a new reform package, which espoused the expansion of political freedoms, 
as part of the continuation of reconciliation efforts. During the course of the dialogue 
process, MB played a prominent role as a mediator, thus facilitating the dialog between 
the Qaddafi regime and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group whose members suffered 
long term sentence in prison (Doha Institute, 2011). 
The Libyan MB supported the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) from the 
onset and some of its main figures took part in the body. MB members also established 
the Justice and Construction Party on 3rd March 2012, a nationalist party with an 
Islamic reference (Ashour, 2012), and MB emerged as the most organized political 
force in the early stages of post-revolution Libya. 
 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 
 
The LIFG is a Salafist faction established by Libyans who participated in the fight 
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The group led an insurgency based mainly in 
eastern Libya and attempted to overthrow the Qaddafi regime in the 1990s (Doha 
Institute, 2011). The group reportedly perpetrated three failed assassination plots 
against Qaddafi. During the confrontation, 165 Libyan officials and military servicemen 
were killed (Ashour, 2012). However, LIFG`s struggle against Qaddafi proved 
unsuccessful; Libyan armed forces and security agencies heavily clamped down on 




The US froze the LIFG’s assets in the US in September 2001, and officially 
designated the LIFG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004 
(Blanchard, 2011). Following the dialogue and reconciliation process initiated in 2005, 
the Libyan regime and LIFG struck an agreement at the end of 2010 in which LIFG 
leaders renounced violence and advocated tolerance of other ideologies and religions 
(Ashour, 2012). Over 200 LIFG members were released, followed by the final 110 
LIFG members, at the outset of the 2011 uprising. The group declared a reorganisation 
under the name of the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC), pursuing a non-
violent political activism (Blanchard, 2011). 
 
Libyan Opposition groups in exile  
Opposition groups in exile were critically important for Libya simply because the 
regime did not allow for any opposition inside the country. The only option was to team 
up and collaborate with opposition in exile. Opposition groups in exile held the National 
Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO) in July 2005 in London, calling for the 
relinquishing of Qaddafi`s power, formation of a transitional government and 
establishment of a democratic state. These groups included the National Libyan 
Salvation Front (NLSF), the National Alliance, the Libyan National Movement (LNM), 
the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Islamist Rally, and the Republican 
Rally for Democracy and Justice. A follow-up meeting was held in March 2008 (again, 
in London), wherein the commitment articulated in the first conference for a free, 
democratic and constitutional Libya was reinforced. The NCLO reportedly was 
instrumental in organizing the ‘Day of Rage’ in Libya on 17th February 2011 that turned 




The most prominent of these groups was the NLSF. This group was launched from 
Sudan by an ex-Libyan official in 1981. Its agenda was centred on opposition to the 
dictatorial regime and it sought a transition to a constitutional democracy.  NLSF's first 
armed uprising against Qaddafi in 1984 ended up with Qaddafi’s regime publicly 
hanging eight of its members. Later, the NLSF abandoned its plans to overthrow 
Qaddafi through military means and joined the NCLO in 2005 to seek a political 
transition. NLSF's last major gathering was held in the United States in 2007 (Jacop, 
2011). 
 
Syrian Opposition in Historical Perspective 
The core drivers of Syrian unrest are largely centred on a broader sense of socio-
economic inequality, poor governance, unemployment, favouritism, systematic 
corruption and injustice faced by large segments of the Syrian population since the 
early 1980s (Tashjian, 2012). 
There have been three mainstream ideological strands that played a crucial role 
among both political and armed opposition by influencing their perspective on 
democracy, freedom and pluralism during the revolution: nationalism and secularism; 
the Muslim Brotherhood; and Salafism.  
 
Secular Nationalists 
The secular nationalist opposition and rebel groups who advocated a secular, 
liberal and democratic state were the main driver of the uprising at the beginning of 
the conflict. In particular, the Free Syrian Army`s founders were secular-minded 
military officers who had defected from the Syrian Army at the outset of the revolution 




The first recent wave of intense anti-Assad opposition and activism had come just 
after the death of Hafez al-Assad on 10th June 2000, what later became known as the 
“Damascus Spring”, and called primarily for political, legal, and economic reforms and, 
more specifically, the establishment of multiparty democracy and the lifting of the 1963 
State of Emergency. The Assad regime announced tentative reformist measures 
which later were withdrawn in the name of national unity. The most notable amnesty 
was the release of hundreds of political prisoners after the closing of Mezze prison in 
November 2000 (Carnegie Centre, 2012b). The prison was seen as a symbol of the 
regime’s brutality. Assad`s initiative to improve the relationship with the opposition saw 
the number of political prisoners reduced from a peak of around 4,000 (in 1993) to 
between 300 and 1,000 (Landis & Pace, 2007). 
Seif, Riad al-Turk, Secretary General of the Syrian Communist Party between 
1973 and 2005, attempted to establish a new political party, the Movement for Social 
Peace.  However, together with a number of other leading figures from the movement, 
he was arrested and charged on 1 September 2001 with “attempting to change the 
constitution by illegal means”.  The regime once again oppressed opposition, with 
arrests and threats ensuring, and by the end of 2002 the `Damascus Spring` 
movement lost its momentum. Some members of the `Damascus Spring` later 
participated in the second and third wave opposition movements against Assad’s 
regime, known as the 2005 Damascus Declaration and 2011 uprising respectively 
(Carnegie Centre, 2012b) 
The second wave of forging and revitalising a common alliance against the Assad 
regime came after the Cedar revolution, which caused the withdrawal of Syrian forces 
in Lebanon.  Leaders from Islamic, Arab nationalist, Kurdish, and leftist movements 




repressive regime in 2005 (Landis & Pace, 2007). On 16th October 2005, opposition 
figures and political parties issued the Damascus Declaration and denounced the 
Syrian regime as being “authoritarian, totalitarian, and cliquish” (Bagy, 2012). 
The declaration primarily called for establishment of a democratic regime through: 
peaceful and gradual change based on dialogue, tolerance, respect of the beliefs, 
culture, and the special characteristics of others; granting freedom to individuals, 
groups, and minorities to express themselves and exercise their cultural and linguistic 
rights; suspending emergency law and Emergency Law 4912, lifting the ban on the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement; and releasing all political prisoners (SyriaComment, 
2005).   
 
Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria had been politically active from 1946 until 1963 
when the Baath Party came to power and banned the group`s activities. In 1979, the 
Combatant Vanguard defected from the Brotherhood to take up arms against the 
regime; the group killed eighty-three Alawite student officers at the military school in 
Aleppo (Carnegie Centre, 2012c). 
In 1980, the Assad regime imprisoned about 550 Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
(SMB) members and executed them in their cells under the pretext that they plotted to 
assassinate Assad. The regime used violence as a tool to maintain its rule, most 
strikingly during the Hama massacre of February 1982 (Sayigh, 2013), wherein the 
army, in an attempt to clamped down on rebels, reportedly committed collective 
                                                          
12 Syria's emergency law was introduced after the 1963 coup d'état that brought the Baath 
Party to power. It restricts public gatherings and the free movement of individuals, it allows 
government agents to arrest "suspects or people who threaten security," it authorizes the 





punishment against the local people, killing roughly 20,000 people. As a result, SMB 
was drawn out of Syria and spent the last three decades in exile to reorganize before 
it played an important role in the 2011 uprising (Tashjian, 2012). 
On March 25, 2012, the Syria Muslim Brotherhood issued the `State-for-All 
Commitment Charter` in which it outlined the commitments and prospects for the 
future of post-Assad Syria. The group pledged to establish pluralism and democracy 
in a civil constitutional State, with equality for all citizens, and with full respect for 
human rights and freedoms. The Charter was proposed as “common denominators 
for a new social contract”, to re-establish “peace and harmony between all segments 
and religious, sectarian, ethnic, political and intellectual trends of Syrian society.” 
(Ikhwanweb, 2012)  
The Syrian MB`s political ideology called for a secular state inspired and guided 
by the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. MB was politically influential after the 
revolution and had one quarter of the Syrian National Council (SNC) seats. SNC also 
retained one third of the seats in the successor political opposition coalition, The 
National Coalition for the Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, which led to 
sustainment of MB dominance and influence in SNC (Ostovar & Mccants, 2013). 
 
Salafism13 
The spread of Salafi ideas in Syria was impeded by the systematic prosecution 
and detention of its members by the Assad regime over the course of a number of 
                                                          
13 `Salaf` means "predecessors" referring to the first three generations of Muslims: Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions; their successors; and the successors of the successors. 
Salafism seeks to "purify" Islam of Western influence and digressions from the true Islam. 
Salafists see the salvation of Muslim majority countries in full compliance to the way the first 
three generation lived. Salafists define Islam as anything that was explicitly condoned by 
Prophet Muhammad and that was upheld by his first three generations of Sunni followers. (For 





years. During the revolution, the Salafi presence in Syria noticeably propagated and 
developed more into an armed resistance as the regime started exerting excessive 
use of force against the protesters. As long as the intrastate conflict protracted and the 
regime was responsible for mass civilian causalities, both local armed resistance and 
the influx of battle hardened and experienced foreign fighters increased (Rumman, 
2013). 
Salafi rebel groups espouse the idea that Islam should become ‘the sole source 
of law and cultural identity’ in Syria. However, the Salafis differ among themselves 
over how to achieve this goal; some groups advocate for a transnational `Islamic 
State` established through armed struggle and reject democratic process; other 
groups seek to establish an `Islamic State` in Syria through political processes that 
involve all Syrian citizens (Ostovar & Mccants, 2013).  
 Having briefly touched upon the historical opposition baseline in Libya and Syria, 
the following section will focus on the capability and ideology of political and armed 
opposition that emerged during the Arab Spring in respective conflicts.  
 
Formation of Libyan National Transitional Council and Armed Opposition 
In the wake of successful revolutions that toppled long lasting regimes in 
Tunisia and Egypt, the initial protests started in eastern Libya in mid-February 2011. 
The arrest of lawyer and human rights advocate Fathi Terbil on 15th February 2011 in 
Benghazi changed the course of the demonstrations and instigated large-scale 
protests (Ayhan, 2011). 
On 15th February, security forces used tear gas and batons to disperse the 
protesters in Benghazi, injuring 14 and possibly killing 1. On 17th February, thousands 




by Qaddafi security forces led to the killing of 24 protestors. In that phase, the 
government`s opponents were not organised and acted primarily as individual citizens 
against the regime. However the capture of Benghazi on 20th February changed the 
course of the uprising (Johnston, 2012). In addition to the escalation of mass killings, 
arbitrary arrests, detention and torture of protestors, the use of tanks, helicopters and 
military aircraft indiscriminately killing or injuring possibly thousands on 25 February 
2011, reported by Navi Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (Spencer, 2011), urged the  protestors to take arms and fight against the 
Qaddafi regime. So, Qaddafi`s repressive crack down on the protestors turned an 
uprising initiated by youth activists into an armed rebellion joined by a cross-section of 
the Libyan society (Pack, 2011). 
UNSC Resolution 1970 was adopted on 26th February and condemned the use of 
lethal force against protestors in Libya and imposed sanctions, weapons, asset 
freezes, and travel bans (UN, 2011a). As the protestors and rebels consolidated their 
gains in eastern Libya an interim governing body, The National Transitional Council 
(NTC), was formed in Benghazi on 27th February 2011 (Brahimi, 2011) and officially 
declared its foundation on 5th March 2011. An executive body was formed on 23rd 
March 2011. The goal of the NTC was to “remove Qaddafi from power and establish 
a unified, democratic, and free Libya that respects universal human rights principles.” 
(Book, 2012) 
The NTC promised to steer Libya during the interim period until the country was 
liberated from Qaddafi’s oppressive regime and hold free elections to draft a 
constitution for Libya. NTC placed itself as the only legitimate body to represent the 
Libyan people and state. The council comprised of defectors, returning exiles and 




from various cities, towns, and regions liberated by the rebels in order to refute the 
perception that the revolution was eastern-dominated. The Chief of the NTC, Mustafa 
Abdul Jalil, was Qaddafi's justice minister prior to his defection (Dunt, 2011). 
 With the establishment of the NTC, defected reformist regime technocrats and 
diplomats, along with representatives from a wide range of factions of the opposition, 
all came together. The fact that grassroots committees were established in eastern 
Libya and selected town notables endorsed NTC consolidated its legitimacy and 
mandate (Pack, 2011).   
Even though NTC was based in eastern Libya, it attempted to encompass all strata 
of Libyan society to include religious groups, Qaddafi regime defectors, Libyans who 
spent the majority of their life abroad and who held dual citizenship, and members 
from cities outside of Benghazi. The youth movement, on the other hand, who initiated 
the uprising, was composed of young, urban, middle-class citizens, students and civil 
society organizations (Tempelhof & Omar, 2012).  
On 15th July 2011, five months after the uprising started and after more than thirty 
other countries recognized NTC, the US officially recognised NTC as Libya’s legitimate 
government (Barany, 2011). US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the 
US recognized NTC "as the legitimate governing authority" in Libya. Clinton articulated 
the assurances given by NTC that were instrumental for US policy change as "the 
promise to pursue a process of democratic reform that is inclusive both geographically 
and politically, to uphold Libya's international obligations and to disburse funds in a 
transparent manner to address the humanitarian and other needs of the Libyan 
people" (CNN, 2011).  
US recognition was of critical importance and enabled the rebels access to the 




stipulated that `all member states shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial 
assets and economic resources on their territories` which are owned or controlled by 
Qaddafi and his five children (UN, 2011a). In that context, the U.S. Treasury 
Department had seized approximately 30 billion US Dollars (USD) (S. Kaufman, 
2011).  
David Cohen, the Treasury's acting undersecretary for terrorism and financial 
intelligence said that "this is the largest blocking under any sanctions program ever" 
in American history. Treasury officials declared that some of the assets frozen 
belonged to Libya's central bank and its sovereign-wealth fund, the Libyan Investment 
Authority. These two assets are accepted by US as being directly controlled by 
Qaddafi, signifying a broad interpretation of UNSC Resolution 1970. The Central Bank 
of Libya and the sovereign-wealth fund were believed to have over 100 billion and 70 
billion USD respectively in foreign-currency reserves world-wide (Solomon & Johnson, 
2011).  
The cautious approach taken by the US to recognise NTC can be partially 
explained by a lack of information and a scepticism on the part of the US administration 
regarding the identities, capabilities, intentions and goals of armed and political 
opposition leaders and groups.  
As Qaddafi responded to the protestors by using `parallel elite and paramilitary 
forces` led by his relatives, rather than the regular army, which had been deliberately 
weakened by the regime over the years, the divide in Libyan military structure 
translated into a divided response from the military as well. It was mainly the army 
units in and around eastern cities like Benghazi, Tobruk (Barany, 2011) and al-Bayda 
that provided the rebels the initially limited military capabilities they needed to fight 




the rebel forces (Black, 2011a), suggested in an interview with BBC Newsnight`s Tim 
Whewell on 30th March 2011 that the number of defected Libyan military personnel 
numbered a few thousand (Mahmoud, 2011). So, contrary to Tunisia and Egypt, the 
military in Libya did not side with the protestors as a whole and the lack of unified 
military structure served as an advantage for the regime at the nascent phase of the 
conflict (Brahimi, 2011).  
Jason Pack categorises three different rebel groups fighting against Qaddafi at 
the early beginning of the conflict. The first group was comprised of former 
professional Libyan army soldiers and officers who defected en masse in mid-
February, mostly from eastern Libya. These included the units led by Abdel Fatah 
Younis, who became the commander in chief of the rebel forces after resigning on 22 
February as Qaddafi`s interior minister. These units are believed to have retained their 
organisational structure and numbered around 1,000 troops. The second group was 
composed of volunteers, who were ordinary civilians with different occupational 
backgrounds with no or little military experience and training. The third category were 
rebels with an Islamic orientation, coming from cities like Darnah. Some of these were 
returned Libyan fighters from earlier conflicts who also took part in the establishment 
of LIFG (Pack, 2011).   
 The general perception of the rebels at the beginning of the conflict was that 
they represented a broad cross-section of Libyan society. Large and organized units 
coordinated their effort with the NTC, and among the radical elements within the rebel 
groups, only a few of them were believed to pose a threat (Tempelhof & Omar, 2012). 
During an interview in Al Bayda with the Dailybeast`s Fadel Lamen on 12th 
March 2011, Libyan National Council Chief Mustafa Abdul Jalil said: “There is no place 




and do not subscribe to these extremist ideologies. Libya is and will be a moderate 
Muslim country where democracy and rule of law will be supreme. The Libyan people 
suffered so much for over 41 years from Qaddafi’s extremist ideology and will not 
replace it with anything but democracy and the rule of law” (Lamen, 2011). 
On 14th March 2011, John McCain, the US Senator from Arizona who ran as 
Republican Presidential nominee in the 2008 US Presidential election, together with 
Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman, put together a resolution that called for official 
recognition of Libya’s NTC in Libya and imposed a no-fly zone over Libya. In his 
speech to Congress Senator McCain criticised those who claim that the US cannot 
support the opposition on the grounds that the administration does not know who the 
opposition is. He said “They have been organized for weeks. Their senior leaders 
consist of longstanding critics of Qaddafi as well as officials who recently broke with 
his regime. They even have a Web site”.  Senator McCain also stated that sanctions 
and humanitarian aid were not enough and, on the top of imposing no fly zone, the US 
should share intelligence with the opposition, help them develop command and control 
capability, provide technical assistance and security and jam Qaddafi’s 
communications and television channel (Mccain, 2011c). The support provided by an 
influential opposition party member was significant for US administration calculations.     
 Senator Lieberman also underlined that the US did not have to choose between 
US friendly secular dictatorships and religious extremist regimes antagonistic to the 
US. He portrayed the Arab Spring as an opportunity that provided the US 
administration a third way, i.e. democracy. He characterised the opposition in Libya as 
seeking change for peaceful democratic revolution, political freedom, universal human 





During a briefing on 28th March 2011 to reporters on operations in Libya, Vice 
Admiral William Gortney, Director of the Joint Staff, answered a question about the 
opposition. He reassured that the US administration was not talking with the 
opposition. He said “we would like a much better understanding of the opposition. We 
don`t have it. It does matter to us and we are trying to fill in those knowledge gaps. 
We are not in direct support of the opposition, we are not coordinating with the 
opposition. Clearly the opposition is not well organised and it is not a very robust 
organisation” (Gortney, 2011). 
 On 29th March 2011 then NATO Supreme Allied Commander of Europe and at 
the same time US-European Commander, James Stavridis, testified to Senate Armed 
Services Committee on US operations in Libya. He said: 
We are examining very closely the content, composition, the personality, 
who are the leaders of these opposition forces. The intelligence I am 
receiving at this point makes me feel that the leadership that I am seeing 
are responsible men and women who are struggling against Colonel 
Qaddafi. We have seen flickers in the intelligence of potential Al-Qaida, 
Hezbollah, we have seen different things. But at this point I don`t have detail 
sufficient to say that there is a significant Al-Qaida presence or any other 
terrorist presence in and among these folks (Stavridis, 2011). 
 
 On 29 March 2011, Senator McCain reiterated that the US ambassador to the 
UN suggested that the US may provide arms to the Libyan rebels and reiterated his 
backing to any effort to support Libyan rebels in order to tilt the balance of power in 
their favour against Qaddafi forces. He refuted Al-Qaida’s influence among the rebels 
and assured that the rebels largely pledged their support to the NTC, which he saw as 
representative of tribes and communities across Libya. He said “if these moderate, 
democratic forces do not succeed in Libya, we know exactly who would fill the void: 
the radicals and the ideologues” (Mccain, 2011b)  




Odyssey Dawn and US Military Operations in Libya on 31st March 2011, Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that the US administration lacks clarity about 
the Libyan opposition. He said: 
 
Other than handful of leaders we don`t have much visibility into those who 
have risen against Qaddafi. But I think that in a way, speaking of opposition 
is a misnomer. Because it is very disparate, scattered, and probably each 
element has its own agenda. Each of those towns that rose up in the west 
where resistance has been quelled, basically did so on their own. You didn`t 
see people going one town to the next to share the fight. Frankly, that is 
one of the problems that those who rebelled against Qaddafi is facing lack 
of command and control and lack of organisation. So I would say there are 
multiple agendas, very disparate elements across the country engaged in 
this. And at this point we don`t have a lot of visibility into those. We may not 
know much about the opposition or the rebels but we know a great deal 
about Qaddafi (Gates, 2011a)   
 
 During the same hearing, Joint Chief Chairman Mike Mullen responded to a 
question about whether US was planning to arm the rebels in Libya:  
 
We know a few of the Libyan opposition leaders but there is whole a lot we 
don`t know. We certainly are not looking at options from not doing it or doing 
it. There is a fairly standard way to do this: train and equip that we are 
familiar with. But I will also repeat what the Secretary said we are not the 
only ones that are familiar with this. There are plenty of countries who have 
the ability, the arms and the skill sets to be able to do this. There is 




 On 30th March 2011, during discussions in the US Congress, former Republican 
Nevada Senator, John Ensign, criticised the Obama administration`s support for the 
rebels without knowing who they are and what their ideology is (Ensign, 2011). 
Republican US Congress Representative from Texas, Louie Gohmert, questioned 
who would replace Qaddafi when he is toppled and drew attention to al Qaeda and 




in Libya as the most probable successor to Qaddafi. However, he added that it was 
not in line with US interests. The congressman drew parallels between Libya and 
Egypt, where he argued that US support to toppling Mubarak was a serious mistake 
and advocated that Mubarak posed a threat neither to the US nor Israel, contrary to 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that replaced him (Gohmert, 2011). 
In Libya, eastern regions historically represented the most rebellious opposition 
groups, including Muslim Brotherhood in Libya but also some militant groups based in 
and around Benghazi, Dernah, and Ajdabia (Pargeter, 2009). Charles Levinson of the 
Wall Street Journal interviewed Libyan fighters at the early stages of the uprising who 
had fought against US invasion in Afghanistan and at the time were among the rebels 
confronting Qaddafi. He observed on 2nd April 2011 that “Islamist leaders and their 
contingent of followers represent a relatively small minority within the rebel cause. 
They have served the rebels' secular leadership with little friction. Their discipline and 
fighting experience is badly needed by the rebels' ragtag army” (Levinson, 2011).  
House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, a Republican 
from Michigan, stated on 3rd April 2011 that the Libyan opposition lacks coordination 
and the US administration does not have sufficient intelligence on who the rebels are. 
He reminded that in the recent past, potential al-Qaeda elements in Libya sent fighters 
to Iraq in an effort to counter the US presence. However, he reaffirmed his view that it 
does not necessarily mean that Al-Qaeda has a majority or influence in the country. 
Congressman Rogers underlined the administration’s concern about the rebels by 
saying “we don't arm people that we don't know who they are and if they're going to 
use those weapons against civilians or maybe us in the future” and justified US 
involvement in Libya as an effort to support people seeking liberty so that the 




On 8th April 2011 Senator McCain refuted the allegations that Al-Qaida has 
traction within the Libyan opposition and reiterated his view that the Libyan opposition 
was struggling for political freedom, economic opportunity, and justice against an 
oppressive, repressive and brutal regime. However, he also highlighted the danger 
posed if Libya goes through a protracted stalemate. He argued that, in this case, al-
Qaida forces would infiltrate and gain power (Mccain, 2011a). 
 John Boehner, a Republican Representative from Ohio, sponsored House 
Resolution 292 on 3rd June 2011, which reprimanded President Obama for not seeking 
authorization from Congress for military action in Libya, and called on the president to 
submit a report to Congress clarifying and justifying the US mission in Libya. Among 
the 21 questions asked were three regarding: the composition, representativeness and 
political agenda of the NTC; the relationship between NTC, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
LIFG, Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah or other groups who are against the US interests; and any 
weapon acquired and used by those groups. During the discussions in Congress on 
3rd June 2011, Mike Turner, a Republican Representative for Ohio, referred to 
Secretary Gates’ suggestion that the US administration knows very little about the 
Libyan opposition and the rebels. Congressman Turner also emphasised the lack of 
knowledge with regards to the rebel`s geopolitical views vis à vis their neighbours and 
the US, their commitment to domestic diversity, their ideology, their preferred form of 
government, and their commitment to non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction in Libya (Berman, 2011). 
 During Congressional discussions on 24th June 2011 regarding House 
Resolution 2278, which aimed to limit funding for US support to the Libya operation, 
Republican Representative Dan Burton of Indiana was also sceptical about the 





We don’t know if it’s the Muslim Brotherhood, we don’t know if it’s al 
Qaeda—now we do know there are al Qaeda operatives that came from 
Afghanistan fighting with the rebels in Libya; are we supporting al Qaeda? 
Are we supporting the Muslim Brotherhood? The Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt has opened up the border—or the Government of Egypt, whatever 
that is right now—has opened up the border between Egypt and Gaza, 
which provides a mechanism for weapons to get into Gaza to fire on Israel. 
So before we start supporting a rebel movement and going after somebody 
like Qaddafi, we ought to find out who we’re for (Burton, 2011b). 
 
 
During the same session Democrat Representative from Washington Adam 
Smith dismissed the idea that the US administration does not know who the opposition 
is and stated that Benghazi was neither controlled by Muslim Brotherhood nor al 
Qaeda, instead arguing that was controlled by a Libyan representative government 
that deserved support (A. Smith, 2011). 
Even after the Qaddafi regime was toppled, NTC leadership felt the need to relieve 
public opinion about the composition of the opposition of the rebels. Mahmoud Jibril, 
NTC Interim Prime Minister of Libya gave an interview to the BBC World News’ 
Hardtalk program presenter Stephen Sackur on 23rd Oct 2011 in Jordan, during which 
he said:  
The Libyan society is a moderate society by the very nature of Islam. It is a 
moderate Islam, Maliki sect, Maliki doctrine. I think Malikis are moderate by 
the very nature. This is not to say that other streams of thought are excluded 
from the process. The cabinet we had, 16 people including myself, four of 
them are Muslim Brotherhood (Jibril, 2011).  
 
 Similarly, former Libyan National Transitional Council Finance Minister Ali 
Tarhouni gave a speech at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 5th 
January 2012, during which he reiterated his conviction that the Libyan society is ready 
to build a democratic state from the revolution since Libya has moderate version of 




those in the international community concerned about the composition and world view 
of the revolutionaries in Libya by saying: 
Most of these revolutionaries are not military people. They are regular 
citizens that allegedly carry guns like thousands of people that I knew. 
Carried gun and went for fight to liberate their country. They are teachers, 
physicians, workers, you name it. The only organised group in Libya is 
Muslim Brotherhood. They are small group, very small group actually, as 
far as we know. But they are organised and well-funded. There are some 
other initiatives by elites here and there. But considering the political 
spectrum the elites do not have grassroots support (Tarhouni, 2012). 
 
In conclusion, just after the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, the Libyan 
revolution was broadly seen by the US administration as part of a regional aspiration 
for an open and liberal society, democracy, and jobs. The general perception of the 
opposition was that it represented a broad cross-section of the Libyan society, 
organised behind the political opposition led by NTC.  
However, as the conflict evolved, the US administration`s scepticism about who 
would replace Qaddafi and a potential AL Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood take over 
in Libya led to a cautious stance and the US refrained from decisively and directly 
supporting rebel groups.  
As the Libyan conflict unfolded, several identified lessons seemed to have 
impacted on US calculations vis-à-vis Syria. Firstly, as Qaddafi was toppled the 
expectation was that the opposition would establish a viable governing structure. 
However, shortly after the regime collapsed different factions started fighting each 
other for power. That reinforced the general belief that overthrowing the incumbent 
regime was not enough for sustained stability and security without keeping sizable 
boots on the ground, which the US administration was reluctant to do. Secondly, 




which were exploited by subnational armed groups with their own agenda and then 
terrorist groups undermining capacity building efforts.  
 
The Evolution of the Syrian Opposition 
Islamic groups’ historical repression and the sectarian side-lining policy of the 
Assad regime was instrumental in urging some groups to take arms against the 
regime, since they believed that the prospect for tangible, peaceful reform was 
hopeless during the Arab Spring. As the revolution turned into an intrastate conflict, 
support provided to the warring factions by the rival regional and international actors 
prolonged the conflict, fuelling the rise of numerous armed opposition groups 
(Badoura, 2014).  
While various political and armed opposition groups in Syria shared an immediate 
goal to topple the Assad regime at the nascent phase of the conflict, they had 
conflicting ideas on what kind of political order should replace the current system. 
Especially main groups` diverging opinions on the role of religion in a post-Assad state 
further divided both the opposition and their external resource providers as well 
(Ostovar & Mccants, 2013).  
 The formation and evolution of the political and armed opposition in Syria during 
the Arab Spring uprising was categorised by Asaad Al-Saleh and Loren White into 
three phases. In the first, grassroots opposition groups were established at the village 
or neighbourhood, city or district, and national level. At the village and neighbourhood 
levels were Local Coordinating Councils (LCC) and youth activists; at the city and 
district levels were Revolutionary Councils, consisting of prominent local intellectuals 
and businessmen; at the national level was the Syrian National Council (SNC), formed 




conflict and formation of the FSA in July 2011 in response to mounting regime 
aggression and its use of tanks, artillery, helicopters, and military aircrafts against 
protesters. The regime`s increased brutality essentially further militarised the 
opposition and marginalised political opposition groups. The third phase represented 
the increasing influence of extremist groups at the expense of FSA among the armed 
opposition groups, which undermined the credibility of moderate groups in Syria (Al-
saleh & White, 2013) and practically urged them to cooperate locally with hardliner 
groups in the absence of decisive support and increasing Syrian regime and ISIL 
pressure. 
 A day before US led intervention started in Libya, the protests against the arrests 
and long-time detainment of the school children on 18th March were the first example 
of large-scale demonstrations in Syria against the government. The students had been 
imprisoned and allegedly tortured in late February 2011 on the grounds that they 
sprayed the graffiti on the school wall that reads "the people want to topple the regime." 
During the protests, police opened fire and killed at least four protesters (Sterling, 
2012). Initial US administration response to the Syrian crisis was measured, as Assad 
promised to make the necessary reforms demanded by protesters. However, as the 
peaceful demonstrations transformed into clashes with the security forces as a result 
of dissatisfaction of the protestors with the reform pledges, the US administration also 
changed its rhetoric gradually.  
On 29th March 2011, the US Secretary of State called on Assad to timely 
implement the reforms demanded by the Syrian people, starting with the elimination 
of emergency law (US Department of State, 2011). The Assad regime passed the law 
on 20th April 2011 to lift the emergency law and in a stroke, had suspended a policy 




 On 19th May 2011, President Obama underlined that the Syrian regime chose 
to mass murder and arrest its citizens, which resulted in US sanctions. Obama also 
called on Assad to initiate a “serious dialogue to advance a democratic transition” and 
presented Assad two options: “lead the transition, or get out of the way” (Obama, 
2011f). 
 Daraa city was followed by the crush of protests in Hama in July 2011, with 
tanks killing up to 100 people (Black, 2011b). The attacks carried out on the 12th July 
2011 by pro-Assad groups that targeted US and French embassies was also 
instrumental in so much as it altered US rhetoric and stance against the Syrian regime 
(BBC, 2011a). Over the Hama incidence, Hilary Clinton stated that “Assad has lost 
legitimacy, failed to deliver on the promises he has made, he is not indispensable and 
we have absolutely nothing invested in him remaining in power” (The Washington 
Post, 2011). 
Michel Kilo, a Syrian Christian and a prominent opposition figure, suggested 
that the regime prioritised the sustainment of its existence and intentionally aimed to 
transform the peaceful demonstration, demanding reform into armed action by 
adopting a security solution option rather than reforming. He claims the notion of 
armed and unarmed opposition would give the regime a justification to supress any 
uprising against the regime. He also underscored the strategy adopted by Assad 
regime served to transform “struggle for freedom, justice and equality into sectarian 
infighting” and led to religious extremists attempting to “take the leadership of the 
street out of the hands of those who can mainly be described as modernist and 
belonging to civil society, as well as circles within the regime itself who are inclined to 
reform” (Kilo, 2011). In that context, the regime-backed Shabihha militia, composed 




of the violence (Phillips, 2012), which in turn urged some of the peaceful protesters to 
take up arms for self-defence.  
 The Secretary of State`s tacit declaration of a shift in US policy against the 
Assad regime was reinforced a month later on 18th August 2011 by US President 
Obama`s call for Assad to step down, five months after the conflict started. This official 
statement marked a change in US policy, which had up until then been urging the 
Assad regime to lead a democratic transition for Syrian people. President Obama also 
ordered expanded sanctions targeting Assad, Syria’s intelligence and security 
establishment (Ukman & Liz, 2011) and the freezing of all Syrian assets in the US, 
banned imports of Syrian oil and barred American citizens from having any business 
dealings with the Syrian government (Myers, 2011). President Obama also reinforced 
his position regarding the Assad regime by saying: 
The United States cannot and will not impose this transition upon Syria. It 
is up to the Syrian people to choose their own leaders, and we have heard 
their strong desire that there not be foreign intervention in their movement. 
What the US will support is an effort to bring about a Syria that is 
democratic, just, and inclusive for all Syrians. We will support this outcome 
by pressuring President Assad to get out of the way of this transition, and 
standing up for the universal rights of the Syrian people along with others 
in the international community (Obama, 2011h). 
 
Activists living in exile, mostly well-educated and western-oriented elites and 
intellectuals, with nationalist/secularist background or affiliated with the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood established officially Syrian National Council (SNC) as the main political 
opposition against Assad regime on 02 October 2011 in Istanbul to lead the efforts. 
Some key figures had taken part in both the Damascus Spring and Damascus 
Declaration process (Bagy, 2012). SNC was composed of nationalists, secularists and 
religiously motivated groups and was thus similar to Libya’s National Transitional 




Stratfor’s analysis of the Syrian opposition at the early stages of the conflict 
highlighted three stumbling blocks for the SNC. Firstly, a lack of unified opposition that 
the international community could recognize as the alternative to the Assad regime, 
and disparate rebel groups in Libya pledging loyalty to the Libyan NTC until the regime 
collapsed. Secondly, geographically, Syrian armed groups lacked safe havens, unlike 
Libyan rebels, who initially operated in the east of Libya. Thirdly, while there were en 
masse defections, including by senior officers, at the beginning of Libyan uprising, a 
limited number of defections in Syria only came months later (Stratfor, 2011). 
Michael Weiss and Hannah Stuart`s report on the Syrian opposition quoted 
Ammar Abdulhamid, Western spokesperson for the opposition when he said that  “less 
than a third” of the opposition were religiously oriented and “can neither be excluded 
from nor dominate the Syrian opposition” (Weiss & Stuart, 2011) 
At the early stages of the uprising there were conflicting views regarding the 
support for the opposition amongst US Congress members and as to whether the US 
should support the opposition for a regime change. On the one hand, Joseph 
Lieberman, US Senator from Connecticut, raised his criticism against those who were 
sceptical about the opposition when he said “we know enough about the opposition to 
know that it cannot be worse than Assad and will be much better” (Joseph Lieberman, 
2011). On the other hand Adam Schiff, a Democratic Party member of the US House 
of Representatives from California, articulated his deep concern for a potential large 
scale violence between Sunni, Shia, Alawi, Muslim, Christian, and Druze population 
in Syria (similar to the situation in Lebanon) if the Assad regime fell (Adam Schiff, 
2011). In fact, while the majority of Sunnis in Syria supported armed opposition groups, 
a preponderance of Alawite, Christians and Druze communities aligned with the Assad 




In addition to the ideological background of the opposition, a lack of central 
leadership was another concern regarding the Syrian opposition. Nir Rosen, who 
spent time with fighters in late 2011 and early 2012, stated there was no central 
leadership to the armed resistance and that the majority of the armed groups were 
civilians who took up arms, as opposed to the general conviction that the defectors 
from the Syrian Army constituted the vast majority of them. He also underlined the fact 
that the influence of the Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies was insignificant in 
Syria among the rebels (Nir, 2012). 
 The concerns regarding the worldview of the opposition had also an impact 
upon the US military leadership`s judgement regarding the arming of the opposition. 
During a CNN interview on 19th February 2012 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Martin Dempsey, said: 
It's premature to take a decision to arm the opposition movement in Syria, 
because I would challenge anyone to clearly identify for me the opposition 
movement in Syria at this point. You know, there's indications that Al Qaeda 
is involved and that they're interested in supporting the opposition. And until 
we're a lot clearer about, you know, who they are and what they are, I think 
it would be premature to talk about arming them (Dempsey, 2012). 
 
On 24th February 2012, the first meeting of the “Friends of Syria” conference was 
held in Tunis. More than 60 countries and representatives from Western and Arab 
countries convened to discuss the worsening situation in Syria. The Friends of Syria 
Group recognised the SNC as a ̀ legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful 
democratic change` and pledged to increase practical support for the Syrian 
opposition (Gov.uk, 2012).  
SNC had opposed a violent uprising at the nascent phase of the upheaval, seeking 




Defence to amalgamate the armed opposition under the SNC flag (Ostovar & Mccants, 
2013).  
Even though the SNC attempted to secure wider representation from all political, 
ethnic and sectarian groups, the international community was frustrated by infighting 
within the SNC, its deficiency to persuade other opposition groups to merge with it, a 
and lack of meaningful support and participation from the Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, 
and Turkmen community and only limited support from Christians (Sharp & Blanchard, 
2012a). The second point of criticism was the perception about the Muslim 
Brotherhood`s effective clout over the SNC. This perception was an essential factor 
that raised concern among Western countries and limited the organization’s influence 
in Syria (Bagy, 2012). 
The emergence of the Al Nusra Front in January 2012 as the most effective rebel 
force complicated the picture for the US even further. During Congressional hearing 
in March 2012, Republican Representative from Indiana Dan Burton referred to the 
assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper’ about al Qaeda’s 
presence among armed opposition groups in Syria. He warned “…we better be careful 
before we start making a regime change there that al Qaeda doesn’t take over or have 
a big influence in Syria that will cause problems for the United States, our ally Israel, 
and others in the Middle East later on” (Burton, 2012). 
Another prominent faction in Syria were the Kurds. At the beginning of Syrian 
uprising Syrian Kurds were divided into two main blocs, the Kurdish National Council 
(KNC), a coalition of 15 smaller parties sponsored by Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) in Iraq, and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), founded in 2003 and closely 
affiliated with the PKK. Essentially, both blocs espoused the same goal to establish 




whereas the PYD preferred to struggle to place Kurds as a neutral third force in Syria. 
In mid-July 2012 Iraqi KRG President Massoud Barzani facilitated negotiation between 
the two main blocs, culminating in the Erbil Agreement, which called for KNC and PYD 
to administer Syria’s Kurdish areas through the `Kurdish Supreme Council`, a 
governing body equally represented by the KNC and PYD (Caves, 2012). However, 
the PYD and Kurdish National Council have co-operation seldomly (T. Lister, 2012), 
mostly because of the PYD`s military dominance through the People’s Protection Unit 
(YPG), a Kurdish militia that provides security in most of Syria’s Kurdish controlled 
areas (Caves, 2012).  
In July 2012, Syrian security forces relinquished control of several Kurdish towns 
in the north to PYD (T. Lister, 2012). That manoeuvre led the Assad government to 
divert its heavy weapons and fighting force against the Sunni-led armed opposition. 
(Arango, 2012) .  
In her memoirs, Secretary of State Clinton points out that US top military officials 
were persistently reluctant to get involved in Syria and brought forward the difficulty of 
imposing a Libya-style no-fly zone in Syria. She suggested that the difficult stem in the 
advance air defence systems in place. Clinton also admits that in mid-August 2012, 
CIA Director David Petraeus presented a plan to arm and train a moderate opposition 
in order to build up a partner that could do enough to convince Assad and his backers 
that a military victory was impossible. So, the primary US objective was not forming a 
force strong enough to defeat the regime; “However the President thought the US 
needed more time to evaluate the Syrian opposition before escalating commitment so 





 In late 2012 as Assad forces were gradually losing the control of Damascus, 
Hezbollah from Lebanon, Iranian proxy militia groups in Iraq Asa’ib Ahl al Haq and 
Kata’ib Hezbollah, and Iranian Revolutionary Guards were deployed into Syria to turn 
the tide in favour of the Assad regime (Chulov, 2014a). Hezbollah fighters in Syria, 
were instrumental at the later stages of the conflict in reclaiming the strategically 
important town of Qusayr, located six miles from the Lebanese-Syrian border (Nikitin, 
Feickert, & Kerr, 2013). 
In November 2012, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the SNC 
would no longer be viewed as the leader of the Syrian opposition and called for the 
formation of a more inclusive opposition. In response to increasing pressure from the 
international community, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces was established in November 2012 in Doha, Qatar as a new 
coalition that would embrace all segments of the society (BBC News, 2013a).  
 On 7th December 2012, in order to unite and consolidate the authority over 
various armed groups, rebel leaders from all across Syria elected a 30-member unified 
command and control committee, the Supreme Military Council.  Six members from 
each five "fronts" in Syria (Northern, Eastern, Western, Central and Southern) were 
represented in the 30 member council (Bagy, 2013).  
On 1th December 2012, during an interview with ABC’s Barbara Walters, President 
Obama was asked whether he planned to recognize the Syrian opposition and give 
them some legitimacy. President Obama said: 
 
 We’ve made a decision that the Syrian Opposition Coalition is now 
inclusive enough, is reflective and representative enough of the Syrian 
population that we consider them the legitimate representative of the Syrian 
people in opposition to the Assad regime and so we will provide them 
recognition and obviously, with that recognition comes responsibilities. 




fact affiliated with Al Qaeda in Iraq and we have designated them Al Nusra 
as a terrorist organisation. We are going to make clear to distinguish 
between those elements of the opposition (Obama, 2012a). 
 
 
The new coalition for the first time included representation from the Local 
Coordination Committees of Syria and key internal opposition groups within Syria. The 
National Coalition also had the support of the FSA. The primary objective was to 
establish a group that would gain more widespread international and internal 
recognition thanks to greater representation from minority groups and groups 
operating inside the country. This was seen as a precondition for increased financial 
and material support to the opposition (Carnegie Centre, 2012a). 
SNC`s primacy was challenged by the National Coordination Committee (NCC), 
formed as a Syrian based alliance and consisting of representatives from leftist, 
Kurdish and individuals associated with the 2005 Damascus Declaration in June 2011 
(Sharp & Blanchard, 2012). It was an alliance of 16 left-wing parties, three Kurdish 
political parties, and independent political and youth activists (BBC News, 2013a). 
Some of the members of NCC were wary of the Islamic background of some of the 
SNC`s members. Unlike the SNC, the NCC was open to negotiation and a political 
settlement with the Assad regime. While the NCC acknowledged the FSA as an 
essential part of the revolution, it rejected foreign arm transfer to the FSA or any form 
of foreign military intervention (BBC News, 2013a). 
 Given that the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces 
was established and acknowledged by a considerable international community in 
November 2012, and that the Supreme Military Council of the FSA was empowered in 
December 2012, potentially filling the gap in military domain, it was the high time to 




recognition of the newly established, more inclusive political and armed opposition did 
not lead to a strong commitment to empower armed opposition to a degree that could 
tilt the balance on the ground. 
Obama’s reluctance to provide direct military assistance to the Syrian 
opposition is based essentially on the potential danger that sophisticated American 
weapons sent into Syria could fall into the wrong hands – particularly those of the Al 
Nusra Front – and be used against American interests. The US designated the Al 
Nusra Front as a terrorist entity in December 2012, due to its reported Al Qaeda 
affiliation. The US complained on the one hand about the divided nature of the 
opposition and its lack of a unified command and control that could facilitate transfer 
of US support and, on the other, about the existence of religious extremist groups 
among the armed opposition (Rugh, 2013). 
US Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, a Democrat from 
Michigan, reinforced these issues during the testimony of US Regional Commanders 
where he said: 
 
The administration has showed some real caution about getting more 
deeply involved militarily, in terms of supplying arms, particularly to the 
opposition in Syria. I think the fear has been that we want to make sure who 
those arms are getting to first of all. Secondly when Assad falls there needs 
to be in place, ready to be put in place by the Syrian some kind of an interim 
government which would avoid chaos and anarchy in Syria so that it does 
not fall apart, it doesn`t disintegrate (Levin, 2013). 
 
 
  US Secretary of State John F. Kerry announced on 28th February 2013 that the 
US would provide only non-lethal aid, including food, medicine, and training assistance 
through the SMC of the FSA. That was a critical shift in US policy given that the US 
for the first time publicly committed itself to support armed opposition (Bagy, 2013). 




increased as he visited Brussels on 6th March 2013 and attended a meeting organised 
by Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). During that meeting Gen. 
Idris stated that the Free Syrian Army was established by civilians and military 
personnel who defected from the army to protect civilians from Syrian Armed Forces 
and Shabbiha militia. He summarised FSA goals as: respect for freedom of speech 
and religion; democracy; equality among Syrian citizens; the defence of minorities; 
and opposing any type of extremism. He underlined the need for humanitarian support 
(largely in the form of food and medicine) to liberated areas and more weapons and 
ammunition (particularly anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles) to stop the regime from 
killing and destroying of Syrian infrastructure. Gen. Idris  also articulated that the Al 
Nusra Front accounted for 2-3% of all armed opposition groups in Syria, comprising 
roughly of 5000 fighters (Idriss, 2013). 
 The leader of the Al Nusra Front, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, announced on 10th 
April 2013 the group’s allegiance to the leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The 
statement came after the Islamic State of Iraq released an audio message announcing 
the extension of its 'Islamic State' into al-Sham (the Levant) (Alaaldin, 2013). That was 
a significant turning point in Syrian conflict. 
In April 2013 Al-Baghdadi expanded the area of operation beyond the borders of 
Iraq to encompass initially Syria and rebranded the organisation under the name of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant. Al-Baghdadi`s effort to merge with Al Nusra Front 
was declined by both Al Nusra Front and Al-Qaida`s Senior Leadership. The Al Nusra 
Front leader denied the unification of his group with ISIL and proclaimed his allegiance 
to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the successor to Osama bin Laden in Al-Qaeda. Later, al-
Zawahiri formally announced the dissociation of Al-Qaeda`s senior leadership from 




as a sectarian one, the foreign fighter flow gradually increased. In 2013 there were as 
many as 1,000 individual armed rebel groups, each of which fell somewhere on the 
spectrum from religious extremist ideology to secular (Kelley, 2013). 
 
Source: Michael Kelley/Business Insider, (Kelley, 2013)  
 
 These foreign fighters became a very crucial issue both for the balance of 
power in Syria and also their potential to pose threat to their home countries. The 
International Centre for Study of Radicalization (ICSR) report on foreign fighters in 
Syria and estimated that from late 2011 to 10th December 2013 between 3,300 (low 
estimate) and 11,000 (high estimate) individuals from 74 nations went to Syria to fight 
against the Assad government. Even if the highest estimate turns out to be true, at 
that time the “foreign contingent” did not represent more than 10 per cent of the armed 
opposition, which is thought to number more than 100,000 fighters (ISCR, 2013). 




Charles Lister puts the number in Syria and Iraq as of April 2015 at between 22,000 
and 30,000, from 100 countries.  Lister`s account of the increasing number of foreign 
fighters in the Syria conflict suggest that the numbers over the years rose from 700-
1,400 in mid-2012 to 6,000 in August 2013 (C. Lister, 2015). 
In that context, the armed opposition at that time can be classified into three 
categories, according to their motives and post-Assad regime prospects: 1) secular, 
liberals, leftist nationalists who see the fighting as a national struggle against an 
authoritarian corrupt regime, 2) religious/conservative nationalists seeking to topple 
the Assad regime and establish a state based on Islamic principles that is not imposed 
on society, and 3) religious extremists espousing the establishment of a transnational 
caliphate and the implementation of a strict interpretation of Sharia law (initially 
encompassing the Levant) that does not tolerate minorities and other sects and 
beliefs.  
In May 2013, during a US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing 
regarding the Syrian Transition Support Act of 2013, Foreign Relations Committee 
Chairman Robert Menendez and Ranking Member Bob Corker introduced bipartisan 
legislation that aimed to authorise limited lethal and increased non-lethal assistance 
to vetted elements of the Syrian opposition. Republican Senator Rand Paul raised his 
concern that it was impossible to know who the US`s friends are among the rebel 
groups, referring to statements of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey. 
Senator Paul also warned that supported rebels could turn against the US in the future 
and also might target the 1-2 million Christians living in Syria, who have been largely 
protected by the Assad regime. He also alluded to the risk of arming groups allied with 
AQ, or arms winding up in the hands of AQ linked groups (Rand Paul, 2013). 




Services Committee Gen. Dempsey responded with a letter dated 19 August 2013 in 
which he highlighted the complexity of the situation and the opposition in Syria: 
 
We can destroy the Syrian Air Force. The loss of Assad`s Air Force would 
negate his ability to attack the opposition forces from the air, but would also 
escalate and potentially further commit the United States to the conflict. 
Stated another way, it would not be militarily decisive, but it would decisively 
commit us to the conflict.  In a variety of ways, the use of U.S. military force 
can change the military balance, but it cannot resolve the underlying and 
historic ethnic, religious, and tribal issues that are fuelling this conflict. Syria 
today is not about choosing between two sides but rather about choosing 
one among many sides. It is my belief that the side we choose must be 
ready to promote their interests and ours when the balance shifts in their 
favour. Today, they are not. The crisis in Syria is tragic and complex. It is a 
deeply rooted, long term conflict among multiple factions, and violent 
struggles for power will continue after Assad`s rule ends (Dempsey, 2013a). 
 
 
During the hearing at the Committee of Foreign Relations, organised to weigh 
the Obama administration`s response regarding whether US should take action or not 
in the wake of a chemical weapons attack in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21st 
August 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry opposed the idea that al-Qaeda or 
extremists are majority among the opposition. Kerry said:  
 
There are about 70,000 to 100,000 oppositionists. About somewhere 
maybe 15 to 25 percent might be in one group or another who are what we 
would deem to be bad guys. There are many different groups and 
sometimes they are fighting each other. The general belief, there is a real 
moderate opposition that exists. General Idris is running the military arm of 
that. And our allies in this effort, our friends, from the Saudis, to the Emiratis 
to the Qataris and others, are now in a disciplined way funnelling assistance 
through General Idris. And the moderate opposition is getting stronger as a 
result of that. The reason for supporting the moderate opposition is to have 
a buttress against those folks who, if Syria continues to move in the 
direction it has been going, if there is an implosion, they will be 





 However, Gen. Dempsey separated support to the opposition from acting in a 
limited way to deter and degrade the Assad regime from using chemical weapons. He 
reiterated his conviction that the US should not use military force in support of the 
opposition to tip the balance of power against regime. He said, “I remain cautious 
about taking the opposition’s role here in the civil war, with the understanding that the 
ultimate transition will come and can come through a negotiated settlement, a political 
resolution, not a military one”. He pointed towards the uncertainty regarding “when 
that support ends and how much it has to grow over time”. Instead he supported the 
idea of empowering the opposition by training and equipping them, but not by 
becoming their `military arm` (Dempsey, 2013b). On the other hand, Defence 
Secretary Chuck Hagel highlighted the groups under General Idris who are 
endeavouring for a free and inclusive Syria (Hagel, 2013). 
 During the US Congressional hearings on 10th September 2013, Republican 
Representative Paul Gosar also raised his concerns about the presence of al Qaeda 
affiliated opposition fighting against the Assad regime. He said, “it cannot be said that 
the enemy of my enemy is my friend. In this dangerous civil war, the enemy of our 
enemy is still and will always be our enemy” (Gosar, 2013). Democratic 
Representative Brian Higgins portrayed the Syrian conflict as “a brutal battle between 
two bad sides for control” rather than one between democracy and freedom. He said 
“Assad is a brutal dictator, for certain; but the opposition’s best fighters are al-Qaeda 
and Islamic extremists bent on creating an Islamic state in Syria” (Higgins, 2013)  
 Texan Republican Senator John Cornyn referred to the killing in Benghazi of 
the US Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, and several embassy personnel by 
terrorists potentially linked to Al Qaeda. He accused the US administration of having 




boots on the ground failed in Libya. He essentially opposed a limited operation that 
would allow the Assad regime remain in power (Kaine, 2013). In a similar vein, 
Republican Representative Tom Mcclintock from California put forward his scepticism 
about the moderate opposition phenomenon in Syria and drew a parallel between 
Libya and Syria in that context. He said “we’re told that al Qaeda’s not more than a 
fourth of our new coalition and that the rest are moderates. Well, we were told the 
same thing about Libya” (Mcclintock, 2013). 
 President Obama also supported the case for limited punitive military 
intervention against the Assad regime by stating that inaction would play into al 
Qaeda`s hand by conveying the message that the US does nothing to protect innocent 
civilians against chemical weapons attacks (Obama, 2013b). However, President 
Obama opted to pursue a diplomatic path limited to the elimination the Syrian chemical 
weapon stockpile rather than taking punitive action against the Syrian regime. His 
main concern with a post-Assad Syria was about potential successors. As we saw 
above, he raised his concern by saying “I don't think we should remove another 
dictator with force -- we learned from Iraq that doing so makes us responsible for all 
that comes next” (Obama, 2013d). This was a concerned reference to some of Assad’s 
extremist opponents, who would be eager to play a prominent role in a post-Assad 
era. 
 Republican US Representative Charlie Dent from Pennsylvania mentioned that 
the Christian Syrian population in his community were scared about potential atrocities 
by al Qaeda affiliated groups against Christians in Syria. He also talked about a Syrian 
village where the Aramaic language is spoken, the language that Jesus Christ spoke, 




 Democratic Senator Tom Udall from New Mexico also opposed military 
intervention to degrade Syria`s chemical weapon capability on the grounds that even 
limited military intervention against Assad’s regime could tilt the balance too far in 
favour of opposition groups, some of whom (primarily Al Qaeda affiliated groups) do 
not `share US values` (Udall, 2013).  Even though the US administration made it clear 
that any potential US action against the Syrian regime would be limited to degrading 
Syrian chemical weapons capabilities, the perception that it could tilt the balance of 
power at the expense of the Assad regime was significant. So, let alone toppling the 
Assad regime, some politicians, even from the Democratic Party, opposed punitive 
action against the Assad regime. 
In November 2013, seven armed opposition groups declared that they had 
formed the largest rebel alliance and had an estimated 45,000 fighters to "topple the 
Assad regime completely and build an Islamic state". They portrayed the new front as 
an "independent political, military and social formation". The Islamic Front withdrew 
from the SMC's command in December 2013 and seized the Bab al-Hawa border 
crossing with Turkey in the North West of Syria from SMC-aligned forces after driving 
them out of their bases and capturing arms depots. That development prompted the 
US to suspend `non-lethal` assistance for rebel groups in northern Syria (BBC News, 
2013a).  
On 20th March 2014, the US Ambassador to Syria between 2010 and 2014, 
Robert Ford, said in a speech at the Wilson Centre said “the opposition in Syria have 
a vision of Syria that for most part, I am leaving aside Al Qaeda elements, even some 
of the even hard liner Islamist they are not trying to impose an Islamic State although 
they are certainly going to advocate for one. There is a difference between advocating 




Christiane Amanpour, the Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria put forward his 
dissatisfaction with the US administration`s lack of commitment to the moderate 
opposition and underscored that letting down those groups would culminate in 
extremist groups gaining the upper hand on the ground. He explained what difference 
decisive US support to the opposition would make by saying: 
 
Had there been more military assistance and logistical assistance even this 
like cash, two things would have happened differently: number one the 
opposition would have probably been able to gain more ground couple of 
years ago more quickly, and been able to go to a negotiating table in a 
much stronger position. The regime would have been much weaker. And 
the second thing is the ability of Al Qaida and Islamist extremist groups to 
recruit away from the moderates would have been less and we would have 
had less extremism problem in Syria now had there been more assistance 
provided to the moderate forces even a year or two years ago would have 
made big difference.(Ford, 2014a) 
 
 
After ISIL took control of areas, both in Iraq and Syria, it declared the 
establishment of so called `Islamic State` in late June 2014. As the conflicts in Syria 
and Iraq were entwined, US President Barack Obama requested 500 million USD from 
Congress to ramp up the assistance to vetted rebel groups in Syria in their fight against 
ISIL. (Pollack, 2014)  
 In his 7th August 2014 speech, Obama announced that he authorized targeted 
airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. His justification was based on two factors: the advances 
of ISIL near Erbil, where the American consulate sits and where American military 
personnel advise Iraqi forces; and ISIL`s savage treatment of religious minorities, 
including Christians and Yezidis (Obama, 2014h). The first US airstrikes against ISIL 
targets took place on 8th August 2014 in Iraq; these were portrayed as a necessary 




co-ordinate defences with Peshmerga fighters` efforts to secure Yezidi refugees 
trapped on Mount Sinjar escaping from ISIL (Roberts & Ackerman, 2014).  
 In his 10th September 2014 speech, Obama declared that US airstrikes would be 
expanded into Syria to target ISIL. His reference to ramped up military assistance to 
the Syrian opposition in Syria again was within context of the fight against ISIL. He 
specifically mentioned that in the fight against ISIL, the US cannot rely on the Assad 
regime that has, he said, lost legitimacy. President Obama prioritised strengthening 
the opposition to counterbalance ISIL and simultaneously pursue a political solution 
for Syria conflict (Obama, 2014i). 
 The US strikes in Syria started on 23rd September 2014. The US staged strikes 
against ISIL strongholds in north-eastern Syria, initiated with Tomahawk missiles 
launched from the sea and followed by air strikes inside Syria. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
the United Arab Emirates and Jordan was also involved in the initial airstrikes (Sciutto, 
Castillo, & Yan, 2014).  
As ISIL sieged Kobani in northern part of Syria and increased its attacks in 
September 2014, the fight between PYD/YPG and ISIL intensified. When Kobani`s fall 
seemed imminent and potential for mass killings increased, US provided air support 
and Kurdistan’s Regional Government in Iraq provided fighters with heavy weaponry 
to defend the city.  ISIL was completely pushed back and forced to withdraw from 
Kobani on 27th January 2015 (Gunes & Lowe, 2015). A second major offensive against 
ISIL aimed to capture Tel Abyad in order to connect Cezire and Kobani cantons in 
Northern Syria. The offensive started in May 2015 and was supported by US air strikes 
to ISIL targets that ended on 14th June 2015, culminating in the capture of the city by 




During a panel discussion on 14th September 2015 held by the SETA Foundation 
at Washington D.C entitled, `A Tale Four Augusts: Obama’s Syria Policy`, Robert 
Ford, ex-Syrian Ambassador, criticised the US administration`s policy over Syria 
because, he said, it failed to act on the grounds of `civilian protection`. He suggested 
that the US had the ability to intervene at minimal risk and make definitive changes on 
the ground:  
 
I came to the conclusion there was precious little interest at White House in 
coming up with a strategy that would implement the President`s words of 
August 18, 2011, that Bashar al-Assad should step aside. Look now at the 
policy implications of what Basher al-Assad`s virtually unopposed program 
of collective punishment has given rise to. We have got ISIS in Syria 
enjoying a safe haven from which in June 2014 attacked and absorbed 
major parts of Iraq. This is one of the consequences. Every time a barrel 
bomb is dropped on a civil residential neighbourhood, it is a victory for ISIS. 
It enables the so called Caliph`s recruitment program in Syria and around 
the world. As the US pursues, the President`s definition of the mission, 
degrade and destroy ISIL there is a gaping hole in our strategy. It is a gaping 




During a press conference on 2nd October 2015, President Obama made clear 
that his Syria strategy does not involve directly targeting the Syrian regime and 
prioritised the fight against ISIL and a diplomatic solution for Syrian intra-state conflict 
instead. He stated: 
What we have learned over the last 10, 12, 13 years is that unless we can 
get the parties on the ground to agree to live together in some fashion, 
then no amount of U.S. military engagement will solve the problem.  And 
we will find ourselves either doing just a little bit and not making a 
difference, and losing credibility that way, or finding ourselves drawn in 
deeper and deeper into a situation that we can't sustain. But we’re not 
going to make Syria into a proxy war between the United States and 
Russia.  That would be bad strategy on our part.  This is a battle between 
Russia, Iran, and Assad against the overwhelming majority of the Syrian 
people.  Our battle is with ISIL, and our battle is with the entire 
international community to resolve the conflict in a way that can end the 




work, grow food, shelter their children, send those kids to school (Obama, 
2015c). 
 
In September 2015, “moderate” rebel group Division 30, trained and armed by 
the US to fight against ISIL, reportedly surrendered to the Al Nusra Front in northern 
Aleppo after they entered to Syria. In doing so, they were reported to have handed 
over all their US provided weapons (Bulos, 2015). Following this incident, President 
Obama acknowledged that the US administration could not find a way to help 
moderate opposition on the ground. He argued that even though Congress allocated 
500 million dollars to train and equip 5,000 opposition members to fight against ISIL, 
this program failed after 50 US trained rebels either were killed or defected to extremist 
groups. He reassured that as long as Assad remains in power it is difficult to get 
moderate opposition to focus their attention on ISIL (Obama, 2015b). 
More than a year after the first air strike in Syria, the White House shifted its 
strategy in Syria and White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest announced on 30th 
October 2015 that the US President Obama made a decision to send fewer than 50 
Special operation forces into northern Syria on a "train, advise and assist mission" to 
opposition groups that have made territorial gains against ISIL. (Engel, Welker, & 
Vinograd, 2015) 
The opposition referred to by the White House Press Secretary were the 
YPG/PYD dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), formed in North Eastern Syria 
on 15th October 2015 following a visit by US officials to northern Syria in early October 
2015. The YPG has partnered with the US and Western air power since the Kobani 
siege – the US even air-dropped 50 tonnes of arms and ammunition to those groups 
– and then drove ISIL forces east across a large swath of territory and subsequently 




Insights gained from the interviews conducted also shed light on US 
administration`s concerns with regards to the opposition in Libya and Syria. The main 
concern the US had in both the Libya and Syria conflicts seems to have focused on 
who the administration should back in a complicated civil war setting among warring 
factions with differing capacities, sizes and ideologies. The administration`s scepticism 
in this regard was more prevalent in Syria, where some of the groups fighting against 
the Assad regime were seen as much anti-American as they were anti-Assad. So, the 
US response to both conflicts presents a similar tendency to take a more sober 
response and refrain from full-fledged backing of any rebel group decisively if the 
potential exists that some of those backed groups could turn against the US in the long 
term. In Syria the US did not want to go in and back groups which did not have 
compatible interests and which were divided along so many different lines. The US 
administration didn`t want a repeat of the scenario in Afghanistan, where the US 
armed the `mujahidin` for the sake of pushing back the Soviets and later found some 
of those groups had turned against the US. The lessons learned in Libya also 
influenced how the US positioned itself in Syria with regards to the opposition as the 
conflict became protracted and unresolved. The outcomes of the Libya experience 
seemed to help inform US actions or, more importantly, lack of actions and provided 
part of the justification not to get more involved in Syria (Interviewee 4, 2015). That 
could partially explain why the US involvement in Syria did not involve a strong 
commitment to the opposition (Interviewee 8, 2015). 
Another lesson identified by the US administration from the experience in Libya 
could be the fact that without sizeable boots on the ground to provide post conflict 
security and stability, overthrowing the incumbent regime was not enough for 




than 150,000 coalition troops into Iraq and even then could not secure the country. 
So, with its complexity, the Syria case was almost certain to have a more significant 
demand for the post conflict security and capacity building measures (Interviewee 7, 
2015). This was intimidating for the US administration. 
More importantly, when the time came to form the post Qaddafi government the 
rebels indirectly supported by the US started fighting each other. As a result, the US 
administration approached the Syrian opposition with significant suspicion from the 
outset. A general conviction, one that still stands, was that the Syrian opposition is too 
divided, corrupt, weak, and disorganised to defeat either Assad or ISIL and form a 
viable post-Assad alternative and rebuild Syria (Thomas Juneau, 2016). 
On the other hand, the Libyan revolution was seen more like those in Egypt and 
Tunisia in so much as they were led by young people seeking democracy, a liberal 
society, and jobs. In the case of Syria, though, the general perception was that the 
uprising was a Sunni revolt against an Alawite regime (Interviewee 2, 2015).  
The situation in Syria was much more complicated than that in Libya. In Syria 
it started with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and then soldiers from the FSA started 
leaving FSA and joining or creating new groups. While in the beginning the main 
objective was to overthrow Assad, as the conflict protracted different groups started to 
pursue their own goals. For example, ISIL`s goal to establish the `Islamic caliphate` 
was a fundamentally different one to that of the FSA, which was to overthrow Assad 
and establish a democratic regime. (Tziarras, 2015) 
When the Syrian revolution initially started there was a strong cadre of young 
people who were out in the streets demanding democracy and freedom. However, the 
sectarian element became an increasing factor in Syria as the conflict continued. The 




supporting moderate elements may have caused and helped precipitate the situation 
where extremists were able to take control. “The more control the extremists got the 
more cautious President Obama got, and the more Al Assad could see that as a 
weapon” to play with (Interviewee 3, 2015). 
As a result of the Arab Spring uprisings, weakened and in some cases 
overthrown autocracies in the region led to the emergence of ungoverned spaces that 
were exploited by extremists (Interviewee 8, 2015). This potentially affected the way 
US characterised the situation in Syria.  
 
Impact of Opposition Groups 
The capacity, capability and the congruence in worldview and end state 
objectives of the opposition groups provide the baseline for contextualising US choices 
regarding the Syria conflict. 
In Libya, the US administration by and large saw the uprising representing a 
broad cross-section of the Libyan society and collectively supportive of the political 
body, the National Transitional Council. The capacity and capability of the rebel groups 
was not significant enough to counter the military units loyal to Qaddafi regime. 
However, most of the rebels concentrated in eastern Libya and operational support 
provided by the US and the other coalition forces helped them tilt the balance in their 
favour. Nevertheless, the US administration was meticulous in crafting its strategy to 
support the rebels, as there was a constant scepticism about some elements within 
Libyan rebels. The general perception was that the majority of the opposition consisted 
of moderate forces from defected professional Libyan soldiers and ordinary civilians 
who took up arms after the conflict started. However, battle hardened fighters 




the Libyan civil war. The number of fighters in that group and their ideology and end 
state objectives were source of concern for some US Foreign Policy Executives and 
high-ranking military officials, including Joint Chief of Staff, Mike Mullen. This 
scepticism seems to have influenced the means used to by the US in supporting the 
rebels and the scale of support provide; there was a fear that once Qaddafi was gone 
some rebels could turn against the US. So, the US purposefully supported the rebels 
to the point at which they could topple the Qaddafi regime but avoided empowering 
them to a degree they could not pose threat to US interests in the region. In the first 
episode of the Syrian conflict, which lasted until August 2011, the opposition lacked 
military capability and mainly sought more freedom and democracy through 
government led reform. Before the mass killings of civilians by the Assad regime 
before August 2011, the opposition was motivated by political aspirations. The political 
opposition groups also rejected the idea of external intervention to the uprising in that 
time frame. At that stage the opposition mainly had a peaceful political agenda, and it 
is difficult to talk about organised armed opposition. So, the US response was along 
the line of pressuring the Assad regime through sanctions for reform.  
During the second episode, which lasted until between November and December 
2012, the political and armed opposition was divided and could not garner enough 
support from the outside world to develop substantial capacity or capability to be able 
to pose a viable threat and alternative to the regime. In that period, the SNC struggled 
to gain meaningful support and participation from the broader cross-section of the 
community, particularly minority groups. In addition, the rebels lacked safe havens in 
which to thrive and operate against the regime. While the Obama administration took 
a firm stance against the Assad regime, the means wielded against the Assad regime 




opposition groups. Lack of central leadership and infighting among political and armed 
opposition groups were the primary deficiencies that negatively influenced the overall 
capability and capacity of the FSA to become a viable actor.  Ideologically, the 
influence of Muslim Brotherhood in FSA and some extremist elements were source of 
concern for the US administration, even though the majority of the FSA were defectors, 
mostly secular Syrian army soldiers. On the other hand, the emergence of the Al Nusra 
Front as the most effective rebel force dedicated to toppling Assad regime, which 
started attracting foreign fighters and external support from countries like Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, complicated the picture for the US even further. The US administration thus 
felt the need to handle the Syrian conflict cautiously. Another turning point in Syria that 
coincided with that time period was the PYD and YPG`s relinquishing of control in 
Kurdish majority towns in Northern Syria to the Assad regime. That move elevated the 
PYD and YPG to the major players in the Syrian conflict.  
In the third episode, which ended in August 2013, the Assad regime was 
supported by Hezbollah, Iranian forces and some other Shia elements from Iraq, and 
political and armed opposition in Syria, which united and started acting in a concerted 
manner. The political and armed opposition in Syria managed to consolidate their 
cohesion in that time frame to counter emerging threat. In that time frame, the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was established to embrace 
all segments of the society and to consolidate its authority over the Supreme Military 
Council. That was a golden opportunity for the US to support the internationally 
recognised Syrian opposition as the political and armed opposition for the first time 
and included representation from the local population, key internal opposition groups 
within Syria and the FSA. However, constant scepticism similar to that the US 




opposition. The US administration stopped short of providing the most needed heavy 
weapons, like anti-tank and aircraft missiles, to the Syrian opposition that would help 
change the balance of power on the ground and stop Assad regime targeting civilians 
and opposition groups significantly. The US limited support to non-lethal aid, including 
food, medicine, and training assistance through the SMC of the FSA. The perception 
within the US administration was that a large proportion of the opposition had been 
pushed to the more extremist side of the spectrum. The scepticism became more 
prevalent during that episode that some of the groups fighting against the Assad 
regime were anti-American as much as they were anti-Assad. So, the US`s reluctance 
to provide lethal weapon to rebel groups was based essentially on the potential danger 
that sophisticated American weapons sent into Syria falling into the wrong hands and 
being used against American interests, particularly by the Al Nusra Front. The US 
designated the Al Nusra Front as a terrorist entity on 11th December 2012 due to its 
reported Al Qaeda affiliation. From that point on it was inconceivable for the US 
administration to provide any kind of direct and indirect support to that and any 
associated group, especially considering the lessons learned from Libya, Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Another dimension the US seemed to take into consideration was the 
general recognition that the Syrian uprising revealed itself as a Sunni uprising against 
a very narrowly based Alawite regime and that the Syria conflict might be a lot less 
idealistic and likely a lot less secular.  
 The fourth period in the Syrian conflict was the most significant period 
with regards to threats that emerged both from the Assad regime and from ISIL. The 
use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime in August 2013 on the one hand and 
the rise of the threat from ISIL and other Salafist groups on the other made it difficult 




groups constituted the majority of the influential armed groups in Syria, eclipsing the 
capability and capacity of FSA, which is widely accepted to be a group of moderate 
fighters. The conflict in Syria was starting to be conceived as a war between the devil 
and the deep blue sea; a brutal dictator on one side and an extremist dominated 
opposition on the other.  From that point on, the US`s priority was more about 
degrading ISIL`s capability and shrinking its area of control in the region and thus the 
administration`s effort focused on empowering anti-ISIL groups. The most convenient 
alternative from the US perspective was PYD/YPG Kurdish forces exclusively focused 
on fighting against ISIL to protect the area under their control. The group had a secular 
mind-set, which was also seen as a panacea against the growing clout of the 
religiously oriented and extremist groups in Syria. General Dempsey acknowledged 
that the US had the capability to neutralise the Assad regime`s Air Force, but 
underlined that it would increase the US’s commitment. He warned that the groups 
who would potentially take over governance in post-Assad Syria would not promote 
both the US and their own interests. Groups with an Islamic orientation and some 
extremist groups started to receive more external support and gained further 
advantage over moderate groups.  
It looks like the US strategy was staggered in a way that prioritised more 
imminent and direct ISIL threats and delayed confronting the Assad regime for later 
stages. The US administration`s understanding seems to be that if Assad goes, the 
balance would tilt in favour of more extremist groups, contrary to US interests in the 
region. While the US’s reluctance to support moderate opposition groups urged 
regional actors to increase their support for more extremist groups, which were more 
capable of confronting the Assad regime, extremist group`s gaining the upper hand 




transition of fighters from moderate groups to more extremist groups (with more 
funding and capability) increased. The US was not sure if the moderate groups would 
consistently subscribe to mutual interests without allying with extremist groups out of 
a convenience of interests in the complicated war environment.   
Finally, the fifth episode was marked by the steadfast expansion of ISIL and 
further marginalisation of the moderate opposition. As PYD and YPG forces pushed 
ISIL back and seized territory, the US sustained air strikes in support PYD and YPG 
forces. As ISIL expanded further into the north of Syria and beheaded two US 
journalists, the US responded with strikes from sea and air based platforms, avoiding 
boots on the ground. Instead, the US administration increased its support to PYD and 
YPG. PYD and YPG forces were both capable and ideologically less dangerous from 
the US administration’s perspective, which facilitated increased and direct support. 
The Obama administration even sent special operation forces into northern Syria 
under a "train, advise and assist mission" in their fight against ISIL. The US 
administration was disappointed though, as some moderate groups trained and 
equipped by the US to fight against ISIL defected to extremist groups in Syria. This 
also provided justification to shift the majority of support towards PYD and YPG 
dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. The US was also determined not to turn the 
Syrian civil war into a proxy war between US and Russia. Instead, the ISIL threat 
became a common enemy where they could cooperate, or at least de-conflict their 
military operations and support PYD and YPG forces as a common ally against ISIL.  
 
5.4 The Impact of the Public Opinion on US Interventions in Libya and Syria 
The previous section discussed the Obama Doctrine, economic constraints, and 




Libya and Syria. This section is devoted to the potential influence of US public opinion 
on intervention decisions for both conflicts. So, the question is how and to what extent 
could public opinion have influenced the form, timing and the scale of intervention 
options over the intervention spectrum.  
Before looking into US public opinion and potential influence on US foreign policy 
choices vis-à-vis the Libya and Syria conflicts it is worthwhile to probe the elements of 
US public opinion and the associated literature. Donald C. Blaisdell argues that various 
domestic pressure groups interact with the political parties, the formal organs of 
government (the president as the chief of foreign policy, Congress, and the 
bureaucracy, including the military) to impinge upon particular foreign policy decision. 
Given that policy makers are highly sensitive to public opinion, domestic pressure 
groups endeavour to influence both the public and government. The use of the press 
and the divide among the members of the Congress provides pressure groups the 
opportunity to influence specific foreign policy choices (Blaisdell, 1958).  
Sparrow argues that with regards to the public opinion, polls could be misleading, 
due to the selective process in determining the questions and what to report, and 
instead the author attributes more definitive influence over the President`s perception 
to the media and Congress.  Sparrow also emphasises the media`s role in shaping 
public opinion, `the media’s framing capacity`.  
Another dimension of the changing nature of the media and its role in 
constructing social knowledge is noteworthy; the printed press and broadcasting 
media has recently been more profoundly supplemented by internet enabled web 
sites, blogs, and discussion forums (Sparrow, 2008), including social media accounts 
(Facebook, twitter etc.). These provide a more levelled playing field and opportunity 




subcategories of media requires detailed analysis in order to understand their 
contribution in the aggregate influence on public opinion. For instance, Habel posits 
argues that preferences of leading media editorial pages over policy decisions and the 
public was negligible. (Habel, 2012) 
The source of public opinion is schematized by Powlick in a way where elites, 
news media, elected representatives, interest groups, and the general or mass public 
affect one another in shaping foreign policy. The research results highlight the relative 
importance of the interplay and linkage between news media and elected 
representatives. Politicians consider the media`s `priming` and `framing` roles as 
important in raising public awareness to particular issues and in framing the issues in 
the desired direction. Meanwhile, they also act as delegates of those who elected them 
and voice their views. (Powlick, 1995) 
Civil society is defined by Carothers as the organisations and associations that 
exist out of state and which encompass interest groups like NGOs, labour unions, 
professional associations, religious, ethnic and social groups. Virtual civil society, 
created over internet and where members interact within a network, is complementary 
to civil society (Carothers, 1999). John W. Masland focuses on intervention and non-
intervention as a foreign policy choice and the impact of pressure groups within a 
pacifist versus war context. He alludes to two types of pressure groups, with reference 
to the methods used and abused: those trying to stimulate public opinion; and those 
directly engaging with government. While continuous publicity through the media is 
used to stimulate public opinion, personal contacts with Congress members and 
administration are used as a means to influence foreign policy. The two-track 




demand and setting the conditions to pressure government to take action at a 
particular time (Masland, 1942). 
Harold H. Sprout makes a distinction between official and unofficial pressure 
groups. Unofficial pressure groups manipulate public opinion to put pressure on 
Congress, White House or political parties. Congress serves as an official pressure 
group through its legislative power and its members` constant interaction with the 
White House and public over policy decisions requiring executive action. Political 
parties also exploit international issues as a means to fight domestic politics (Sprout, 
1935). 
Patrick J Haney and Walt Vanderbush also examines the role of ethnic interest 
groups in US foreign policy. The American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is 
presented as an exceptional example and labelled as "the most effective ethnic/foreign 
policy lobby on Capitol Hill", particularly with regards to US foreign policy in the Middle 
East. Haney and Vanderbush proposes that ethnic interest groups are more 
successful in influencing Congress than affecting executive power (Haney & 
Vanderbush, 1999). 
Public opinion is also closely scrutinised by politicians and approval and 
disapproval rates regarding US military action abroad can serve as either obstacles or 
catalysts for governments when making final decision (Moss, 2012). Richard C. 
Eichenberg`s research on US Public Opinion and the use of military force between 
1981 and 2005 concludes that the US public supports less risky military actions (for 
example, air strike versus a commitment of troops), multilateral action as opposed to 
unilateral US intervention and restraining adversaries versus intervening in internal 
conflicts or civil wars (Eichenberg, 2005). So, probing how the US public perceived US 




similar conflicts could contribute to understanding the internal dynamics of decision 
making.   
Even though there exists a multitude of pressure groups, two main channels exist 
through which all these groups influence the foreign policy decisions of the US 
administration: congressional actors or dynamics and public opinion. So, regardless 
of the driving shadow actor behind a particular foreign policy behaviour, be it Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGO), minority ethnic groups, or economic interest 
groups, the interaction among the executive (President), legislature (Congress)  and 
public opinion seems to have the potential to influence government action (Moss, 
2012). 
The constitutional freedom of action provided to President to commit troops to 
combat operations and sustaining that commitment is another dimension in the 
domestic political context. The War Power Resolution Act, passed in 1973, intended 
to limit President`s war authority as given by the Constitution. The resolution required 
the President to gain Congressional authorisation within 60 days and, in an 
emergency, within 90 days after a military operation in a foreign territory commenced. 
The resolution also requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours after the 
onset of the operation (Hendrickson, 2013). Analysing how the War Power Resolution 
Act and Congress influenced or limited the Obama administration in the Libya 
intervention and searching for the repercussions for Syrian foreign policy choices 
seem to be important. 
In his article, `Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy`, Norrin M. 
Ripsman also emphasises the interplay among public opinion, the legislature, which 




and organised interest groups, which can provide an electoral pay-off that can 
collectively influence the foreign policy (Ripsman, 2009, p.170,171,185). 
Finally, as Jason W Davidson suggests, governments attempt to minimize 
electoral losses by getting the public or opposition party or coalition backing for the 
intervention (Davidson, 2013). In that context, cross-party dynamics and the impact of 
the electoral cycle on public opinion and President Obama`s foreign policy choices 
requires particular attention.  
William Quandt divides the electoral cycle for US Presidents into four phases: 
the first year is defined as an experimental term for the President and top advisors to 
gain experience in foreign policy; during the second and part of the third year the 
President deals with the complexities of foreign policy; during the rest of third year and 
the last year, as the election year approaches, the president either rushes for success, 
with a tendency to abandon controversial and costly foreign policy with the desire not 
to lose the support of constituencies; during the second term the first and second year 
are the best time frames for taking foreign policy initiatives, while at some point in the 
third or fourth year the "lame duck" phenomenon emerges. Loss of control over one 
or both houses of Congress is also something the President takes into consideration 
























08-Nov-16 √ √ √     
04-Nov-14 √ √   Republican Republican 
06-Nov-12 √ √ √ Democrat Republican 
02-Nov-10 √ √   Democrat Republican 
04-Nov-08 √ √ √ Democrat Democrat 
* 435 Members of House of Representatives stand for re-election every two years 
** 100 Senators serve six year terms. Elections are staggered.  Every two years a third of Senators 
run for re-election. Each state is represented by two senators 
*** Presidential elections take place every four years. The public *don`t vote directly for their choice 
of president. Instead an electoral college system is used. Each state is allocated a number of 
electors; they will make the final choice. A state has the same number of electors as it has senators 
and representatives. 538 (435 representatives, 100 senators and 3 electors from District of 
Colombia) electors chose a ticket (for both president and vice president) 
Source: The official YouTube channel for the UK Parliament, US Elections -- How do they work?, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRu_JcarCDY 
Table 4 US Electoral Cycle and Election System 
 
It is challenging to define a measure of influence of public opinion over foreign 
policy decisions and gauge how much the administration takes public opinion into 
account when making intervention decisions. However, looking into the correlation 
between public opinion and foreign policy decisions with regards to the forms of 
intervention has the potential to shed light on any link between public opinion and 
pursued intervention options.   
In the interviews conducted by the author, there was a consensus of a negative 
influence of the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences on public opinion regarding new 
military entanglements. The majority of the interviewees (except for the three out of 
nine) thought that public opinion is completely irrelevant or of secondary importance 
for the US administration; public opinion is widely considered as being `good to have` 
in support of their preferred action, or something to justify inaction or something that 
can be shaped in the direction the administration deems necessary. However, there 




opinion into consideration in conjunction with Congressional dynamics and the 
electoral cycle. So, the power of the opposition in the Senate and House of 
Representatives, the associated election year in US electoral cycle, coupled with 
general US public opinion could have the potential to influence the US administration`s 
calculations interactively.  
In this section I will highlight some of the key arguments which may help identify 
key elements of the processes that led to certain US policy decisions in the context of 
Libya and Syria. 
In the US political scene, the US public is expected to support their political 
party`s decision with regards to any intervention, and oppose other party`s choices. 
During the Arab Spring even some of Democrats, along with the Republicans, were 
sceptical about taking direct military action against the Assad regime. However, as 
ISIL emerged as a brutal actor, conservative media outlets helped in shaping public 
opinion towards military action  (Interviewee 7, 2015) 
Thomas Juneau considers public opinion as a tool for the US administration to 
justify their decision in support of or against intervention. Juneau sees US public 
opinion as a driver of decisions not to intervene, but thinks it was secondary in taking 
a military intervention decision. Juneau also highlighted that non-interventionism was 
an integral part of President Obama`s electoral commitment, which was relaxed 
against the ISIL threat as the US Congress reached a consensus to target the group 
and wider US public supported that policy shift (Thomas Juneau, 2016). To change 
public opinion the administration talks to the public, conveys their messages through 
the press, and seeks to build coalitions among politicians by communicating with 




With that in mind, congressional and public speeches from key actors during 
both conflicts, the way they influenced groups` efforts to shape public opinion in a 
particular direction and, subsequently, the degree to which those endeavours reflected 
on public opinion polls constitute the primary source of the analysis that follows.  
Other important themes regarding the US public’s conviction about the Libya 
and Syrian conflicts were: firstly, that the Libya intervention would be easy and short, 
as opposed to Syria; secondly, Libya was very isolated and didn`t have the same sort 
of alliances that Syria had protecting it (Interviewee 4, 2015). So a potential Syria 
intervention was seen as a more dangerous conflict, involving more complexity and 
threat potential. It was also seen as entrenching the US deeper into a convoluted 
Middle East conflict, which would cost a lot of money without tangible results to help 
improve the US’s security or position in the world (Interviewee 2, 2015). 
Having looked at key themes from the interviews, the following section will be 
dedicated to the analysis of the potential interplay among the composition of the 
Congress, electoral cycle, public opinion, and US intervention decisions vis-à-vis Libya 
and Syria. It is expected that the impact of those dynamics would be limited when the 
key security interests were at stake, but would weigh in more when other interests gain 




The Libya conflict started in the beginning of President Obama`s third year of 
Presidency and at a time when the Democratic Party held the majority in the Senate, 
whereas he has just lost the majority to Republicans in the House of Representatives 




the position taken by the Republican Party vis-à-vis the Libyan conflict appears to be 
an important element of President Obama’s calculations. To be able to understand 
how cross party dynamics and public opinion collectively could have had an impact on 
foreign policy decisions I will look into the Libya conflict from the start of the public 
protests against the Libyan regime, followed by the civilian causalities that emerged 
along with the formation of Libyan Transitional Council, and the intervention period 
that lasted until NATO operation ended seven months later at the end of October 2011. 
It is important to note that the announcement of victory in Libya came just before a 
presidential election year, which could have facilitated President Obama to explain to 
voters why the US got involved in the Libyan conflict. 
The immediate US response to the Libyan regime’s crackdown on protestors 
was to close its embassy in Tripoli on 25th February and impose unilateral sanctions 
against the Libyan regime, including assets freeze and travel bans (Cooper & Landler, 
2011). Just before the US military intervention the US public opinion was divided over 
enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya but was overwhelmingly united against sending 



























Support OpposeFigure 17 US Public Opinion on US intervention in Libya PEW Research Center, 




Pew Research Centre between 10th to 13th March, a week before the US, France and 
UK-led strikes started, showed public scepticism about the US’s involvement in Libya 
at large. Only a narrow majority (51%) supported increasing economic and diplomatic 
sanctions. The public was divided over the idea of enforcing no fly zone (44% in favour, 
45% opposed), while the vast majority opposed sending arms to anti-government rebel 
groups (69%), bombing Libyan air defence systems (77%), and sending ground troops 
to fight against Libyan regime forces (82%) (Pew Research Center, 2011b). 
 
While public opinion appeared to be divided over enforcing a no-fly zone, 
Republican Senator John McCain put together (with Senator Joe Lieberman) on 14th 
March 2011 a Senate resolution that called for the imposition of a no-fly zone over 
Libya (Mccain, 2011c). Support for no-fly zone led by an influential Republican Senator 
could be interpreted as part of public opinion formation in support of US intervention 
in Libya.  
As the Organisation of the Islamic Conference released a statement supporting 
a no-fly zone over Libya on 8th March 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 
Arab League called on the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone on 8th and 12th March 2011 
respectively, and UNSC Resolution 1973 was endorsed on 17th March 2011. 
Alongside these developments, US public opinion appeared to have shifted 
significantly in favour of limited military involvement. A poll conducted by CNN and 
Opinion Research Corporation (ORC) between 18th and 20th March 2011 – just as the 
strikes started – revealed decisive support in favour of establishing of no fly zone 
(70%), but a majority opposed deploying ground troops into Libya (70%). On the other 
hand, public support to airstrikes targeting the Libyan regime forces was 54%. CNN 




a no-fly zone was stronger than that of Democrats and Independents, and Republicans 
were more likely to support air strikes disassociated with the no-fly zone (CNN/ORC, 
2011b).  
if we consider historical examples of multiple recent US interventions, the 
political party to which the President of the time belongs normally rallies stronger 
support for intervention relative to the opposition; Democratic President Bill Clinton`s 
Bosnia intervention had been supported largely by Democrats while the Republicans 
overwhelmingly opposed and Republican President George W. Bush`s decision to 
invade Iraq had been largely supported by Republicans, while the Democrats were 
largely against it (Interviewee 7, 2015). However, in the Libya case, stronger 
Republican support for intervention presented an anomaly. Alas, the fact that 
Republicans were more enthusiastic about stronger US military involvement in Libya 













On the other hand, according to another poll conducted on 21st March 2011 by 
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Figure 18 US Public Support to Libya Intervention, CNN/ORC 




regime forces (unlike the CNN/ORC poll), only 47% of the respondents approved 
ongoing US military action against Libya, while 37% disapproved. According to 
historical Gallup data, 47% was still the lowest approval rate for US military 
intervention among the last ten recent interventions. (Jeffery M. Jones, 2011). Like the 
CNN/ORC poll results, the Gallup poll also showed that Republicans were ostensibly 



















Even though the initial strikes intended to protect civilians, public opinion polls 
included questions regarding support for regime change starting from the early days 
Table 5 Approval Rates for US Military Interventions, Gallup Poll, 















Approve/Disapprove of U.S. Military Action 
Against Libya, by Political Party
Approve Disapprove
Figure 19 Support for US Military Action in Libya, by Political 




of strikes enforcing the no-fly zone. According to a poll conducted by Reuters/Ipsos  
three days after the US-led bombing campaign, 79% of the public agreed that the US 
and allies should remove the Qaddafi regime. These findings were similar to those in 
a CNN poll released on 22nd March 2011, which found that 77% supported removing 
Qaddafi from power. In accordance with Reuters/Ipsos survey, 60% was in favour of 
military action in Libya, 39% opposed strikes and only 7% supported deploying US 
ground troops in combat role to Libya (Reuters/Ipsos Survey, 2011). 
A PEW Research Center survey conducted between 24th and 27th March 2011 
showed modest support (47%) for US airstrikes in Libya (Pew Research Center, 
2011a). We can again see that Republicans were slightly more enthusiastic and 





According to a CNN/ORC poll conducted between the 9th and 10th April 2011 
and released on 14th April 2011, a slim majority supported military action against the 
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Figure 20 PEW Research Center, 24-27 March 2011 The US Public Support to 




majority opposed sending US ground troops into Libya should NATO air and missile 
strikes turn out to be ineffective. There was also waning support for seeking regime 
change, and 55% of the US public did not think US national interests were at stake in 
Libya (CNN/ORC, 2011c). The national interest theme also became a significant 





According to a CNN/ORC poll conducted between 24th and 26th May 2011 and 
released on 31st May 2011, public support to the limited use of military force by the US 
in Libya as part of the NATO mission was 54%, with 43% opposed (CNN/ORC, 2011a). 
However, just a month later, a Gallup poll conducted on 24th June 2011 revealed that 
already relatively low public support was further fading away. Compared to the 21st 
March 2011 poll, approval for US military action in Libya had dropped by 8%. The poll 
suggests that the most significant shift took place among Republicans, where support 
shifted from an approval of 39% to 57%, whereas Democrat support was largely stable 
(Jeffrey M. Jones, 2011). Gradually declining support for US military involvement in 
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Figure 21 US Public Support for Libya Intervention, CNN/ORC Poll, 




tangible results and an opportunity to confront a Democratic presidential candidate for 



























Even though the public support for military intervention into Libya was low 
before the intervention, it increased after military action started. Since a limited 
Figure 22 Public Support to US military actions 
against Libya, Gallup Poll, 22 June 2011 
Figure 23 US Public Support for Libya 























intervention strategy composed of sanctions, enforcing a no-fly zone, a naval 
blockade, and targeting regime forces from sea and air based platforms was seen 
relatively risk free and with high expectation of success, it was easy for the US 
administration to disregard public opinion to some extent in Libya. Moreover, 
Republican support for, in particular, enforcing a no-fly zone and stronger US military 
involvement in Libya encouraged President Obama to take action. A limited response 
to the Libya conflict can also be interpreted as a compromise and a sensible position 
taken by Obama administration given that it balanced reluctant public opinion. On the 
other hand, regional and international support for intervention, President Obama`s 
reassurances vis-à-vis limited, multilateral (encompassing regional Arab countries as 
well), and a no-boots on the ground approach in line with his doctrine, a swift 
intervention decision and the idea of preventing mass civilian causalities in Libya made 
it difficult for the public and the Congress to stand firmly against intervention. However, 
very strong US public opinion, which consistently opposed providing support to rebels 






Support for US military involvement in the Syrian conflict had been consistently 
low over the course of the conflict against the Syrian regime in support of the rebels. 
The most significant shift took place after an August 2013 chemical weapon attack by 
the Syrian regime, which resulted in the elimination of a Syrian regime chemical 
weapon stockpile.  From that moment on the threat posed by ISIL came to the forefront 
and public support for military action against ISIL, even the idea of sending ground 





Five time periods, representing four significant shifts, will be analysed to 
understand the impact of public opinion over intervention decisions along with the 
evolving threat perception. The first time period starts with the onset of the Syrian 
demonstrations and spans until the start of mass killings of protestors by the Syrian 
regime in August 2011. This time frame corresponds to the ongoing Libya intervention 
and reform pledges from the Syrian regime along with increasing civilian causalities. 
The US and regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Turkey also believed in that period 
that a peaceful solution in Syria was probable. According to a poll conducted by the 
University of Maryland between 1st and 5th April 2011 designed to understand the US 
public opinion regarding the Arab Spring uprisings,  the results revealed that two thirds 
of the US public believed that the US should take a neutral position, 26% supported 
demonstrators while only 4% sided with the government (Telhamy & Kull, 2011). That 
was just two weeks after the Libyan intervention started, which showed the reluctance 
of the US public for another entanglement in Middle East. That did not change 
throughout the first time period as the US administration opted to find a political 
solution while using variety of sanctions as leverage to push the Assad regime for 
























The second period started with the mass killings perpetrated by the Syrian 
regime, which was condemned by the US administration. The US called for Assad to 
step down in order to open the way for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. That 
time frame also coincided with the militarisation of the Syrian opposition. The end of 
that period was marked by emergence of a united political and armed opposition, 
which provided an opportunity for the US to offer support against the Syrian regime. 
On the other hand, this time period was also the Presidential election year, which could 
have prevented the US administration to take substantial risks. The changing 
dynamics inside Syria did not translate into decisive US intervention into the conflict, 
which was reflected also by the public opinion polls. According to a CNN/ORC poll 
conducted between 10th and 13th February 2012, in response to a question about 
whether the US has a responsibility to do something about the fighting in Syria, the 
vast majority (73%) of the public believed that the US did not have responsibility 
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Figure 24 University of Maryland, the US Public Opinion on 























Firm public opinion against military intervention in Syria prevailed across 
crossing party lines, even as the conditions surrounding the Syrian conflict evolved 
over time. A CNN/ORC poll from 7th June 2012 showed that 57% of Democrats and 
58% of Republicans (and 61% of the overall US public) still believed that the US should 
play no role in an attempt to halt the conflict in Syria (CNN/ORC, 2012a). 
Another poll conducted by the University of Maryland between 27thSeptember  
and 2nd October 2012 also looked into US public opinion about various potential US 
intervention options in Syria. The poll results revealed that the majority of the US 
public, by a wide margin, was in favour of increasing diplomatic and economic 
sanctions (%60) and enforcing a no-fly zone (59%) over Syria. However, a greater 
majority also continued to oppose sending arms to Syrian rebel groups (67%), 
bombing Syrian air defence systems (68%), and sending US ground troops into Syria 
(77%) (Telhamy & Kull, 2012). Substantial US public support for enforcing a no-fly 
zone is important to note, given that it was also supported by regional actors and 
Syrian opposition, but it did not come to fruition as the implementation of a no-fly zone 
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The third period started with the formation of a relatively unified political 
opposition which also started scrutinising military efforts and which resulted in 
recognition from numerous international and regional actors. That time period also 
corresponded with the first year of President Obama`s second term, which, as we saw 
above, is considered the best time for a President to take foreign policy initiative. 
However, during that time period the US administration only provided limited non-lethal 
aid to selected rebel groups, which was ineffective in tilting the balance. The 
administration did not concede to demands for enforcing no-fly zone. The end of third 
period was marked by the chemical weapons attacks conducted by the Syrian regime 
against rebel held areas that also affected civilians. During that period, even though 
the US public was fully aware that the Syrian conflict would not end through non-
military intervention means, cross-party opposition to the US getting involved militarily 
remained.  
According to a Gallup poll conducted on 28th May 2013, 68% of the US public 
































Figure 26 University of Maryland, the US Public Opinion on Potential 




Even though there were relatively more decisive differences across parties in the 
percentage who believed that economic and diplomatic efforts can resolve the Syrian 
conflict, overall the US public, by a wide margin (58%), believed non-military means 
could not resolve the conflict (Jeffrey M. Jones, 2013). 





Figure 27 US Public Opinion about the 
Use of Force in Syria to End the Conflict, 
by Political Party, Gallup Poll, 28 May 
2013 
Figure 28 US Public Opinion about the Influence 
of Economic and Diplomatic Efforts to Resolve 





The start of the fourth period was marked by the use of chemical weapons and 
lasted until the ISIL took control of vast swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq. Even 
though President Obama had declared that the use of chemical weapons would cross 
the "red line", corroborated chemical attack that struck opposition controlled Ghouta, 
Syria on 21st August 2013 with rockets containing the chemical agent sarin did not 
alter widespread US public opinion that the US should avoid military involved in Syria.   
According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released on 24th August 2015, the most popular 
option from the range of options Obama was considering in the aftermath of  chemical 
attack was still non-intervention in Syria (37%), followed by `offer military aid to vetted 
rebel groups` (27%). Exceedingly less popular options were `airstrikes against Syrian 
regime forces in support of armed opposition` (12%), `imposing a no-fly zone` (11%) 
to practically nullify the Syrian Air Force, `sending multinational ground troops to 
invade Syria` (9%), and `sending only US ground troops to  invade Syria` (4%) 
(Wroughton, 2013). 
Another poll conducted by Post-ABC after chemical weapon attack was 




























Figure 29 The US Public Support to range of Options against Chemical Weapon Attacks, 




support for punitive airstrikes (36%) against the Assad regime, while a vast majority 






















A Gallup survey conducted between 3rd and 4th September and published on 
6th September 2013 also revealed similar results and compared support for US military 
action in Syria with that of recent conflicts (Dugan, 2013). Despite the fact that a 
repeatedly drawn red line was crossed by the anti-US Syrian regime, low levels of 
public support was noteworthy, especially when compared to previous US 
interventions in Iraq (2003), Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq (1991). More importantly, 
the support for US military strikes against the Syrian regime among Democratic Party 
supporters was relatively low (45% in favour and 43% opposed). Surprisingly, 
Republican support for punitive strikes against the Assad regime was much lower 
compared to Libya, where the Republicans had advocated enforcing no-fly zone more 
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Figure 30 US Public Support for Missile Strikes and Supplying Weapons 



























According to a CNN/ORC poll conducted between 6th and 8th September and 
released on 9th September 2013, which examined the potential impact of US 
Congressional approval for military action on public opinion, the decision to be taken 
by Congress would have an indecisive impact on public opinion.  
 
 
Figure 31 US Public Support for Proposed Interventions before 
Commencement of Such Actions 
Figure 32 Support for Potential US Military Intervention 
after Chemical Weapon attack in Syria, by Political 























A hypothetical question about the US Congress potentially passing a resolution 
that would authorise military action for 60 to 90 days and bar the use of the US troops 
in a combat role in Syria increased support for limited air strikes against Syrian regime 
by only 4%. This also shows consistent US public reluctance to be involved in the 
Syrian conflict. The majority of the public (69%) also did think getting more involved in 
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Figure 33 Potential Impact of US Congress Passing a Resolution Authorising Military 
intervention in Syria after Chemical Weapon Attack, CNN/ORC Poll, 09 September 
2013 
Figure 34 US Public Opinion on whether it is in US Interests to be involved in Libya 




President Obama set the threshold for intervention where US ideals and principles 
and national security were at stake at the same time, and chemical weapon usage in 
Syria fell under that category (Obama, 2013a), that did not translate into military 
intervention.  
Another survey conducted by the PEW Research Centre compared weekly 
results between 29th August and 1st September and between 4th and 8th September   
2013 and shows the fluidity of public opinion. 14% undecided respondents seemed to 
have shifted to the opposing side, since the percentage of public that opposed to US 
airstrikes against Syrian regime increased to 63% from 48% in only a week (Pew 
Research Center, 2013). The disapproval to airstrikes in this poll also reflected cross-

















Figure 35 US Public Support for Airstrikes in against Syrian Regime, PEW Research 






When the Obama administration was preparing to seek Congressional approval 
for limited airstrikes to degrade Syrian chemical weapon capabilities, one of the most 
influential lobbying groups, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), 
formally called on the US Congress to approve the airstrikes in Syria.  In a statement 
its website on 3rd September 2013, AIPAC urged Congress to grant the President the 
authority `to protect America’s national security interests` on two main grounds: first, 
the civilized world should not tolerate use of chemical weapons, particularly against 
civilians; secondly, upholding international norms to prevent a further proliferation of 
unconventional weapons in Middle East and, for the most part, preventing Iran 
attaining nuclear weapons capability (AIPAC, 2013). It was noteworthy to see AIPAC 
taking a definite position in support of intervention given that it had not publicly lobbied 
for intervention against the Assad regime up until that point. 
 The Syrian conflict and potential US intervention was seriously discussed for 
the first time in US Congress just after the chemical weapon attack, whereupon 
President Obama publicly declared that the US would take punitive action. During the 
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Figure 36 Cross Party Support for Airstrikes against Syrian Regime post Chemical 




bi-partisan concerns for a potential US intervention by citing their constituents` 
reluctance. In the Senate debate on Senate Joint Resolution (S.J. Res.) 21 on 9th 
September 2013, Dan Coats, a Republican Senator from Indiana, talked about his visit 
to his constituents and the calls and e-mails he received regarding US potential 
involvement in Syria over the previous week. He mentioned that the vast majority of 
Indiana residents opposed to any US military engagement in Syria, citing 12 years of 
unsuccessful efforts in the Middle East that were unsuccessful in attaining meaningful 
results and which failed to contribute to the US national security interests, but instead 
resulted in increased violence, chaos, and disintegration (Coats, 2013). Barbara Ann 
Mikulski, Democratic Party Senator from Maryland also articulated her constituents` 
views, expressed to her during face to face interactions, phone calls or through e-
mails.  She said that Marylanders overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in 
Syria (Mikulski, 2013). 
 On the following day, 10th September 2013, during Congressional discussions, 
Republican Congressman from Nebraska Jeff Fortenberry raised his objection to 
unilateral US intervention in Syria, highlighting potential further destabilisation and 
other unintended consequences. He also stated that the majority of his constituents 
expressed remarkable concern about the potential for US military intervention 
(Fortenberry, 2013). Republican Congressman from Texas Kenny Marchant also 
mentioned that his constituents were deeply sceptical and concerned about what 
would be achieved in Syria through military intervention (Marchant, 2013). 
During the continued Senate discussions on 10th September 2013 over 
authorizing the limited and specified use of US Armed Forces against Syria, Bernie 
Sanders, US Senator from Vermont, stated that approximately “95% of the thousands 




intervention in Syria and he shared his view that there was no state in the US who 
supports intervention. He also drew attention to the across-the-board consensus that 
had developed among the vast majority of “Democrats, Republicans, Independents 
and also progressives, conservatives, moderates” against a third military intervention 
in the Middle East in 12 years. He explained why he thinks the US public felt so 
strongly against military involvement in Syria; he said that after 12 years of protracted 
entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan, which inflicted thousands of US causalities and 
led to loss of huge amount of money at the expense of domestic requirements, stability 
and democracy have not been accomplished yet. In conclusion, he suggested the US 
administration pay attention to US citizen`s needs and choices (Sanders, 2013). 
During the same discussions, Tom Udall, a Democratic Senator from New 
Mexico echoed the sentiments of New Mexicans and said that the US public believed 
a limited strike would not deter Assad and would instead bring about the necessity of 
greater direct US involvement and commitment to the conflict. Senator Udall 
acknowledged that officials should not always follow what the public polls indicate 
when making important decisions; however, he also said that he shared the 
widespread public view that that US administration should exhaust political, diplomatic, 
and economic options first before taking military action (Udall, 2013). Another 
Democratic Party Senator from Maryland, Ben Cardin, reflected his constituents` 
concerns that the consequences of Iraqi intervention might also be the case Syria, i.e. 
an ineffective, protracted, long-term and large-scale commitment where the US did not 
have national security interest at stake (Cardin, 2013). 
President Obama also acknowledged in his `Address to the Nation on Syria` on 
10th September 2013 the fact that after the toll of Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, 




his commitment to work to end the wars and concentrate on socio-economic re-
building efforts at home (Obama, 2013d). It was a recurrent theme in the interviews 
that the author conducted that the public, having in mind what happened in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, would not steadfastly support another intervention in Middle 
East (Tziarras, 2015) So, recent intervention experiences rendered US public largely 
disinterested and fearful about getting more involved in the Middle East. That put 
pressure on the President and Congress (Interviewee 3, 2015) 
 On 11th September 2013, Republican Congressman Mo Brooks from Alabama 
reinforced the fact that there was not public support to attack Syria. Mr. Brooks stated 
that the US public opposed attacking Syria by a two-to-one ratio. Mr.Brooks referred 
to the 1,267 of 1,272 citizens from Alabama`s 5th District who contacted his office who 
were opposed attacking Syria; only 5 were in support (Brooks, 2013). 
Despite the fact that the chemical weapon attack provided enough legitimacy 
and rationale itself for military intervention by the US, public and congressional 
opposition to military intervention seems to be significant enough to be taken into 
consideration by the US administration. That also coincided with two significant 
developments: ISIL emerged as a significant cross-regional threat in summer 2013 
and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who postured himself being open to dialog on 
Iran’s nuclear weapon development program, assumed office in August 2013 in Iran. 
Having dismantled Syrian chemical weapon capabilities and stockpiles, the US threat 
perception shifted and prioritised degrading and destroying ISIL in Syria and Iraq 
instead.   
The fifth period started with ISIL seizing control of territory in Iraq and Syria, 
followed by its declaration of a caliphate on 29th June 2014. The US carried out the 




airstrikes into Syria on 23rd September 2014 in the aftermath of beheading of US 
journalists there by ISIL. As the administration shifted the top priority objective, public 
opinion also evolved.  
After the release of videos showing the beheading of two American journalists, 
James Foley and Steven Joel Sotloff, American public opinion shifted significantly in 
favour of US military intervention (Kearn, 2014). The video of James Foley was 
released on 20th August 2014, during which the executioner threatened the life of 
another American journalist, Steven Joel Sotloff, if President Barack Obama doesn't 
end airstrikes against ISIL (Carter, 2014). Subsequently, a similar video surfaced 
online on 2nd September 2014 displaying the decapitation of Steven Joel Sotloff (Miller, 
2014). 
 
As a reflection, a Post-ABC poll published on 9th September 2014 showed 
widespread support for striking ISIL, both in Iraq and Syria. The support for the US 
airstrikes against ISIL targets in Iraq was 71%, while backing for expanding the air 
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On 23rd September 2014, President Obama highlighted the support provided 
by bipartisan majorities in Congress for airstrikes against ISIL in Syria and ramping 
up the US effort to train and equip the Syrian opposition to counterbalance ISIL and 
the Assad regime (Obama, 2014f) 
Another poll conducted by CNN/ORC between 25th and 28th September 2014 
and released on 29th September 2014, just after airstrikes targeting ISIL in Syria, 
started showed wider support for airstrikes against ISIL in Syria and Iraq (73%) while 
emphasizing persistent public opposition to sending ground troops (60%), even if they 
were directed against ISIL. The US public also appeared to still be unenthusiastic 
about providing weapons and military training to rebel groups fighting against ISIL 
(42% supported while 54% opposed). On the other, hand 91% of the public perceived 
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Figure 38 US Public Support for Various types of Intervention 



















A poll conducted between 14th and 17th October 2015 by CNN/ORC also 
revealed further increasing threat perceptions against ISIL among the US public. The 
percentage of the public who thought ISIL posed a very serious threat to the US was 

















According to another poll conducted by CNN/ORC between 27th November and 
1st December 2015 and released on 6th December 2015, more than a year after ISIL 
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How serious a threat do you think ISIS poses 
to the United States? 
Very serious Fairly serious Just somewhat serious Not so serious
Figure 39 US Public Opinion about the level of threat ISIL Poses 
to the US, CNN/ORC Poll, 25-28 September 2014 
Figure 40 Evolving US Public Opinion regarding the threat 




ISIL in Iraq and Syria reached its highest level since 2014, with 53% supporting such 
a move (CNN/ORC, 2015b). The US sent US Special Operation Forces into Syria to 
train and equip YPD-led Syrian Democratic Forces, alongside close air support and 
















Non-interventionism was the most supported option in public vis-à-vis the 
Syrian conflict since the public at large did not consider the Syrian conflict and the 
regime as a threat to US and its security interests. So, any form of intervention was 
not supported by the public and the US administration also limited its involvement in 
Syria by imposing sanctions and providing non-lethal equipment to vetted rebel 
groups. The predominant public opinion opposing any form of military intervention in 
Syria prevailed across party lines, even though the US public was aware that the 
Syrian conflict would not end through non-military means. Even the Syrian regime 
violating red lines repeatedly drawn by President Obama did not shift public opinion to 






































Figure 41 US public Support to Sending Ground Troops into Combat 




also perceived by the public as a failure. This influenced the public`s positioning vis à 
visa the Syria conflict. Despite intervention that toppled Qaddafi, the regime sustained 
instability, leading to a growth in uncontrolled spaces and terrorism in Libya and raised 
concerns of a similar pattern in Syria. The paradigm shift took place after ISIL emerged 
as a serious cross regional threat and the US public overwhelmingly perceived ISIL as 
a serious threat to the US. In that context, public opinion rapidly changed in favour of 
intervention against ISIL, which brought about airstrikes against ISIL targets. The US 
administration and public came to the same point after the emergence of ISIL. 
President Obama also increased funding to train and equip vetted opposition fighters 
with sophisticated weapons to counter ISIL. Even sending ground troops, which is the 
most unwanted intervention form, was gradually seen as a viable option among the 





Chapter 6 Comparative Analysis of Libya and Syria Cases 
  
 Having examined independent, intervening and dependent variables in the 
previous chapters, this chapter is devoted to comparing Libya and Syria cases through 
checking the distinct processes that led to particular US foreign policy choices. The 
process-tracing method provides opportunity to identify the drivers and establish the 
causal chain between the independent variable (threat to US interests vis-à-vis Libya 
and Syria conflicts) and the dependent variable (US Foreign Policy Behaviour). The 
intermediate steps identified in the process will help make inferences about the 
sequence of events leading up to particular forms of intervention and establish 
potential causal mechanisms. The method is useful for both conducting within-case 
and cross case analysis because it allows for a comparison of the discernable 
similarities and differences of the elements of the causal chains. As part of the NCR 
theoretical framework, the intervening variables will also serve as part of the causal 
chain to explain the way the conflicts escalated and subsequently led to particular US 
responses.   
Thus, process tracing requires analysis of the cases retrospectively from the 
outcome to potential causal mechanisms in play, the outcome being particular non-
military and military intervention means (i.e. the intervention spectrum) applied by the 
US administration during the course of the conflicts.  
 
Libya 
Firstly, before examining the interaction among independent, intervening and 
dependent variables, the US’s historical relationship with Libya and Syria provides the 




thinking. The recent history of bilateral Libya-US relations brings into prominence two 
primary issues: multiple US military confrontations and targeted air strikes in Libya 
during the period of strained relationship in 1970s and 1980s; and suspected links 
between the Libyan regime and terrorist organisations throughout the world. 
Nevertheless, the Qaddafi regime`s cooperation on counterterrorism post 9/11 and 
efforts in complying with Chemical Weapon Conventions paved the way for the 
normalisation of bilateral relations and the eventually US’s removal of Libya from the 
state sponsor of terrorism list. However, the notion that the Libyan regime was 
promoting terrorism lingered in the psyche of the American people because of 
numerous incidents that the regime had been involved throughout the world, most 
prominently the Pam Am Flight explosion at Lockerbie. So, when the Libyan uprising 
started, Qaddafi`s anti-US rhetoric and historical references to the Libyan regime`s 
ties to terrorism were vivid and resonated deeply within the administration and the 
public. This potentially had an impact on US policy choices.  
Secondly, and more importantly, taking into consideration the threats to US 
interests regarding the Libya conflict under the interest categories outlined in the US 
National Security Strategy document (Security, Prosperity, Values, and International 
Norms), the threats to US values and upholding international norms turned out to be 
the key driver of US military intervention in Libya, followed by security and less so 
prosperity concerns. The analysis of threats to US interests based on intention and 
capability criteria were detailed in Chapter 4.     
With regards to US values and international norms, the US administration saw 
the Libya uprising as part of region-wide aspirations, preceded by Tunisia and Egypt, 
for freedom and establishment of democratic institutions. The US expectation was 




in the Middle East and North Africa and decrease violent extremism in the region by 
replacing dictatorships with accountable, elected administrations. On the other hand, 
the US strongly felt the need to be on the right side of the history, as the Libyan 
uprising was presented as a democratic revolution of the Libyan people against an 
autocratic regime. In addition to the pursuit of democracy, allowing the mass killing of 
civilians would threaten the credibility of US moral leadership on the world stage and 
undermine the emerging norm of a `responsibility to protect`. On the other hand, the 
UN`s inability to stop state violence against its citizens would embolden other 
autocratic regimes to resort to state violence against protestors and undermine the 
UN`s credibility and role in ensuring global peace and security. Since the US 
attributed significant importance to NATO as an organisation, and showed solidarity 
with NATO partners, the fact that Britain and France had vital interests at stake in 
Libya and previously had supported US led efforts in Afghanistan (Britain supported 
the intervention in Iraq too) meant that Libya was seen as being in line with US 
interests as well.  
With regards to security interests from the regional and global perspective, 
Libya lacked meaningful support from global or regional powers, which could have 
threatened destabilising the North Africa region further. The destabilisation induced by 
the protracted civil war itself would also provide a window of opportunity for Al Qaeda 
and related groups to exploit the vulnerabilities in the region. Considering Libya`s 
proximity to Europe and its geostrategic position overseeing the Mediterranean Sea 
and as a gateway to North Africa, the risk of Libya turning into a failed state as a result 
of protracted conflict would provide terrorist groups safe heaven to operate and would 
render Libya a main hub along the transit route for migrants and the trafficking of arms 




their potential seizure by extremist groups was also a source of concern for both 
Europe and the US. The protracted conflict would drive more people to Libya’s borders 
as refugees or immigrants attempt to move into neighbouring and EU countries. This 
could further destabilise the region and pose substantial threat to regional security.  
The refugee flow and security related spill over affects into Tunisia and Egypt would 
also undermine the transition processes, rendering those countries and the region 
more vulnerable to security challenges. 
 In the domain of `prosperity`, some European nations were dependant on 
Libyan oil and gas. However, this wasn’t the case in the US. However, the potential 
negative impact of protracted conflict and instability in Libya on global oil supply, 
security of energy transit routes, and the consequent rise in oil prices was a source of 
concern for the US. The US has a general interest in stable markets in oil supplies to 
stabilise the prices at home.  
  While the `high` threat perception to US interests defined the contours of US 
intervention, the intervening variables (Obama Doctrine, economic constraints, US 
elite perceptions regarding the Libyan and Syrian Opposition, public opinion) 
influenced the scope and the form of intervention.   
The most important tenet of the Obama Doctrine appears to be ̀ exhausting other 
options before use of military force`. In the Libya case, the US exercised diplomatic 
pressure by closing its embassy and publicly condemning Libyan regime, which was 
followed by an arms embargo, economic sanctions and travel restrictions to the key 
regime figures to change Qaddafi regime`s stance against the protestors. That was 
immediately followed by enforcing a no fly zone and conducting air strikes against 




The second important aspect is `building and leading broad coalition and sharing 
responsibility and financial burden with partners and local allies`. The US led a broad 
coalition, including primarily UK, France and Arab partners in the nascent phase of the 
intervention, but this was later expanded to include NATO.  
The third aspect, `ensuring legitimacy for action`, was ensured through UN 
resolutions and getting the support and consent of the Arab League for military action 
against the regime. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference support for no-fly zone 
over Libya and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab League’s calls on the 
UNSC to impose a no-fly zone were followed by UNSC Resolution 1973.  
The fourth tenet could be articulated as `defining clear mandate and specific 
objectives` rather than fighting for an open ended conflict that would turn into nation 
building , as happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the nascent phase of the conflict 
the US’s initially declared aim was to protect the Libyan people from regime 
aggression. However, as the mandate to impose no-fly zone was broadly interpreted, 
the US led coalition choice of targets indicated that the US administration aimed to 
weaken the regime to a level that could tilt the balance on the ground and culminate 
in regime change in Libya.  
From an economic constraints perspective, the Libya and Syria conflicts took 
place in the aftermath of 2008 recession, which heavily crippled the US economy and 
consequently resulted in substantial defence spending cuts. The experiences in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, which the Obama administration viewed as mistake on the part 
of the Bush administration, influenced the way the US perceived the Libya and Syria 
conflicts, particularly from the perspective of the potential cost of war. So, the limited 
role US took within the multilateral coalition reduced the initial financial cost of 




The estimated cost of US intervention in Libya was around one billion USD, which is 
extremely low compared to US involvement Iraq and Afghanistan, where cost 
estimates vary from between 4 to 6 trillion USD, including long term costs. On the 
other hand, taking into consideration the potential financial burden Libya would place 
on the US and wider international community in the post-conflict era, Libyan oil 
resources and existing frozen economic assets and funds outside Libya amounting to 
hundreds of billion dollars were a reliable source of funding to compensate capacity 
building efforts. 
Elite perception regarding the Libyan opposition, who would eventually be the 
alternative to the Qaddafi regime, also played a role in the US calculations. The 
protests that started on 15th February 2011 in Benghazi as unorganised protests led 
by individuals turned into armed conflict as protestors captured Benghazi on 20th 
February 2011 and Qaddafi regime resorted to pitting conventional forces against the 
protestors and inflicting civilian casualties on 25th February 2011. As the protestors 
took arms to fight the regime, in the space of two weeks the uprising morphed into an 
intra-state conflict. It was mainly army units in eastern cities that provided the rebels 
with the initial military capability needed to confront the regime forces. At the early 
stages the rebel groups were composed of deserted professional army soldiers, 
ordinary civilians, and religiously oriented and battle hardened ex-fighters. However, 
all these groups accepted coordinating their efforts with the National Transitional 
Council (NTC) until the regime was toppled.  
 As the protestors and the rebels consolidated their power in eastern Libya, the 
NTC was formed as an interim governing body at the very early stages of the conflict 
and gained acceptance by broad cross-section of the society. However, it took 5 




on 15th July 2011. The main reason for the cautious approach taken by the US 
admiration can be partially explained by the potential perceived influence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Libya over NTC and Al Qaeda affiliated groups benefitting from the US 
actions in Libya.  That was a result of primary US objectives to make sure succeeding 
governments would not be hostile to the US and not to inadvertently support or provide 
safe heaven to terrorist groups.   
Nevertheless, the dominant US perception vis-à-vis the Libyan opposition at 
early stages was that it was part of a regional struggle for Libyan democracy and rule 
of law following the examples of Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions and a broad cross-
section of the Libyan society supported the political opposition led by NTC.   
It is also important to take into consideration US public opinion, along with cross 
party and Congressional dynamics within the US foreign policy making cycle. Firstly, 
even though a week before the intervention the US public support for enforcing no fly 
zone in Libya was low (44% in favour), it increased swiftly just after the military action 
started (70%). Since a limited intervention strategy was seen as relatively risk free and 
was perceived to have a high likelihood of success, it was easy for the US 
administration to take the intervention decision. Secondly, as the Libyan conflict 
started at a time when the Republican Party gained a majority in the House of 
Representatives, the Republican Party`s position appeared to be more important for 
President Obama calculations. Relatively stronger Republican Party support 
compared to Democrats in favour of enforcing no-fly zone and even extended air 
strikes disassociated with the no-fly zone strengthened the Obama administration`s 
position for action. Thirdly, just after the intervention started the vast majority of the 
US public was also in favour of regime change in Libya and at the same time strongly 




role, thus shaping the boundaries of US action in Libya. Finally, regional and 
international support for enforcing a no-fly zone, coupled with President Obama`s 
strong commitment for a limited and multilateral intervention strategy ruling out 
deployment of US forces in combat role in line with his doctrine, and very quick 
turnaround for intervention decision to prevent mass civilian causalities in Libya 




Looking at the US-Syria historical bilateral relationship and threats to US 
interests, the main contentious issue between the US and Syria had been the Syrian 
regime`s confrontation with Israel and its support for anti-Israeli groups, which led to 
US administration putting Syria into State Sponsor of Terrorism list in 1979. After the 
US`s Iraq invasion in 2003, Syria and Iran shared a similar threat perception against 
the US, which led them to further their collaboration to fuel insurgency in Iraq against 
US forces and establish a facilitation network through its porous border with Iraq. 
Continuous Syrian cooperation with Iran and support to Hezbollah as as transit route 
for Iranian arms transfers and suspected Syrian regime complicity in the killing of the 
Lebanese Prime Minister in 2005, who had been critically opposing Syrian troop 
presence and influence in Lebanon, were other important issues that hindered the 
normalisation of the bilateral relations. So, before the Arab Spring, contrary to the US`s 
positively trending bilateral relations with Qaddafi regime, US-Syria relations could be 
characterised as being historically strained.   
Since the Syrian conflict evolved gradually in a much slower fashion compared 




was done using 5 phases, discussed in Chapter 4. That helped reflect on evolving US 
interests and associated strategies and responses that required shifts and 
adaptations. 
 The `high` threat perception the US had vis-à-vis the Syria conflict in the first, 
second and the third phases required US military intervention against the Syria regime. 
Eventually, when the ISIL threat became prominent in the fourth and fifth phases and 
overall threat perception was `very high`, the US felt obliged to act against ISIL.  
In the first phase of the Syrian conflict the US, along with Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia, pushed for a diplomatic solution to the conflict. However, increasing Iranian 
influence in the region and shared Iranian and Syrian threat perception against the 
US and Israel, the Syrian regime`s constant support to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and 
Syrian chemical weapons posed threats to US interests in the region. At the top of 
security interests at the nascent phase of the conflict was the Syrian regime`s 
oppression of protestors, which violated basic human rights and ran against US 
interests. 
In the second phase, the Syrian conflict was militarised and gained a more 
sectarian tone as Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah aligned with the Syrian 
regime, while the US, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and numerous European nations 
supported the Sunni majority opposition. As the use of state violence with 
conventional military force against the protesters and armed opposition intensified 
throughout 2011 and early 2012, the number of causalities, refugees and internally 
displaced people increased dramatically. 
In the third phase of the conflict, political and armed opposition increased its 
inclusiveness and cohesion, which helped inflict heavy losses to the regime and 




increased its support to Syrian regime in a combat role, along with Iranian forces. As 
the fighting and the regime`s indiscriminate use of shelling and air strikes (particularly 
barrel bombs) increased, the number of causalities, refugees, and internally 
displaced people became more acute and thus became a chronic problem.  
In the fourth phase of the Syrian conflict the chemical weapon threat posed 
by the Syrian regime and extremist groups dominating the armed opposition 
significantly changed the dynamics of the US policy. ISIL controlled large swaths of 
territory inside Syria and some Salafist factions united to establish Sharia law, which 
undermined the credibility and viability of moderate political and military opposition. 
The use of chemical weapons in Damascus, which killed more than a thousand 
civilians, undermined the global prohibition of chemical weapons and increased the 
risk of further employment of those weapons against the US by state and non-state 
actors. The Syrian chemical weapon dismantling process that was agreed in the 
aftermath of the attack overlapped with preparations to broker a deal with Iran to stop 
its nuclear weapon development program under P5+1 negotiations. While the US 
regarded Syria as being free of chemical weapons, it placed seemingly more 
importance to preventing Iran acquiring nuclear weapons capability, which showed 
the priority of US interests in the region.  On the other hand, the extremist threat 
stemming from ISIL increased as the group started imposing Sharia law within its 
controlled zone and targeted other religions in the region. 
In the fifth phase of the Syrian conflict, ISIL became the primary threat in 
Syria and for the wider international community. Increases in the number of terrorist 
groups pledging allegiance to ISIL, coupled with AQ and ISIL`s call for lone wolf 




and decreased the prospects for a better future as waves of refugees crossed over 
into Europe.  
Considering negative trending US-Syria relations and the high level threats 
posed by the regime and the protracted conflict in Syria during the first three phases 
of the conflict, targeting the Assad regime through non-military and military intervention 
means seemed to be the optimal option for the US. That would primarily serve US 
security interests and would help reinforce democratisation efforts in line with US 
values. The credibility of the US, UN and international norms would be better protected 
by targeting the Syrian regime. In particular, providing offensive or lethal weapons that 
could tilt the balance on the ground, establishing buffer zone and no-fly zone, providing 
close air support to moderate rebels and targeting key Syrian regime offensive 
capabilities would have better served US interest. However, the US preferred to seek 
a diplomatic solution in the first phase of the conflict and used non-military means. 
Even as Iranian and Russian involvement to sustain the Assad regime increased and 
the number of refugees and civilian deaths started to rise, the US only provided non-
lethal assistance to the opposition. 
The chemical weapon deal with Syria overlapped with the extremist groups` 
becoming a more serious threat to US interests in the region. Particularly in the fourth 
and fifth episodes of the conflict, the US started seeing ISIL as a homeland security 
threat. Thus, the US prioritised targeting ISIL as opposed to Assad. As a consequence, 
providing offensive or lethal weapons to groups fighting ISIL and Al Nusra Front, 
directly targeting ISIL targets and supporting rebel`s offensives against ISIL and even 
putting boots on the ground to eliminate an existential threat to the US and its allies in 
the region became the most viable option for the US. The US started air strikes and 




operation forces to northern Syria to train and assist YPG led Syrian Democratic 
Forces.  
To better understand the way the Obama Doctrine could have factored into and 
influenced the intervention decisions in the Syria case, `exhausting other options 
before use of military force` should be dealt with in two distinct episodes: before and 
after the chemical weapon attack that took place in August 2013 and, in parallel, the 
emergence of ISIL as a prominent actor in Syria. Before that turning point, the US 
exercised almost all non-military intervention means in Syria against the Assad regime 
and there was no indication that US was aiming to become involved in Syria through 
military intervention against the Assad regime. However, as ISIL and AQ related 
terrorism became more of a concern for the US than the Assad regime, the US 
administration prioritised direct military intervention and supporting those groups that 
fight against ISIL.  
The second important aspect of Obama Doctrine is `building and leading a broad 
coalition and sharing responsibility and financial burden with partners and local allies`. 
Again before the chemical weapon attack in August 2013 and the emergence of ISIL 
as a prominent actor in Syria, the US mainly led efforts to find a political solution to the 
ongoing fight. Unlike Libya, there has been lack of consensus at different levels and, 
or distinct reasons, among global and regional actors when it comes to targeting the 
Assad regime. However, the US administration showed its reluctance to target the 
Assad regime, even after a serious chemical weapon attack in defiance of US red lines 
and international law, and at the same time emergence of ISIL changed the 
calculations. The US easily managed to build and lead an anti-ISIL coalition with the 




The third aspect of the Obama Doctrine is `ensuring legitimacy for action`. For 
the first episode, unlike Libya, there has never been consensus among UNSC 
members to take any kind of military action against the Assad regime. Even the 
political opposition in Syria opposed outside military intervention at the nascent phase 
of the conflict, which was the case for the Arab League as well. During the second and 
third phases, instead of reaching a consensus to act against Syrian regime, the rift 
between the opposing sides supporting different factions were deepened. It was only 
after the emergence of ISIL that legitimacy for action was a non-issue.  
Finally, the last part of Obama Doctrine refers to `defining a clear mandate and 
specific objectives`. At the nascent phase of the conflict the US administration was 
ambivalent about the objectives, or at least about the means used to make sure 
declared objectives were met. The US administration prioritised a political solution to 
the conflict and publicly put forward removing Assad from the administration as a US 
policy and priority. That presented a contradiction, since the Assad regime was 
reluctant to make concessions and the US was not ready to take action to force Assad 
out of the administration in Syria. Conversely as the ISIL threat emerged, the US 
administration defined clearly the objective to degrade and destroy ISIL. 
In addition to general concerns regarding the cost of intervention, particularly in 
the Middle East considering the complexity of the Syrian conflict and multitude of 
actors involved, the US calculated that a potential military engagement against the 
Syrian regime would incur costs similar to those in the Afghanistan and Iraq 
interventions. So, the US administration did not want to risk depleting limited resources 
through a US commitment to a protracted conflict where limited intervention was 




external support to rebuild the war torn country as it lacked meaningful financial 
resources.  
Another intervening variable, elite perception vis-à-vis the Syrian opposition, 
seemed to be more important in the Syria case for US foreign policy considerations. 
First of all, as the Libyan conflict unfolded, some lessons identified associated with the 
opposition seemed to have impacted upon US calculations pertaining to the Syria 
conflict: overthrowing the regime without keeping sizable boots on the ground in Libya 
led to chaos, where different factions started fighting each other for power; lack of a 
functioning regime and  state institutions resulted in the emergence of ungoverned 
spaces readily exploited by terrorist groups; democratic process does not always lead 
to a preferred composition in government, as the US administration was deeply 
sceptical about the Muslim Brotherhood take over in Libya.  
When it comes to the Syria conflict, which started with the protests on 18th 
March 2011, grassroots political opposition groups had been established before the 
conflict was militarised. Local Coordinating Councils and youth activists at village and 
local level, Revolutionary Councils led by intellectuals and businessmen at city and 
district level, and finally at national level the Syrian National Council constituted the 
political opposition. As an initial response on 29th March 2011, the US administration 
called on Assad to implement the reforms demanded by Syrian people. So in the first 
episode of the Syrian conflict, which lasted until August 2011, the opposition was 
asking for more freedom through government led reforms and lacked military 
capability. The US response was in line with Syrian society`s demands and saw it 
pressure the Assad regime diplomatically and by imposing sanctions. However, in 
response to the regime`s use of conventional weapons against protestors and the 




militarisation, which led to the establishment of the Free Syrian Army in July 2011. 
That was followed by President Obama`s call for Assad to step down, which presented 
a strategic shift in US policy in Syria. That was contrary to what the US previously had 
pursued to reach a political transformation with Assad.  
Several factors concerning the Syrian opposition influenced the position taken 
by the US at the nascent phase of the conflict. Firstly, unlike Libya, the Syrian 
opposition opposed any foreign intervention and sought for a reform through 
negotiation in the beginning of the conflict. Secondly, unlike Libya, where rebel groups 
pledged loyalty to Libyan NTC, in Syria a lack of unified opposition undermined the 
support from the US and the international community. The Syrian National Coalition 
was established 7 months after the protests as the main political opposition in exile on 
2nd October 2011 whereas the Libyan NTC was established two weeks after the initial 
protests. While the majority of Sunnis in Syria supported the opposition, the majority 
of the Alawite, Christian and Druze minority aligned with the Assad regime as they 
feared large scale sectarian violence against minority communities. So, the SNC was 
seen as non-inclusive by the US and international community. Syrian Kurds presented 
a divided posture in their stance against the SNC, the KNC aligned itself with SNC 
while the PYD remained neutral until July 2012 when Syrian security forces 
relinquished control of several towns in the north to PYD. Taking into consideration 
the fact that the minorities in Syria account for 40% of the population, their stance was 
important for US calculations. Thirdly, Syrian armed groups lacked safe heavens, 
unlike Libyan rebel groups who controlled and operated in the eastern Libya. Finally, 
a limited number of Syrian Army defections occurred, compared to en masse 




During the second episode, from August 2011 until November to December 
2012, the political and armed opposition was divided and lacked capability to be able 
to pose a substantial threat to the regime. The SNC failed to gain support from the 
minorities and a cross section of the Syrian society. On the other hand, as the Al Nusra 
Front became the most effective rebel force and because of its potential affiliation to 
AQ at that time, US`s concerns regarding the composition of the Syrian opposition 
increased. The US’s Joint Chief of Staff presented the existence of Al Qaida elements 
among the opposition in Syria in early 2012 as justification for the US decision not to 
arm the opposition. Furthermore, the killing of the US Ambassador to Libya, 
Christopher Stevens, by armed militants in Benghazi with potential AQ connections on 
11th September 2012 reinforced the US’s fear regarding the extremist danger in Syria. 
That resulted in the US administration becoming more cautious about its support to 
the Syrian opposition, which also hindered the ability of moderate elements to become 
more capable and precipitated the situation where extremists gained the upper hand 
on the ground. 
 In the third episode between November and December 2012 and August 2013, 
the Syrian political and armed opposition consolidated their cohesion, however the US 
administration regarded a large portion of the opposition as extremists. That meant 
that the US was reluctant to hand over sophisticated lethal weapons to armed 
opposition, taking into consideration the risk of those weapons falling into the hands 
of extremists groups, particularly the Al Nusra Front, which was designated as a 
terrorist entity by the US administration in December 2012. When ISIL started 
operating in Syria in April 2013 and the conflict increasingly took on a more sectarian 
tone, the foreign fighter issue also became prominent. The concern regarding 




arms depots from moderate opposition groups in the North West of Syria in December 
2013. The US responded to that situation by temporarily suspending lethal and even 
"non-lethal" assistance to the armed opposition.   
 In the fourth episode between August 2013 and June 2014, ISIL and other 
Salafist groups became more prominent among the Syrian opposition. Thus, the US 
administration started seeing the conflict as one between two evils, ISIL and the Syrian 
regime, and saw the Syrian regime as lesser of the two.  That was a significant turning 
point when the US administration`s number one priority in Syria became degrading 
ISIL`s capability and empowering anti-ISIL groups in Syria, primarily the YPG forces.  
Finally, in the fifth episode, ISIL expanded its area of control, which further 
marginalised the moderate opposition. The US started conducting air strikes against 
ISIL in support of PYD/YPG forces as the US administration saw those forces as 
capable and ideologically less dangerous and who could seize and hold territory from 
ISIL. As the Obama Doctrine ruled out deploying US soldiers to the conflict zone in 
combat roles for military intervention purposes, finding viable local actors to serve as 
ground forces was a necessity in Syria in the fight against ISIL. The Obama 
administration provided arms and ammunition to YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF) in North Eastern Syria and also sent special operation forces to train and advise 
those forces. This was something the US administration had been refraining to do 
since the start of the conflict against the Assad regime. 
Lastly, considering US public opinion and the congressional dynamics, strong 
and consistent opposition to any form of US military intervention against the Syrian 
regime crossed party lines in the US. US public support for US military intervention 
against Syrian regime had been persistently very low over the course of the conflict. 




the US administration refrained from militarily involving into the conflict and only chose 
to impose sanctions and to provide limited amounts of non-lethal equipment to vetted 
rebel groups.  Even the 21 August 2013 chemical weapon attack did not alter the low 
trending US public support for military action against the Syrian regime. However, as 
the elimination of Syrian regime chemical weapon stockpile in the aftermath of the 
attacks overlapped with the emergence of ISIL as a substantial threat to  the US and 
the wider regional and international community, the majority of the US public started 
to back decisive military action against ISIL. That was followed by airstrikes against 
ISIL targets and increased funding to train and equip vetted opposition groups with 
lethal weapons to counter ISIL. Even the idea of deploying US ground troops into Syria 
became gradually seen as a more viable option among the US public.  
 The start of the Syrian conflict overlapped with the Libya intervention and the US 
public showed reluctance for concurrent entanglement in Middle East; two thirds of US 
public believed US should take a neutral position in Syria. The second episode of the 
Syrian conflict coincided with the Presidential election year, keeping the administration 
away from taking substantial risks. Increasing mass killings by the Syrian regime only 
led to increasing US public and regional support for enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria, 
which did not gain traction within the administration. The third period was President 
Obama`s first year in his second term, deemed to be the best time for US presidents 
to make major foreign policy decisions. However, the US administration was limited in 
its offering non-lethal aid to selected rebel groups and refrained from enforcing a no-
fly zone or providing lethal weapons to the opposition. Even after the 21st August 2013 
chemical weapon attack, support for US military strikes against the Syrian regime 
among Democratic and Republican Party supporters was relatively low compared to 




than Democrats. For the first time during the Syrian conflict potential US intervention 
was seriously discussed in Congress after the President publicly declared that the US 
would take punitive action in response to the chemical weapon attack. However, 
during the Congressional discussions, bi-partisan concerns were raised for a potential 
US intervention by citing constituents` reluctance. On the top of public reluctance for 
intervention, two significant developments seem to have played a substantial role in 
preventing a direct military action against the Syrian regime: ISIL emerged as a serious 
cross-regional threat in summer 2013; and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani 
assumed office in August 2013, which was perceived as a chance for an Iranian 
nuclear weapon deal. Under those circumstances, after dismantling the majority of 
Syrian chemical weapon capability and stockpile, the US prioritised degrading and 
destroying ISIL in Syria and Iraq and was reluctant to risk Iranian nuclear negotiations 
by taking direct action against Iran and Russia`s closest ally in the region.  
 In the final episode, the US expanded the airstrikes into Syria on 23rd September 
2014, just after the release of videos showing the beheading of US journalists in Syria 
by ISIL. After that incident, US public opinion shifted significantly in favour of US 
airstrikes against ISIL. In late 2015, US public support to sending ground troops 
against ISIL in Syria reached a majority first time, with 53% supporting such a move.  
 
Conclusion  
 In particular, it is more reasonable to compare the first episodes of both conflicts 
in order to understand the dynamics behind US calculations for intervention and non-
intervention.  The Libyan conflict started and evolved quickly before it turned into a 
civil war between the Qaddafi regime and rebels. The protests in Libya started on 15th 




conventional weapons, leading to indiscriminate killings. On 26th February the UN 
Security Council voted unanimously and adopted UNSC Resolution 1970 to impose 
sanctions against the Libyan regime. The Arab League called on the UNSC on 12th 
March 2011 to impose a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians. On 17th March 2011 
the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, which authorized member states to take all 
necessary measures to protect civilians and establish a ban on all flights in the 
airspace. The first US attacks against the Qaddafi regime occurred on 19th March to 
set the conditions for the no-fly zone implementation. As the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference released a statement supporting a no-fly zone over Libya on 8th 
March 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab League called on the 
UNSC to impose a no-fly zone on 8th and 12th March 2011 respectively; UNSC 
Resolution 1973 was endorsed on 17th March 2011 and US public opinion appeared 
to have shifted significantly in favour of limited military involvement. 
President Obama and his administration`s stance with regards to the Syria 
conflict was not so much different, particularly at the nascent phase of the conflict. A 
day before the US-led intervention started in Libya, large-scale demonstrations took 
place in Syria on 18th March 2011 against the government. However, contrary to the 
Qaddafi regime, the Syrian regime espoused a more conciliatory strategy to subside 
the protests by pledging political reform. The Assad regime passed a law on 20 April 
2011 to lift the emergency law that had suspended most constitutional protections for 
almost four decades. However, the regime stopped short of making substantial 
changes to allow a broader cross section of the society to have a level playing field in 
political and economic domain and, in response, the protests continued and gradually 
grew. After the crush of protests in Hama in July 2011 with tanks by Syrian regime 




with call for Assad to step down. Unlike the Libya case, Russia opposed any sanctions 
against the Syrian regime and even the political opposition in Syria and the Arab 
League opposed outside military intervention at the nascent phase of the conflict. So, 
the lack of support for US intervention from within the Syrian opposition, Arab countries 
and the Russia-Iran block was a significant difference between Libya and Syria cases.  
Overall, different elements of the causal chain between two cases identified and 
outlined below are believed to have had an impact on US foreign policy choices with 
regards to Libya and Syria.  
 The Syria conflict started at a time when the US, together with western and 
regional allies, initiated the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya. The US 
administration and public was not ready for multiple engagements in the Middle East 
and North Africa. Thus, during the first 4 months of the Syrian conflict the US, along 
with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, had been in dialog with the Syrian regime to push for a 
diplomatic solution to the unfolding conflict, since the regime promised to reform while 
the Qaddafi regime severed all ties with the rest of the world in a very short time, 
leaving no prospect for reform. 
 The Syria uprising was seen by the US administration more of a case of 
retribution and sectarian struggle aiming to end a minority regime, whereas the Libyan 
uprising was perceived as a Libyan society`s struggle for democracy. While a broad 
cross-section of the Libyan society supported the revolution against the Qaddafi 
regime, it was mostly the case that the Sunnis in Syria supported the Syrian opposition 
and the majority of Alawite, Christian and Druze minority aligned with the Assad 
regime. Additionally, the Kurds presented a fractured stance against the opposition, 
which in drifted closer to the Assad regime for practical reasons that served their 




 The political and armed opposition in Libya rallied behind the National 
Transitional Council, which gained acceptance from the broad cross-section of the 
society to topple the Qaddafi regime at the early stages of the conflict, while in Syria it 
took a while to pull together political and armed opposition groups and it did not last 
long before they had major disagreements. The initial aim in Syria was the reform of 
Assad regime rather than directly toppling it. 
 Whereas the Libyan regime was isolated, the Syrian regime has been decisively 
supported economically, politically, and militarily since the start of the conflict, mainly 
by Iran and Russia. The US considered the extreme complexity of a potential 
intervention in Syria, given Iranian and Russian support.  
 The UK and France were ready to act against Libya, as they felt their key 
interests were at stake. Even if the US had resisted the intervention, these two 
countries seem to have planned to target the Libyan regime. In addition to a lack of 
similar commitment from other EU partners during the course of the Syrian conflict, 
international and regional consensus has not been reached for enforcing a no fly zone 
in Syria or taking any kind of military action against the Syrian regime. 
 Unlike Libya, there has not been consensus among UNSC members to take any 
kind of military action against the Assad regime and, even at the nascent phase of the 
conflict, the political opposition in Syria also opposed outside military intervention. 
 The impact of energy related issues were negligible in the Syria case, whereas 
the impact of a protracted conflict in Libya on energy security and the stability of oil 
prices was important for the US and the EU. 
 The EU felt directly threatened by developments in Libya, whereas in the Syria 




threat, the Syria conflict was not seen as a direct threat to EU and, to an extent, the 
US.  
 The estimated cost of Libyan intervention was extremely low compared to a 
potential US involvement in Syria against the Syrian regime, as Iran and Russia were 
ready to back the regime and inflict additional costs on potential US involvement. In 
addition, the Libyan regime had its own financial resources to rebuild the country in 
the post-conflict era; this was missing in Syria.  
 The rebels captured and consolidated their power in the eastern part of Libya, 
which allowed them to operate and coordinate their efforts against the regime in the 
West. That kind of geographical separation did not happen in Syria.  
 A limited intervention in Libya was seen as risk free and easy to accomplish at 
low cost. However, the convoluted nature of the Syrian conflict and the complexity of 
alliances at global, regional and local level brought about too many risks for the US. 
 The vast majority of the US public, both Republicans and Democrats, opposed 
military action against the Syrian regime, whereas in the Libya case the Republicans 
were staunch advocates of a no-fly zone and further air strikes targeting the Qaddafi 
regime. Overall, US public support for military intervention against the Syrian regime 
was consistently much lower than that of Libya. 
 Potential spill over effects of the Syrian conflict on the region, particularly to 
Jordan, Lebanon and Israel, were much more significant compared to limited impact 
of the Libya conflict to those and other US allies in the region. On the other hand, the 





 In Libya, the extremist threat, particularly that posed by AQ and ISIL, became 
more of an issue after the intervention and once the regime was toppled. In Syria, the 
protracted conflict and lack of decisive intervention and support to moderate groups 
brought about a conducive environment for ungoverned spaces, easy flow of fighters 
and weapons which led to the emergence of AQ and ISIL affiliated groups, who seized 
large swaths of territory and undermined the credibility of the moderate groups.  
 The US had to take into consideration other regional priorities while dealing with 
Syria, such as preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon development program and its 
relations with Russia, since it was part of P5+1 initiative, while in Libya Iran and Russia 
had limited leverage. 
 Unlike Libya, where en masse defections in the eastern part of the country took 
place, only a limited number of Syrian Army defections were observed. Furthermore, 
a lack of safe heavens similar to those the Libyan rebels controlled and operated from 
in the eastern part of the country rendered Syrian rebel`s struggle more difficult.  
 Even at the early stages of the conflict, potential AQ affiliated groups` gaining 
more influence among the Syrian armed opposition groups was a source of significant 
concern, whereas this issue only became more of an issue in Libya after the killing of 
US Ambassador by potentially AQ affiliated groups on the anniversary of 9/11 attacks. 
 In-fighting among the rebel groups took place after the Qaddafi regime was 
toppled in Libya, while in Syria that started at an early stage in the absence of direct 
military intervention.  
 Finally, within the Syria case itself, the first episode can be characterised by its 
‘wait and see’ nature from the US perspective as the Assad regime pledged to reform 




change. The second and, in particular, third period that ended with the chemical 
weapon attack presented an opportunity for the US to use different means of military-
intervention against the Syrian regime, which was thwarted for the reasons explained 
above. Finally, during the fourth and fifth episodes of the Syrian conflict, the ISIL threat 
emerged and all US priorities shifted towards extremist threat, leading to the military-
intervention. The US was compelled to accept the continuation of Assad regime, since 






Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
The central and overarching question this PhD sought to address was `what are 
the dynamics behind the US foreign policy choices vis-à-vis Libya and Syria 
internationalised intra-state conflicts?` and, more specifically, `what were the 
components of the processes that led to the selection of different set of elements from 
the intervention spectrum at different time and scales during the Libya and Syria 
conflicts`. In order to address the research question, NCR was employed as the 
theoretical framework, incorporating independent variables (in the form of threats to 
US interests vis-à-vis Libya and Syria conflicts) and intervening variables (in the form 
of elite Ideology/the Obama Doctrine, US economic constraints, US elite perception of 
the opposition in Libya and Syria, Congressional dynamics and public opinion) at the 
system and unit level respectively. The variation in the dependent variable, which 
represents US foreign policy choices or outcomes, is broken down to non-intervention, 
non-military intervention and military intervention with specific sub elements.  
In order to test the rigor and explanatory power of the theoretical framework, the 
following hypothesis were identified:  
 
     H1:  The US FPE take a decision to intervene militarily first and foremost in 
response to substantial threats to US interests representing the expected 
option for the US. 
     H2:  Domestic constraints (intervening variables) influence the form, timing, and 
scope of the intervention, and the rationale behind the deviation from 






To test NCR theory, in the previous chapters NCR and the expected outcome of 
the theory was explained and, finally, the cases were explored to uncover any 
congruence between expectation and observation is present. The neorealist driven 
optimal or expected outcomes (i.e. an increased level of intervention as the threat 
increases) are anticipated, to be conditioned by the intervening variables or, 
alternatively, if the optimal or expected foreign policy decisions are not adhered to, 
then the intervening variables should be able to explain the rationale behind the 
deflection.  
The research has contributed to the development of NCR as a theory of foreign 
policy analysis by thoroughly applying it to two case studies. The analytical 
examination of these cases reveals the fact that pure neorealism fall short of 
explaining US foreign policy in both Libya and Syria. US security interests in Libya, 
along with a commitment for `values` and `upholding international norms`, resulted in 
a `high` US FPE threat perception and, in line with the expectation, US FPE decided 
to militarily intervene against the Qaddafi regime. So, the neorealist explanation, 
focusing on national interest and threats to those interests explain is in congruence 
with observed foreign policy decisions. Therefore, it is safe to argue that H1 holds for 
Libya case.   
However, testing for type 1 Congruence (comparison to typical values) between 
expected and observed foreign policy decisions requires conformity of both cases for 
the theory to be valid. So, pure neorealism needs to explain the non-intervention in 
Syria; H1 could only be confirmed if there were lower US threat perceptions in Syria 
compared to Libya. The analytical examination suggests that US threat perceptions 
were in fact at high and very high levels in Syria. The incongruence between expected 




and Syria cases proves the deficiency of neorealism as a theory of foreign policy 
analysis. This, in turn, gives NCR the opportunity to fill the analytical gap by 
incorporating intervening variables.  
The expected US response in Syrian conflict during the first three phases of the 
conflict was to target Assad regime through both military and non-military means. 
However, contrary to neorealist expectations, the US stopped short of decisively 
engaging against the Assad, thus regime disconfirming H1. Even in the fourth period, 
which overlapped with the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime and the 
emergence and empowerment of a trans-regional extremist threat, the US refrained 
from taking decisive action against both the Assad regime and extremist groups, even 
though they posed a substantial (very high) threat to US interests. Instead, the US 
prioritised eliminating Syria`s chemical weapons stockpile and supporting PYD and 
YPG forces in their confrontations with ISIL. The first US airstrikes against ISIL took 
place in the fifth episode, on 23rd September 2014, and from that point on the US 
concentrated all its efforts on fighting against ISIL, which it deemed to be an existential 
threat to US interests. Nevertheless, the US refrained from sending US troops to the 
region in a combat role, which would increase the chance of defeating ISIL in a shorter 
time span. Instead, the US targeted ISIL and AQ positions through air strikes in support 
of PYD/YPG led Syrian Democratic Forces operations. As the threat posed by ISIL to 
US interests was very high, the neorealist expectation was an all-out war against ISIL, 
including boots on the ground.  
It appears then that in all five episodes of the Syrian conflict the US stopped short 
of meeting neorealist expectations. While the threats to US interests in the Syrian case 
were all high and very high, direct military action against the Syrian regime did not 




neoclassical realist explanations, to clarify the reasons for the deviation from neorealist 
expectations.   
Whether the analytical gap could be sufficiently filled by an NCR perspective has 
been tested by analysing how the intervening variables affected the US foreign policy 
choices and the extent to which they could explain the deviation from expected foreign 
policy choices (H2).  
In the Libya case, President Obama`s decision for military intervention was 
predominantly framed by the threat posed to core US interests. However, the Obama 
Doctrine seemed to have influenced the form and the scope of the intervention. 
President Obama ruled out unilateral intervention without a UN mandate and opted for 
a multinational force to share responsibility and costs. The primary motivation was 
shying away from putting boots on the ground to prevent a highly probable knock on 
effect of a long-term US commitment in Libya. Even after the Qaddafi regime was 
toppled, the US and international community refrained from assigning peace keeping 
force in Libya, which was a necessity for creating the conditions for lasting `positive 
peace`. 
While the intervention or non-intervention decision in Libya was not made by 
solely considering economic constraints, the financial cost of intervention seemed to 
have factored in tailoring less costly intervention options like air strikes in support of 
local proxies. The US preferred to be part of a coalition effort to enforce a no-fly zone 
in Libya and, without putting any US troops in combat role in Libya, the US 
administration refrained from any costly nation-building effort.  
While the Obama Doctrine framed the way the Obama administration 
implemented its intervention strategy, the capabilities of the opposition groups and 




operationally supported rebel groups in Libya to tilt the balance against the Qaddafi 
regime, however a constant scepticism regarding extremist connection of some 
groups within Libyan rebels limited the means used by US in supporting the rebels 
and the scale of support provided. The fear was that once Qaddafi was gone, rebels 
could turn against the US.  
Public support for military intervention in Libya was low before the intervention. 
However, low-risk limited military intervention with no boots on the ground in combat 
role and Republican support for enforcing no-fly zone urged Obama to disregard 
reluctant public opinion. While the public and Congress became supportive of a limited 
intervention to impose a no-fly zone, strong US public opinion against providing heavy 
weaponry to rebels and sending US ground troops into Libya determined the 
boundaries of the intervention strategy in Libya.  
We can conclude that the intervention decision for Libya was predominantly 
taken out of US strategic interests and threats to those interests (H1), and that the 
intervening variables influenced and limited the scope of the military intervention (H2). 
This confirms both hypotheses.  
The analytic examination of five distinct episodes of the Syrian conflict (i.e. 
multiple within-case comparisons) helped to check whether Type 2 Congruence holds 
among episodes. For the Syria case, during the first three episodes of the conflict the 
US did not intervene militarily, even though US interests and values were seriously 
threatened by the Syrian regime and the ongoing civil conflict,. The principle tenets of 
the Obama Doctrine seemed to have played an important role in making decisions 
regarding Syria. The lack of broad international support for military action against the 
Syrian regime, the potential risk of a long term US commitment in Syria and concerns 




`retrenchment` and `accommodating rivalries` principles respectively played a 
significant role.  In the beginning of the fourth episode, just after the Syrian chemical 
weapon attack, the US struck a deal with Russia to eliminate Syria`s chemical weapon 
stockpile and used the threat of force as a last resort, in line with the Obama Doctrine. 
Again, the motivation was to avoid an all-out war against the Syrian regime 
(retrenchment) and to avoid provoking Russia and Iran (accommodating rivalries). 
However, as ISIL posed a direct threat to the region and US interests in the fourth and 
the fifth episode, the US decided to take direct military action. This decision was 
facilitated by increased international support for action and a readiness to share the 
responsibility and the cost of burden with regional and Western allies. The US first and 
foremost increased its efforts in empowering local forces in their fight against ISIL. 
However, even after the beheading of two American journalists and the impending 
massacre of Syrian Kurds on the Turkish-Syrian border by ISIL, the US military 
response was limited. Obama clearly opposed sending American combat forces into 
Syria and crafted a long term struggle against ISIL by expanding airstrikes into ISIL 
targets in Syria with allies.  
From the economic constraints perspective, President Obama feared that the 
complex nature of the Syrian conflict would drag the US into a quagmire which would 
be even more costly than Afghanistan and Iraq and which would thus deplete 
resources that could be spend for at home. Even after the ISIL threat, the US stuck to 
less costly intervention options such as air strikes and providing training, weapons and 
close air support to vetted rebel groups fighting against ISIL. From that perspective, 





With regards to perceptions regarding the opposition in Syria, in the first episode 
of the Syrian conflict by August 2011, the opposition was politically aspiring to force 
the Assad regime to reform and pursued mainly a peaceful political agenda, rejected 
the idea of external intervention, and lacked organised military capability. The US and 
regional allies also prioritised pressuring the Assad regime for reform through 
sanctions.  During the second episode that lasted until November and December 
2012, while Obama administration took a firm stance against the Assad regime, the 
means wielded against the Assad regime were not commensurate with the idea of 
tilting the balance in favour of moderate opposition groups.  A lack of central leadership 
and infighting among political and armed opposition groups were the primary 
deficiencies that negatively influenced the overall capability and capacity of the FSA 
to become a viable actor. Ideologically, the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
FSA and some extremist elements were source of concern for the US administration. 
Furthermore, the Al Nusra Front emerged as the most effective rebel force dedicated 
to toppling the Assad regime, and started attracting foreign fighters and external 
support from regional countries. That complicated the picture for the US even further. 
The US administration urged constraint before supporting any Syrian opposition 
groups. In the third episode, which ended in August 2013, the Assad regime was 
supported by Hezbollah, Iranian forces and some other Shia elements from Iraq. Due 
to the emerging threat, the political and armed opposition in Syria consolidated their 
cohesion in that time frame. The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces was establishment to embrace all segments of society and to 
consolidate its authority over Supreme Military Council. However, constant scepticism, 
similar that which the US administration had in Libya, prevented the US taking decisive 




providing the most needed heavy weapons like anti-tank and aircraft missiles to the 
Syrian opposition, which would have significantly helped change the balance of power 
on the ground and stop the Assad regime targeting civilians and opposition groups. 
The US limited its support to non-lethal aid, including food, medicine, and training 
assistance through the SMC of the FSA. The fourth period in the Syrian conflict was 
the most significant period with regards to threats the emerged, both from the Assad 
regime and the ISIL. The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime in August 
2013 on one hand and the rise of the threat from ISIL and other Salafist groups on the 
other made it difficult for the US administration to take decisive action against both. 
The US prioritised empowering anti-ISIL groups, primarily PYD and YPG forces, which 
were exclusively focused on fighting against ISIL to protect the area under their 
control. The group had a secular mind-set, which was also seen as a panacea against 
the growing clout of the religiously oriented and extremist groups in Syria. Finally, the 
fifth episode was marked by the steadfast expansion of ISIL and further 
marginalisation of the moderate opposition. As PYD/YPG forces pushed ISIL back and 
seized territory, the US sustained air strikes in support of PY and /YPG led Syrian 
Democratic Forces.  
So, in the first episode of the conflict, the political nature of the opposition in Syria 
rendered any military intervention unnecessary and as the conflict turned into a military 
confrontation in the second episode, the US urged constraint to support the opposition, 
which lacked cohesion and capacity to represent a viable alternative to the regime. 
The suspicion surrounding the ideological composition of the opposition was 
deepened at the third stage, as the extremist groups became more powerful and 
attracted significant numbers of fighters and funds. In the fourth episode, the rise of 




and YPG forces fighting against ISIL and, finally, as ISIL directly threatened US 
interests, the US directed US and coalition air power against ISIL targets along with 
supporting the PYD and YPG led Syrian Democratic Forces.  
From the perspective of public opinion and Congressional dynamics, since the 
outset of the conflict to the end of the fifth term, the US public and the majority of the 
US Congress across party lines espoused a non-interventionist approach towards the 
Syrian regime. Even the use of chemical weapons by the regime did not shift the public 
opinion towards military action. Furthermore, as of early 2012, the Libya intervention 
was seen as a failure and this perception seemed to have influenced US public opinion 
against intervention in Syria. However, as ISIL emerged as a serious threat to the US 
interests regionally and globally, public opinion rapidly changed in favour of 
intervention against ISIL, which was followed by airstrikes and increased funding to 
train and equip vetted opposition fighters to counter ISIL. The US public even started 
to support the idea of sending ground troops to Syria in a combat role to counter the 
ISIL threat.  
In conclusion, the intervening variables in general and particularly the Obama 
Doctrine and the perception regarding the opposition in Syria seemed to have affected 
the form and the scope of the intervention options chosen by the US administration 
and the intervening variables sufficiently explain the analytical gap left unfilled by the 
neorealist perspective. This means that NCR is a viable theory for foreign policy 





With regards to the distinct interpretation of NCR, the Libya case confirms the 
semi-orthodox interpretation of NCR, which considers external drivers as the primary 
driver of intervention decisions and domestic constraints as a secondary influence in 
determining the form and the scale of intervention. The US response to Syria confirms 
the orthodox interpretation of NCR, which posits that domestic constraints interfere 
when states diverge from the incentives of the international system. 
  As a conclusion, NCR has proven to be a comprehensive theoretical 
framework to understand the rationale behind the suboptimal foreign policy choices of 
a state in a way that deviates from neorealist premises. The analytical results also 
reinforce the idea that it is problematic to explain foreign policy decisions exclusively 
from the perspective of a balance against power or threat without considering the 
impact of intervening variables.  
There are two main strands in NCR with regards to their choices of independent 
variable, the original version (coined by Gideon Rose), which employs `relative 
material power and position of a state in international system` and a revised version, 
tailored for military intervention decisions, (coined by Colin Dueck) which starts the 
analysis by looking at national interests and associated threats to those interests. 
Initially, this research started the analysis of the cases by employing `balance of 
power` as an independent variable, however it was problematic to establish the basic 
parameters of the US`s foreign policy decisions from the perspective of pure balance 
of power at regional or global level in conjunction with the Libya and Syria cases. On 
the other hand, Colin Dueck`s framework proved useful to analyse and establish 
optimal and expected intervention decisions and was subsequently used as a 




 Analysing the cases by employing process tracing techniques also helped 
identify different elements of the causal chain between the cases and within the Syria 
case at the five distinct episodes that led to particular foreign policy outcomes. The 
use of the congruence methodology to test theory was also a powerful tool as it was 
employed in conjunction with the process tracing and thus provided insight with 
regards to observed foreign policy outcomes.  
 As to the enquiry about whether NCR is a distinct theory in itself or a logical 
extension of neorealism, the results of this research suggest that NCR is a theory of 
foreign policy analysis employed to explain foreign policies of individual states and to 
identify the combination of relevant factors of particular case, as opposed to 
international relations theory which aim to explain the whole system in which states 
operate. The research also reinforces the importance of political leaders and elite 
interpretation and perception of national interests and threats to those interests, 
through which systemic incentives and constraints are filtered. 
 
Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 NCR`s parsimony is limited to the selection of a set of intervening variables, 
which cannot account for every aspect of the underlying dynamics behind foreign 
policy. However, a balance needs to be struck to have a solid ground for the 
generalizability of the findings. From the perspective of Alexander L. George`s 
"building block" approach (George, 1985), future research may focus on other cases 
of US intervention or the interventions of other powers in these and other cases with 
a similar theoretical and analytic perspective. This will contribute to establishing 
generalizations on the phenomenon of the internationalization of intrastate conflicts.  




administrations vis-à-vis Libya and Syria conflicts can enrich the analytical baseline 
and allow for further inferences about the applicability of NCR in foreign policy 
analysis.  
 As to the methodological limitations, it was problematic to reach and conduct 
interviews with the US Foreign Policy Executives, including Libyan and Syrian 
ambassadors, who should have played an important role in shaping and executing US 
foreign policy choices in the two conflicts. This limitation was partially mitigated by the 
use of primary sources, such as Presidential Speeches, Congressional testimony of 
the US Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence and top Generals, memoirs of key 
Foreign Policy Executives and speeches of former ambassadors. Nevertheless, the 
thesis would be analytically more powerful if it was possible to get to the FPE`s 
perceptions and thoughts about the dynamics that are missing from first-hand 
accounts. On the other hand, talking to the decision-makers themselves is not 
necessarily unproblematic, as they bring their own biases and agendas.  
 In future research, U.S. strategic interests need to be redefined and new 
variables measuring this concept need to be found as those interests are adjusted on 
the basis of a changing world and changing leadership perceptions.  
 Analytically, future research may also include the rise of ISIL in Libya, the 
associated US response, and Russian military build-up in Syria and its consequences. 
In particular, the post Arab Spring second civil war in Libya that started in 2014 among 
rival factions seeking political power and territory requires further analysis.  
The impact of different intervention strategies on post-conflict state building and 
reconstruction efforts can be explored more in detail to establish sustainable peace 





The US Foreign Policy of Tomorrow   
 The theoretical framework and the empirical findings of the thesis allow for some 
predictions with regard to US foreign policy choices pertaining to emerging conflicts in 
the Middle East and North Africa.  
 A cross party consensus to limit the US`s direct military involvement in Middle 
East and Africa, which was deeply supported by the US public, seems to prevail 
regardless of the administration in the near future. However, persistent restrained 
approaches when core US security interests and values are threatened will highly 
likely undermine US global standing vis-à-vis regional and global rivals.  
 While the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences led to a more cautious US policy 
with regards to nation building efforts with huge numbers of combatant forces on the 
ground, the Libya and Syria intra-state conflicts will compel the US to decisively tackle 
the root causes of the future conflicts and not to create power vacuums for terrorist 
groups before weakening or toppling autocratic regimes. 
 The US struggle to diminish cross national and cross regional terrorism and the 
WMD threat in the Middle East and North Africa will continue to be a priority for US 
security considerations. Besides, a proliferation of the terrorist threat in the region 
targeting US interests will highly likely compel the US to reconsider long term alliance 
structures and rivalries in the region, starting with its stance against Iran. The US might 
reconsider its long-lasting pro-Sunni stance in the region and eventually Iran could 
potentially be a partner in the fight against AQ and ISIL affiliated groups. 
 The areas where ISIL holds territory, such as Libya, are highly likely be subject 
to similar military intervention by US-led coalition to that in Syria and Iraq, beyond the 




 As the US is reluctant to use its own troops on the ground in a combat role, the 
US will depend more on local proxies, which in turn will constrain US policies in 
conflicts in the near future. A strategy of non-military intervention also could be costly 
for the US, as this might undermine the US`s ability to influence the course of the 
conflicts, resulting in numerous threats growing and spilling over internationally. 
 Finally, while the Libya intervention revealed the fact that intervention does not 
always end civil wars or resolve deep rooted factional differences, it signified the utility 
of the R2P norm to mitigate violence against civilians. However, the lack of a sustained 
and credible US commitment in Syria, where all the necessary preconditions for R2P 
had been met, undermined potential R2P applications by the US in the future.  
 In the long run, the US administration`s deflection away from optimal intervention 
strategies might encourage regional and global rivals to fill the void and harm US 
interests. The Syrian Kurds gained significant political power and they have built up a 
considerable military that has been supported by the US. Pro-US PYD and YPG in 
Syria will aim to carve out a second Kurdish autonomous zone in the Middle East, 
which will have further complications. 
 Overall the US will highly likely have to deal with the outcomes of both Libya and 
Syria conflicts in the long term. The strained relations between rival political and 
military factions in Libya on the one hand and the ISIL threat on the other will urge the 
US to commit more resources to address the problems. For the Syria conflict, the 
growing influence of Russia, along with Iran in the Middle East, further destabilisation 
of Syria, which reinforce the notion that a divided Syria could be a viable option, the 
Kurds emerging as an influential actor in the Middle East, and the increased tone of 
sectarianism and infighting in Middle east will be the main contentious issues for US 






Appendix 1 Interview Questions 
Question 1:  
Why do you think US responded differently in the Libya and Syria conflicts?  
Question 2: 
How do you think regional and global balance of power and balance of influence 
considerations affected US decisions for Libya and Syria against the backdrop of the 
rapid collapse of the pro-western Tunisian and Egyptian Governments in early 2011? 
Question 3: 
What were the US interests in Libya and Syria that were at stake before and during 
Arab Spring uprisings? 
Question 4:  
How do you think US economic constraints affected the way the US intervened into 
Libya and Syria conflicts? 
Question 5:  
How do you think the Obama Doctrine factored in the US decision for intervention 
(Bearing in mind the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences)? 
Question 6:  
How do you think the US elite perceived the Libyan and Syrian regime and their 
oppositions (from the outset of the conflict in 2011 until NATO operations ended in 
Libya in September 2013 and just after the Chemical weapon attack in Syria) and the 





How do you think Congressional dynamics and public opinion affected US elites` 
decisions for Libya and Syria intervention? 
Question 8 
How would you prioritise the importance of variables (independent and intervening 
variables) or the sequencing of variables that led to a particular foreign policy choices 





Appendix 2 Revised Interview Questions 
Question 1:  
Why do you think US responded differently in the Libya and Syria conflicts?  
Question 2: 
What were the US interests in Libya and Syria that were at stake before and during 
Arab Spring uprisings? What kind of foreign policy choices (intervention strategies) did 
US interests (security, prosperity, values, and upholding international norms) dictate 
in Libya and Syria?  
Question 3:   
How do you think US economic constraints affected the way US intervened in Libya 
and Syria? 
Question 4:  
How do you think Obama Doctrine factored in the US decision for intervention? 
Question 5:  
How do you think the US elite perceived the Libyan and Syrian opposition and how 
did this influenced the way the US responded? 
Question 6: 
How do you think Congressional dynamics and public opinion effected US elites` 





Appendix 3 Interviewee List 
 





1 Dr. Zenonas Tziarras University of Nicosia, Cyprus Cypriot Skype 15-May-15
2 NATO Analyst Africa  SME USA Face to face 09-Jul-15
3 NATO Analyst Middle East SME USA face to face 10-Jul-15
4 NATO Analyst Libya and Africa SME USA Face to face 27-Aug-15
5 Ex-Diplomat, PhD Student University of Birmingham-Syria SME Syria face to face 04-Sep-15
6 Jason Pack
Researcher of Libyan History in 
Cambridge University and President 
of LibyaAnalysis.com USA Skype 01-Oct-15
7 NATO Analyst Middle East SME USA Skype 17-Oct-15
8
US Defense Intelligence 
Officer for the Middle East 
and North Africa Middle East SME USA Skype 06-Nov-15
9 Thomas Juneau University of Ottowa Canada Skype 07-Apr-16
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